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“One doesn’t discover new  lands  without  consenting to lose sight  of  the shore  (..)” 
André Gide  
I started studying economics because I wanted to change the world. Economics was bad, 
economists were evil and I was going to be brave and face it all. When I graduated, I re-
alized I had not learned much about economics. In fearing to lose sight of the shore, I 
had clung to my old beliefs, and failed to learn anything new.  
Since I was not sure how to change the world either, I started to work as an environ-
mental economist at the Institute for Integrated Water Management and Waste-Water 
Treatment (RIZA) of the Dutch ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Man-
agement (V&W). It was there that I really started to discover economics, not in the least 
because of the post-graduate courses I was allowed to take. Prof. Gunning of the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam opened my eyes to the empirical relevance of economics and 
Prof. Burgess at the London School of Economics made economics look exciting and 
down-to-earth again. 
Although working on Dutch water management was interesting enough, water issues in 
the rest of the world seemed more urgent and I wondered whether there would be any-
thing I could do. Also, despite the course-work and the experience gained, I felt limited 
in my capabilities as an economist and in my analytical capacity to deal with the com-
plex reality of natural resource management. Hence, when I got the opportunity to work 
in India at the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and was offered the 
possibility to combine work with PhD research, this seemed a once in a lifetime chance 
to deepen my knowledge and figure out what I could do. Max, my partner, quit his job as 
a lawyer, and off we went, to discover new lands.  
It was not always easy, losing sight of the well-known shore, but the new lands we dis-
covered made all efforts disappear. Living in India broadened our horizon in every pos-
sible way and the opportunity to conduct PhD research proved inspiring and made it pos-
sible to discover new lands within. However, in both cases, merely losing sight of the 
shore was not sufficient to discover new lands. The friends we made in India, the col-
leagues, neighbours, NGO partners, respondents, all patiently taught us how, and where, 
to look. Also, my supervisors provided important guidance, in teaching me to remain fo-
cused on what I was trying to do. Still, discovering new lands also requires an inner 
sense of direction and a trust that one is not left to drown. In this, I have been blessed 
with a partner, Max Haan, who makes me feel that the shore is always near, and parents, 
Johan and Marianne Bouma-Wiebols, who raised me with a sense of direction that has 
always helped me find my way. Since it is my father who inspired me to start this jour-
ney in the first place, I dedicate this dissertation to him. It is he who taught me science 
can have a real impact and that, one day, it might actually help to change the world.     Acknowledgements 
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1. Introduction 
The main question of this dissertation is whether individual agents can be expected to 
voluntarily contribute to the provision of a semi-public good. The characteristic of a 
public good being that a) consumption is non-rival and b) individuals cannot be ex-
cluded from enjoying the benefits of provision, individual agents have an incentive to 
under invest and free ride on the contributions by others (Starrett 2003). This reduces 
welfare, as each agent contributes less than the socially optimal amount. Although 
semi-public goods differ from pure public goods in that there is rivalry in consump-
tion, without control of free rider behaviour an optimal level of semi-public good 
provision is still unlikely to be reached.  
Traditionally, economists assumed that to ensure an optimal level  of semi-public 
good provision, government coordination, or even provision, was required. The lit-
erature on common property resource management suggests however that under cer-
tain conditions groups of individuals, or communities, can effectively control free 
rider behaviour as well (Ostrom et al. 2002, Baland and Platteau 1996). Community 
management has an advantage over government management in that the costs to con-
trol free rider behaviour are usually lower (Bowles 2005). Besides, by decentralizing 
semi-public good provision to the community level, local requirements and needs are 
often also better addressed. Communities do not necessarily take care of all their 
members however, and decentralizing semi-public good provision might result in the 
social exclusion of certain groups (Bowles and Gintis 2002). Also, community man-
agement is not always possible as it requires that certain conditions are met (Ostrom 
1990). If these conditions are not satisfied, government coordination might still be 
needed  to  ensure  that  a  socially  optimal  level  of  semi-public  goods  provision  is 
reached.  
This dissertation analyzes whether households in India’s semi-arid regions are likely 
to voluntarily cooperate in the maintenance of soil and water conservation (SWC) 
investments. SWC investments have important public good externalities in that up-
stream investments generally affect users downstream. Typically, SWC investments 
consist of small dams, earthen bunds, trenches and village ponds with the aim to re-
duce the speed of surface water run off and allow for more of the rainfall to be lo-
cally absorbed. Although some of the benefits of SWC are private (for example, in-
creased soil moisture or reduced soil erosion on private land) an important part of the 
benefits of SWC tends to be shared (for example, recharged groundwater aquifers 
and better quality common land).    Chapter 1   
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The government of India, together with a large number of non-governmental organi-
zations (NGO’s), heavily subsidizes SWC investment under the program of partici-
patory watershed development (WSD). To optimize returns, investments are planned 
at the scale of the micro-watershed (500-1000 ha) and implemented at the village 
scale. The main objective of the WSD program is to increase agricultural productiv-
ity and alleviate poverty. The WSD program is one of the main programs for rural 
development in India’s semi-arid regions with an annual budget of approximately 
USD 500 million USD (GOI 2000). Households contribute 0-25% of the investment 
costs in voluntary labour, but with project wages above the market wage investments 
are effectively subsidized for over 100% (Kerr et al. 2002, Shah 2005).  
To stimulate household cooperation in SWC management, the WSD program also 
invests in community organization and local institution building, and has villagers 
participate in project planning and implementation from the start. Although several 
studies have indicated that community participation increases WSD project effec-
tiveness (Kerr et al. 2002, Ratna Reddy et al. 2004), the longer-term impacts on 
community SWC management have hardly been addressed. There are indications 
however that SWC maintenance is lacking (Kerr et al. 2002, ODI et al. 2002) but 
whether this is caused by over subsidization, poor project implementation or lack of 
incentives for voluntary cooperation has not yet been assessed systematically. Since 
without maintenance, SWC investments are not effective because agricultural pro-
ductivity is not structurally improved, it seems important to better understand the fac-
tors that determine the households’ willingness to voluntarily contribute to the main-
tenance of semi-public SWC.  
The question whether households can be expected to voluntarily contribute to SWC 
maintenance seems relevant to more than those interested in India’s WSD program 
alone. Globally, local communities are being made responsible for the management 
of roads, irrigation and sanitation infrastructure, water supply and schools (for an 
overview see for example Mansuri and Rao 2004). Community-based projects have 
become  one  of  the  fastest  growing  mechanisms  of  development  assistance,  the 
Worldbank’s portfolio alone being estimates at USD 7 billion (Mansuri and Rao 
2004).  Evidence of whether communities are successful in managing semi-public 
structures  is  scarce,  however,  and  little  is  known  as  to  how  the effectiveness  of 
community-based approaches might be improved (Khwaja 2004, Mansuri and Rao 
2004).  
This dissertation aims to analyze the incentives for voluntary cooperation in semi-
public good provision and to assess whether investments in community organization 
are likely to improve project effectiveness in the long run. In the next paragraph I re-
view some of the literature on common property resource management to explore the 
conditions for successful community resource management. In the remaining part of 
the chapter I define the objectives and research hypothesis of this dissertation.  Introduction       
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1.1 A short review of the literature  
The literature on common property resource management distinguishes four factors 
that help determine whether communities are likely to successfully manage collec-
tive and semi-public goods (Ostrom 1990, Baland and Platteau 1996,Wade 1988, 
Agarwal 2001) i) resource system characteristics, ii) the external environment, iii) 
user group characteristics and iv) institutional arrangements. In the following, I will 
shortly address each factor, reviewing the literature and elaborating its meaning for 
the analysis of community-based SWC.  
The  first  factor,  resource  system  characteristics,  determines  the  extent  to  which 
communities can successfully assign and enforce informal user rights. If the bounda-
ries of the collective resource exceed the boundaries of the community, the commu-
nity cannot internalize all externalities and free rider behaviour is more difficult to 
control.  For  example,  if  the  boundaries  of  an  aquifer  correspond  to  the  village 
boundaries the village can decide on a set of rules to manage its use. However, if a 
neighbouring village also has access to the aquifer, management already becomes 
more complicated and free rider behaviour is less easily controlled (Dasgupta 1982). 
Resource system characteristics also affect resource management in influencing the 
costs of control. For example, grass cutting is easier to monitor than groundwater ex-
traction. If the costs of monitoring and control are high, then community resource 
management is less likely to be successful since informal user rights cannot be effec-
tively enforced (Baland and Platteau 1996).  
In the case of SWC, the boundaries of the resource system tend to exceed the com-
munity boundaries. Whereas investments in soil conservation have important on-site 
benefits, investments in rainwater harvesting generate most of their impact down-
stream. In fact, to include all externalities, water-related investments should ideally 
be planned at the basin scale (McKinney et al. 1999, Shah and Raju 2001) To facili-
tate  implementation  most  water  related  projects  are  however  planned and  imple-
mented at a lower scale. The WSD program is no exception, planning interventions 
at the level of the micro-watershed (500-1000 ha) as this corresponds most closely to 
the administrative boundaries of the village. Although several studies discuss the 
problems of having the boundaries of the hydrological system exceed the boundaries 
of the management unit (Swallow et al. 2001, Rhoades 1998), few studies actually 
quantify the externalities involved. Shah and Raju (2001) suggest that the down-
stream externalities of watershed development are substantial and Batchelor et al. 
(2003) actually quantify the hydrological effects. However, to the author’s knowl-
edge there are no studies evaluating the welfare impacts of WSD at the basin scale.  
Summarizing, the characteristics of SWC investments and the targeting of village 
communities for WSD planning and implementation are likely to affect the manage-
ment of SWC in two important ways. First, since the impact of WSD exceeds the 
boundaries of the village, communities might not have an incentive to cooperate at 
the  village-level  as  free  rider  behaviour  cannot  be  controlled.  Second,  since  the 
downstream  externalities  are  not  accounted  for  in  WSD  planning,  it  is  unclear   Chapter 1   
12 
   
whether WSD is welfare enhancing at the basin scale. For the success of community 
resource management this last element might not be important, but it does determine 
whether community-based SWC management is socially efficient or not. Hence, in 
this dissertation both aspects will need to be addressed.  
The second factor, the external environment, is important in determining the house-
hold’s incentive to contribute to semi-public good provision and in defining the insti-
tutional environment in which community resource management takes place. In the 
literature on farm household decision-making the influence of the external environ-
ment on household decision–making is well explored (see for example Ray 1999, 
Bardhan and Udry 1999). In particular, the literature on ‘less favoured regions’ sug-
gests  that an environment  like that of  India’s semi-arid regions  is likely  to keep 
households trapped in a low-welfare equilibrium since both the agro-ecological and 
the  socio-economic  conditions  for  agricultural  production  are  poor  (Barrett  and 
Swallow 2006, Fan and Hazell 1999). Poor soil quality and high water scarcity keep 
agricultural productivity low (Ryan and Spencer 2001, Scherr 2000) and due to the 
poor production potential, few public investments in rural infrastructure and services 
are made (Fan et al. 2000).  
With  regard  to  the  incentives  for  investing  in  SWC,  the  literature  suggests  that 
households are reluctant because the benefit-cost ratio of SWC investment is rela-
tively low (Barbier 1990, Heerink et al. 2001, Pender and Kerr 1998, Shiferaw and 
Holden 2000). Especially in India’s semi-arid regions, low farm gate prices, uncer-
tain revenues and increasing opportunity costs of labour make investments in rainfed 
agriculture rather unattractive, especially when compared to investments in ground-
water irrigation and agricultural intensification (Walker and Ryan 1990). Also, with 
over 30% of the households in India’s semi-arid regions being classified as poor 
(Ryan and Spencer 2001), farm households tend to go for short-term benefits instead 
of investing in the productivity of the resource base (Bardhan and Udry 1999).  
Clearly, government subsidization of WSD implementation has substantially lowered 
SWC investment costs, but to maintain SWC households need an incentive to con-
tribute as well. If the returns to agriculture are very low or if the amount of rainwater 
that can be harvested is negligible, the incentives for households to cooperate in 
SWC maintenance are likely to be low as well. Kerr et al. (2002) suggest that in-
vestments on plots with access to irrigation are better maintained than investments on 
dryland plots and that maintenance is less in projects with high subsidization. Gener-
ally, the literature on common property resource management has paid relatively lit-
tle attention to the influence of external factors for community resource management 
success (Agarwal 2001). Except when underlining the importance of an enabling in-
stitutional environment (see for example Ostrom 1990, Poteete and Ostrom 2005, 
Wade 1988) the analysis tends to concentrate on internal, community-related factors 
instead. In this dissertation, specific attention will be paid to the relative importance 
of external factors in explaining community resource management success.   Introduction       
13 
The third factor, user group characteristics, is important for community management 
since it determines the extent to which community members interact and whether the 
benefits of cooperation are distributed in a fair and equal way. Several studies have 
analyzed the way user group characteristics influence how communities manage col-
lective resources. For example, Henrich et al (2004) show how individuals from so-
cieties depending on collective activities are more cooperative than those from socie-
ties in which the family is the key decision making unit. Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2000) suggest that heterogeneous communities are less cooperative than homogene-
ous communities possibly because homogeneous communities share a set of social 
norms and trust that facilitate cooperative action which heterogeneous communities 
lack.  
 In the case of WSD in rural India, caste heterogeneity is likely to be an important 
determinant of community cooperation. The caste system is typical for India
1 and 
consists of a hierarchical system of social rules that defines social interaction and, to 
a certain extent, the household’s occupation and thus, economic status. Although 
formally caste membership plays no role in resource governance, especially in rural 
areas it is one of the most determining factors for community interaction and devel-
opment (see for example Das et al. 2004). In fact, Dumont (1970) argues in his fa-
mous book on the caste system in India that village communities do not exist. Since 
it is along caste lines that households interact, social norms, behavioural rules, net-
works and trust are mostly built along caste lines and not at the village scale. Still, 
WSD projects are targeted at village communities and basically assume that house-
holds are willing to cooperate at the village scale. Whether households are indeed 
willing to do so is likely to depend at least partly on village heterogeneity and the ex-
tent to which households daily interact at the village level.  
Socio-economic inequality also affects community resource management, although 
the direction in which is unclear. Baland and Platteau (1999) indicate that the impact 
of  inequality on community resource management is ambiguous. High inequality 
might reduce voluntary cooperation, but it can also induce the few households that 
have access to resource benefits to privately provide the semi-public good. How ine-
quality affects WSD projects has not really been assessed. Although several studies 
address the impact of inequality on project implementation (see for example Kerr 
2002, Joy and Paranjape 2004, Kumar 2002) its impact on long term SWC manage-
ment remains largely unclear. Hence, in this dissertation both the influence of socio-
economic inequality and caste heterogeneity on community SWC management will 
need to be addressed.  
The fourth and last factor, community level institutional arrangements, play a role in 
facilitating voluntary cooperation by controlling free rider behaviour and coordinat-
ing the use of semi-public goods.  
                                                   
1 Neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh have some elements of the caste 
system.     Chapter 1   
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The analysis of existing community resource management arrangements has shown 
that  a  wide  range  of  informal  mechanisms  exists  (Baland  and  Platteau  1996, 
Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002, Ostrom et al. 2002, Bardhan 1993, 2000). However, in 
newly established community-based projects institutional arrangements to coordinate 
the use of collective resources might not be in place. Still, most of the literature on 
common  property  resource  management  focuses  on  cases  where  institutional  ar-
rangements for local resource management exist.  
To improve the effectiveness of WSD it would seem more useful to concentrate on 
examples where, with no existing institutional arrangements, free rider behaviour is 
still  effectively  controlled.  For  this,  the  literature  on  international  environmental 
agreements  seems  to  provide  an  interesting  example.  Like  in  newly  established 
community-based  development  projects,  international  environmental  agreements 
lack an external authority to control free rider behaviour. Hence, whether participants 
can be expected to contribute to public good provision depends on whether the con-
ditions for voluntary cooperation are being met. The literature suggests that in order 
to reach a socially efficient level of semi-public good provision, a stable coalition of 
cooperative participants has to exist (Finus 2001, 2003, Carraro and Marchiori 2002, 
Barrett 2003). For this to be the case, three conditions have to be met: (i) cooperation 
should be profitable, (ii) there should be consensus with regard to the common goal, 
and (iii) the implicit agreement to cooperate should be self-enforcing (Finus 2003). 
The profitability requirement has been widely elaborated in the literature on common 
property resource management, but the self-enforcement and consensus requirement 
are much less addressed. Hence, for the analysis in this dissertation it seems impor-
tant to pay specific attention to these requirements. Also, since consensus and com-
mitment building are important elements of community-based projects, this gives 
ground for the hypothesis that community involvement in project planning and im-
plementation could help facilitate community resource management in the long run.  
Overall, partly due to the case-study nature of most of the literature, a systematic as-
sessment of the relative importance of the different conditions influencing commu-
nity resource management lacks (Agarwal 2001). This complicates the inference of 
more general lessons that could help facilitate the implementation of community-
based projects and increase the effectiveness of project implementation in the long 
run.  This dissertation aims to fill this gap by undertaking a comprehensive analysis 
of the different factors involved.  
1.2 Objective, research hypothesis and methodology  
The main objectives of this dissertation are a) to analyze the conditions under which 
rural communities in India’s semi-arid regions are likely to voluntarily cooperate in 
the provision of a semi-pubic good, i.e. SWC maintenance and b) to assess whether 
community-based WSD is likely to be welfare enhancing at the basin scale.   
 Introduction       
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To analyze these objectives I defined the following four research questions:  
i) Are households likely to voluntarily cooperate in SWC maintenance, given the 
semi-public nature of SWC investments and given the context of agricultural produc-
tion in India’s semi-arid watersheds; 
ii) Do investments in community organization improve community resource man-
agement, i.e. SWC maintenance in the long-run;  
iii) How do community characteristics influence voluntary cooperation and what is 
the relative importance of this effect, and; 
iv) How important are the downstream externalities of participatory WSD and how 
do they influence the welfare impact of WSD at the basin scale.  
Roughly, each question will be addressed in a separate chapter. Before addressing 
the four research questions, chapter 2 will first set the stage. To better understand the 
WSD program and the specific problems WSD projects need to tackle, the chapter 
introduces the process of WSD planning and implementation and the wider context 
in which SWC investments are made. In describing the problems WSD projects en-
counter, the four conditions for community resource management success will be 
further explored. Also, the chapter will further elaborate the potential benefits of 
SWC investment and the specific types of investment made. Although the range of 
SWC undertaken is actually quite large, the analysis in this dissertation will focus on 
water related SWC investments, i.e. investments that promote rainwater harvesting, 
groundwater recharge and the construction of small dams and water storage ponds. 
The chapter ends with an introduction of the study sites.   
Chapter 3 concentrates on the first research question, i.e. whether households are 
likely to voluntary contribute to the maintenance of a semi-public good. Using the 
basic framework of non-cooperative game theory, the model analyses individual de-
cision-making when outcomes do not only depend on individual choices but on the 
actions of others as well (Folmer and De Zeeuw 1999). The strategic interdepend-
ence of multi-person decision-making is what complicates the management of semi-
public  resources.  If  individuals  do  not  cooperate,  a  socially  efficient  outcome  is 
unlikely to be reached. Using a formal model to analyze the conditions under which a 
socially efficient outcome becomes possible allows for a better understanding of the 
actual mechanisms involved.   
The analysis specifically focuses on the self-enforcement condition, i.e. whether a 
stable coalition of cooperative households is likely to be reached. Special attention is 
paid to how changes in the external environment influence coalition stability. In par-
ticular, the analysis elaborates the influence of emerging labour markets. Whereas 
initially in most of India’s semi-arid watersheds few ‘outside’ options existed, with 
the  improvement  of  rural  infrastructure  and  transport  services  temporary  out-
migration starkly increased (Deshingkar and Start 2003). The influence of emerging   Chapter 1   
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labour markets on community cooperation has received little attention so far. Most 
WSD projects still assume low opportunity costs of labour and are not aware that 
emerging labour markets might affect SWC maintenance in the long run.   
The results suggest that only if the coalition has a strong strategic advantage a so-
cially efficient level of SWC provision is likely to be reached. If the strategic advan-
tage of the coalition is less, an initially cooperative group of households is unlikely to 
continue cooperation in the long run. This can be explained by the fact that without a 
strategic advantage, the individual benefits of free riding are larger than the individ-
ual  benefits  of  cooperating,  and  with  free  mobility  between  coalition  and  fringe 
households are unlikely to stay in the coalition long. Whereas the availability of an 
outside option generally reduces the level of SWC provided, it can also increase the 
strategic position of the coalition and thus increase cooperation in the long run. Inter-
estingly, the external environment does not only influence community cooperation, 
but the extent to which households cooperate also influences the impact that the ex-
ternal environment has. Generally, a higher external wage rate lowers the incentive 
for community cooperation, but when households are intrinsically cooperative the 
benchmark wage rate has to be higher to motivate households to migrate out. The 
explanation for this is that in cooperative villages the returns to agriculture are higher 
because a socially efficient level of SWC investment has been made.  
Chapter 4 addresses the second research question, whether investments in commu-
nity organization affect SWC maintenance in the long run. To analyze the long-term 
impact of community-based interventions, I collected data from 800 households in 
22 villages in 4 meso-scale watersheds in semi-arid India. Watersheds were selected 
on the basis of WSD treatment, average rainfall and market integration. To control 
for the effect of project placement on project outcomes, study villages were selected 
on the basis of their location in the meso-watershed. Since upstream villages are 
more often treated than downstream villages, by controlling for location I tried to 
control for project placement effects. Since I did not have access to time series data, I 
asked households about their intention to contribute to SWC in the long run. Consid-
ering  that  investments  in  community  organization  are  expected  to  influence  the 
household’s commitment to contribute, taking the household’s intention as a proxy 
for long-term maintenance seems appropriate to assess impacts in the long run. The 
characteristics of the watershed were used to analyze the influence of the external 
environment, i.e. the impact of market integration and relative aridity on project re-
sults. Besides, income inequality was taken as an indicator for user group character-
istics and used to assess its impact on household cooperation at the village scale.  
In line with the literature on WSD, the results indicate that participatory approaches 
are more effective in the short run. If WSD project implementation is participatory, 
more investments in SWC are made. The effect of participatory WSD on long term 
SWC maintenance is however less clear. Investments in community organization do 
not seem to directly impact the household’s intention to contribute to SWC mainte-
nance, but indirectly participatory approaches do have a positive effect. By increas-Introduction       
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ing the critical mass of households with SWC investment, the household’s commit-
ment to SWC maintenance is increased. Besides, the household’s intention to con-
tribute to SWC maintenance is influenced by household and village characteristics 
and the external environment in which WSD investments take place.  
In chapter 5 I address the third research question, the importance of community char-
acteristics for voluntary cooperation at the village scale. In fact, the popularity of 
community-based approaches stems largely from the expectation that communities 
are intrinsically cooperative and will facilitate investment maintenance in the long 
run. This expectation is based however on the assumption that communities have 
control over a stock of social capital that facilitates social interaction and helps con-
trol free rider behaviour at the village scale. However, the availability of social capi-
tal is likely to depend on community characteristics, like village heterogeneity and 
the extent to which households frequently interact (see for example Dasgupta 2002, 
Miguel and Gugerty 2005). To analyze the relative importance of community charac-
teristics in determining the likelihood of voluntary cooperation, I conducted field ex-
periments to measure village levels of trust. Trust is supposed to be an important 
element of social capital, as it facilitates social interaction and pro-social behaviour 
at the community scale. Because survey questions have been indicated to measure 
reciprocity instead of trust (Glaeser et al. 2000), using an experimental approach 
seemed most appropriate (Carpenter et al. 2004). The advantage of inviting actual 
farm-households  to  participate  in  the  experiments  is  that  participants  have  been 
shown to use their experiences from everyday life to solve the problems they encoun-
ter in the experiment (Henrich et al. 2004). Hence, using ‘real people’ instead of col-
lege students is expected to improve the quality of results. To analyze the relative 
importance of social capital for community resource management I combined the ex-
perimental results with the household survey data. This not only allowed for an inte-
grated analysis of the different factors influencing household behaviour, it made it 
possible to pay attention to the ‘generalizability’ of the experimental results as well.  
Results indicate that trust is higher in homogeneous communities and that it is a sig-
nificant determinant of the household’s willingness to contribute to SWC mainte-
nance in the long run. Individual trusting behaviour is not a significant factor, but av-
erage trust levels at the village scale are. This is in line with the literature on social 
capital, which defines social capital at the community scale. In terms of impact, vil-
lage levels of trust are about equally important as other variables in fostering partici-
pation in community resource management. Hence, targeting homogeneous commu-
nities is likely to improve project effectiveness, but it does not guarantee project suc-
cess.  
In chapter 6 I divert attention from community resource management to focus on the 
impacts of WSD at the basin scale. Although several evaluations have shown that 
WSD can improve welfare at the village scale, at the scale of the basin the welfare 
impacts of WSD remain unclear. With data from the Krishna river basin in southern 
India, I assess the impact of a reduction in surface water flow on users downstream.   Chapter 1   
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For the analysis, I assume that up and downstream regions share a fixed amount of 
surface water and that between up and downstream users no flow of groundwater ex-
ists. Under these circumstances, WSD in India’s semi-arid regions is likely to effec-
tively re-allocate water from down to upstream regions. Two factors are expected to 
determine basin-scale welfare impacts. First, using water upstream reduces the tran-
spiration losses associated with storing water in large irrigation reservoirs. Second, 
re-allocating water might decrease water use efficiency because in upstream regions 
the conditions for agricultural production tend to be worse. In assessing the welfare 
impacts of WSD, the trade-offs between these two factors will need to be assessed.  
Using an economic optimization model, I simulate how changes in water allocation 
affect the agricultural value produced. For five different investment levels I evaluate 
WSD costs and benefits and assess whether benefits are sufficient to pay back costs. 
I then use a Monte Carlo simulation to assess the robustness of the results. The re-
sults indicate that the downstream externalities of WSD can be substantial and that 
the benefits of WSD are on average insufficient to pay back investment costs. SWC 
maintenance increases the probability of WSD having a positive welfare impact with 
10-20% but even in the most optimistic scenario, and under the conditions men-
tioned, the probability that WSD is welfare enhancing is less than 50%. Still, WSD in 
semi-arid regions  might be  socially desirable if  WSD  would substantially reduce 
poverty upstream. Several studies have shown the impact of WSD on poverty alle-
viation to be disappointing however. Hence, in semi-arid regions, with no flow of 
groundwater between up and downstream users, WSD does not seem to be a very ef-
fective strategy to improve welfare at the basin scale. The effects of reduced soil ero-
sion and reforestation have not been considered however, and especially in higher 
rainfall and mountainous watersheds it seems important to account for these factors 
as well.  
Chapter 7 recapitulates the outcomes of the different chapters and discusses whether 
households are likely to voluntary cooperate in SWC maintenance and if WSD pro-
jects can be expected to improve welfare at the basin scale. The chapter concludes 
that in the context of India’s semi-arid regions, the likelihood of households volun-
tarily cooperating in SWC maintenance seems relatively small. Besides, the likeli-
hood that WSD is welfare enhancing under the conditions prevailing in the areas 
studied is relatively low This is not to say that community-based WSD can not be 
welfare enhancing, but that  the  likelihood  of community-based WSD structurally 
changing the outlook for India’s semi-arid regions is relatively small.     
For the analysis I collaborated with several of India’s leading non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGO) to collect data in the field. Besides, I collaborated with hydrolo-
gists and remote sensing specialists from the International Water Management Insti-
tute in Hyderabad, India to evaluate impacts at the basin scale. Because several of the 
chapters in this dissertation are also co-authored, in the rest of this dissertation I will 
refer to the author as ‘we’. Clearly, all errors and omissions are mine.         
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2. Participatory watershed development 
2.1 Introduction 
The watershed development (WSD) program is one of the main programs for rural 
development in India’s semi-arid regions. Although the program started as a program 
to generate employment in times of  drought, over  time attention  shifted  to more 
structural  investments  to  increase  agricultural  productivity  and  alleviate  poverty. 
Poor soil quality and water scarcity being regarded as important production con-
straints (Ryan and Spencer 2001), investments in SWC are supposed to structurally 
improve the agricultural production potential and increase agricultural productivity in 
the long run. Whereas in some regions interventions concentrate on the restoration of 
degraded lands, in other regions WSD projects focus on groundwater recharge and 
rainwater harvesting. Most projects are a mixture, however, of interventions combin-
ing investments in soil conservation, rainwater harvesting and the restoration of (de-
graded) common lands.  
Agricultural productivity is low in India’s semi-arid regions, not only because of 
poor resource endowment but because of a lack of infrastructure and agricultural ser-
vices as well (Walker and Ryan 1990). Agricultural productivity has always been 
relatively low in these regions, due to high climatic uncertainty, poor soils and high 
water scarcity. However, as public investments in agricultural production concen-
trated on the more high-potential regions downstream the gap in agricultural produc-
tivity increased. For example, the Green Revolution (1967-1978) largely bypassed 
India’s semi-arid regions, whereas in better-endowed regions substantial investments 
in  canal  irrigation,  rural  infrastructure  and  improved  production  techniques  were 
made. Hence, in 1970 the value produced per hectare in high-potential regions was 
on average 60% higher than that in semi-arid regions but by 1994 the difference had 
gone up to 78% (Fan et al. 2000).  
To reduce the gap in agricultural productivity, the WSD program tries to improve the 
agricultural production potential of semi-arid regions. Investments in SWC are sup-
posed to reduce soil erosion, improve soil moisture and increase the availability of 
stored (ground) water resources for irrigation in periods of drought (Oweis et al. 
1999). Analysts have argued that to improve agricultural productivity, besides in-
vestments in SWC, investments in improved production techniques and rural infra-
structure  are  required  as  well  (Rosegrant  et  al.  2002,  Fan  and  Hazell  1999).   Chapter 2   
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Although other government programs are making investments in rural infrastructure 
and  improved  production  techniques,  the  WSD  program  mainly  concentrates  on 
SWC. WSD projects do sometimes invest in micro-credit provision and product di-
versification, but generally do not have the means or intent to change the wider con-
text in which agricultural production takes place. 
The extensive literature on WSD in India has shown that well-implemented WSD 
programs can significantly enhance the productivity of agriculture.
1 Investments in 
soil conservation improve soil moisture and, thus, the yields of rainfed crops and in-
vestments in water conservation have been shown to increase groundwater levels and 
the area under irrigation. Besides, WSD interventions reduce soil erosion and im-
prove the quality of common (forest) land. Most evaluations of WSD projects are 
case studies however and the influence of the external environment is often not ad-
dressed. Agronomic studies have established however that SWC investments in less 
arid environments are more effective than in arid environments because with high 
aridity the amount of rainfall that can be harvested is relatively low. Similarly, SWC 
investments on soils with a higher soil moisture retention capacity (i.e. black soils) 
are more effective since relatively more water can be stored (Wani et al. 2002, 2003).  
A study that does systematically evaluate the benefits of WSD interventions is the 
study by Kerr et al. (2002). With data from 86 villages in two states (Maharastra and 
Andhra  Pradesh)  the  study  compares  the  impact  of  participatory  and  non-
participatory project interventions on soil erosion, irrigation development, rainfed ag-
riculture and the rehabilitation of degraded lands. The results indicate that invest-
ments in SWC significantly improve the productivity of agriculture and that partici-
patory approaches are more effective than interventions that implement SWC in-
vestments from the top-down. In fact, the study was so influential that from 2000-
2001 onwards
2 government initiated WSD project became participatory as well (see 
GOI 2000 for example). Although the results of Kerr et al. (2002) clearly indicate 
that participatory approaches are more effective, the longer- term effects remain un-
clear. Besides, the study only considers impacts at the village level and, thus, does 
not assess the welfare implications of WDS at the basin scale. 
This dissertation attempts to evaluate the long- term effects of WSD and the impact 
of WSD at the basin scale. The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate how WSD pro-
jects are implemented and to describe the wider context in which SWC investments 
are made. In the next section, we describe the WSD program and the process of pro-
ject planning and implementation. In the third section we review the conditions for 
successful community resource management to determine what the main problems 
for long-term voluntary cooperation in SWC maintenance are likely to be. The fourth 
                                                   
1 See for example Boersema 2001, Kerr et al. 2002, Wani et al. 2003, Ratna Reddy et al. 2004, 
Chandrakanth et al. 2004, Sharma et al. 2005, Honoré 2002, Joshi et al. 2004, 2005. 
2 Although the study was published in 2002, the research was undertaken in 1997 and outcomes 
were presented and widely shared before 2002.  Participatory watershed development       
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and last section of this chapter introduces the project sites. Introducing these sites not 
only provides the background for analysis in two of the seven chapters of this disser-
tation, it is expected to help visualize the conditions for voluntary cooperation in In-
dia’s semi-arid regions too.  
2.2 Participatory watershed development 
There are roughly two ways in which WSD projects intent to improve agricultural 
productivity i) by increasing the yields of rainfed crops and ii) by increasing (or 
maintaining) the area under (groundwater) irrigation. SWC investments with a focus 
on rainfed agriculture concentrate on measures to improve soil moisture and reduce 
soil erosion. SWC investments with a focus on irrigated agriculture concentrate on 
rainwater harvesting and groundwater recharge. Although most SWC measures con-
tribute to both, some SWC measures (i.e. bunding, terracing etc.) generate more soil-
related  benefits  whereas  other  SWC  investments  (water  storage  reservoirs,  small 
dams etc) generate more water-related benefits. Whether WSD projects emphasize 
soil or water conservation usually depends on the characteristics of the watershed: in 
steeply-sloped watersheds, SWC investments often concentrate on soil conservation 
whereas in watersheds with high levels of groundwater depletion investments focus 
more often on groundwater recharge. In this dissertation, we concentrate on invest-
ments emphasizing water conservation as in our study sites water conservation is the 
main WSD benefit perceived.  
In fact, the WSD emphasize on water conservation is relatively recent, since, tradi-
tionally, agriculture in India‘s semi-arid regions used to be rainfed, with some sea-
sonal sources of irrigation like shallow groundwater wells and small surface water 
reservoirs. Only with the development of deep groundwater irrigation did continuous 
irrigation become an option. Because access to continuous irrigation allows for the 
production of high value, water intensive crops, farm households massively invested 
in deep groundwater irrigation (see also Shah et al. 2003). This caused groundwater 
levels to steeply declined and the demand for groundwater recharge to grow.  
SWC investments range from bunding, drainage line treatment and reforestation to 
investments in small dams, gully plugs and groundwater recharge ponds. To optimize 
investments it is important that the downstream externalities associated with SWC 
are adequately addressed. This requires both technical SWC expertise and knowledge 
of the local context and hydro-ecological environment in which investments take 
place. Although initially most WSD projects were planned by external experts and 
implemented from the top-down, informational asymmetries between the implement-
ing agent and the local beneficiaries caused the effectiveness of this approach to be 
relatively low. The success of more participatory approaches indicated that including 
communities in project planning and implementation helps to address these informa-
tional constraints (see also Stalker Prokopy 2005). In fact, the most successful WSD 
projects  are  those  that  combine  community  participation  with  technical  expertise 
(Kerr et al. 2002).   Chapter 2   
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To ensure the long-term effectiveness of SWC investments it is important that in-
vestments are maintained. In some cases, this will be mostly a private effort of a 
farmer redoing the bunding on his land.  In most cases it requires, however, that 
other households contribute as well. Depending on the biophysical context, coopera-
tion might be required between households sharing an aquifer or a small dam, be-
tween up and downstream households sharing a drainage line or the entire village 
when investments include, for example, a surface water reservoir or common land. 
To involve local communities, WSD interventions generally start with the establish-
ment of a watershed committee. Although for government-financed WSD projects 
the establishment of a watershed committee is mandatory (GOI 2000)
3, the extent to 
which communities participate in project planning and implementation differs a lot 
(Joshi et al. 2004). Whereas in some projects the watershed committee merely ap-
proves  the  investment  plan,  in  other  projects  the  watershed  committee  is  made 
largely  responsible  for  project  planning  and  implementation.  Case  study  analysis 
suggests that, for a well-functioning watershed committee, substantial investments in 
community organization need to be made prior to its establishment (Joy and Paran-
jape 2004, Farrington et al. 1999).  For example, the community has to be made 
aware of what the WSD program seeks to accomplish and what the role of the water-
shed committee in the planning and implementation of investments will be.  
If the watershed committee is to formulate a plan that represents all interests, its 
members should ideally be elected in a democratic way. This in turn requires that 
poor  and  marginal  households  are  stimulated  to  participate  in  village  decision-
making.  Generally,  if  participation  by  marginal  households  in  village  decision-
making is not actively supported, village decision-making is taken over by the local 
elite. The poor usually have less influence in village decision-making and, hence, 
participatory approaches are often incapable of controlling rent-seeking behaviour by 
the local elite (Bardhan and Mookerjee 2005, Galasso and Ravallion 2005). This is 
likely to reduce the long-term effectiveness of WSD as it impedes consensus regard-
ing the WSD plan. Hence, investments in local awareness, empowerment and the 
election and establishment of a representative and well-functioning watershed com-
mittee are required to ensure effective community participation in the long run (Joy 
and Paranjape 2004). Non-governmental organizations involved in WSD implemen-
tation usually spend more time and resources on community organization than gov-
ernmental organizations. Generally, attention for community organization increases 
the time needed for project implementation from 1-2 years up to 2-4 years. Since 
governmental organizations generally do not have the facilities to spend 2-4 years on 
project implementation, often non-governmental organizations receive government 
                                                   
3 In the most recent government WSD guidelines (the ‘Hariyali guidelines; Government of India, 
2003) the village council (the Panchayat Ray Institution) is given a more prominent role. However, as 
in the study sites WSD was implemented before 2003, we do not consider the role of the village coun-
cil in WSD planning and implementation.  
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funding to implement WSD. Few professional, highly committed NGOs exist, how-
ever, and there are many cases of NGOs implementing WSD projects without techni-
cal expertise or of NGOs being established for the cause of receiving government 
funding alone. In this dissertation, we only consider professional NGOs and do not 
address the wide range of semi-professional, and even corrupt, NGOs that are out 
there in semi-arid India to implement WSD projects as well.  
With regard to the costs of WSD investment, as mentioned before, households con-
tribute to 0-25% of the total costs in voluntary labour. With project wages above the 
market wage and with high unemployment, investments are effectively subsidized 
for over 100% (Kerr et al. 2002, Shah 2005). Households and communities have real 
costs however in having part of their land taken out of production. Also, they are 
supposed to maintain SWC investments in the long run. For investments on private 
land, households have to bear the full costs of SWC maintenance, but for collective 
structures or investments on common land in some cases a maintenance fund exists. 
If a maintenance fund has been established, it is managed by the watershed commit-
tee and only covers the material costs of SWC maintenance.  
With respect to the benefits of WSD, several benefits arise. First, there is the em-
ployment benefit associated with project implementation. Villagers can get a good 
income from WSD implementation as they are paid a wage above the market wage. 
This often leads to local rent-seeking behaviour, influential households securing em-
ployment benefits for their kin. Second, households benefit from possible SWC in-
vestments on their land. The on-site, private benefits of SWC are mostly improve-
ments in soil moisture and soil fertility and depend on the slope, size and quality of 
the land (Barbier 1990, Heerink et al. 2001, Pender and Kerr 1998). Third, house-
holds benefit if they have access to the collective benefits of SWC. The most impor-
tant collective benefits of WSD are recharged groundwater aquifers and improved 
biomass availability on common lands. Households with livestock benefit from im-
proved biomass availability (Puskur et al. 2004). Generally, households with access 
to irrigation and land located near drainage lines benefit most (Farrington et al. 1999, 
Bouma and Scott 2006). As these are often the households that are already better off, 
the impact of WSD on poverty alleviation tends to be small.  
An unequal distribution of WSD benefits not only reduces the impact on poverty, it 
might affect long-term project effectiveness as well. Although in this dissertation no 
specific attention will be paid to the distribution of WSD benefits, the analysis will 
address the impact of inequality on the effectiveness of the WSD approach. Apart 
from a qualitative assessment of the functioning of local watershed committees, the 
analysis will not elaborate the organizational aspects of WSD implementation. Many 
case studies regarding the pro’s and con’s of the different approaches to WSD im-
plementation already exist, and the analysis in this dissertation will concentrate on 
the importance of the external environment and community and household character-
istics for project effectiveness instead.     Chapter 2   
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2.3 The incentives for SWC maintenance in semi-arid India 
In the following, to get a better picture of the challenges faced by the WSD program 
we will review the four conditions for successful community resource management 
and elaborate where in this dissertation the different elements will be addressed.  
2.3.1 Resource system characteristics  
In  the  preceding chapter we introduced some  of the externalities associated  with 
SWC investment but we did not elaborate how land and water user rights are defined. 
Generally, most of the land in semi-arid India is privately owned. In some water-
sheds, part of the land is government land, either owned by the forest department or 
the village council. Few user rights regarding the use of common lands usually exist. 
In  some  watersheds,  villagers  monitor  and  enforce  some  limited  grazing  rights. 
Hence, government lands are often heavily degraded, as they tend to be open for all. 
Water rights also tend to be poorly assigned (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2000, Aggar-
wal 1995). Under the riparian system of property rights, the right to use (ground) wa-
ter is linked to the ownership of land, but since the boundaries of most water systems 
exceed individual land entitlements, the appropriation externalities associated with 
water use tend to be large. Only with regard to the extraction of water from canal ir-
rigation systems and surface water reservoirs are explicit rules sometimes defined 
(Wade 1988, Mosse 2003). However, since most surface water reservoirs are used 
for groundwater percolation these rules are often no longer in use.  
Assigning individual user rights to collective groundwater resources is notoriously 
difficult as the boundaries of groundwater aquifers are often unclear and the quantity 
of groundwater available is largely unknown. As the information costs of establish-
ing groundwater user rights would be very high, it is unlikely that communities can 
successfully assign and enforce individual water user rights at the community scale. 
For common lands, the assignment of user rights is more straightforward, but here 
the problem arises that the government usually owns these lands. Hence, communi-
ties are reluctant to improve common property resource management, as they cannot 
be sure to reap the benefits in the long run.  
The lack of clear user rights regarding the use of common land and (ground) water is 
clearly not conducive for SWC management. However, it does not necessarily im-
pede voluntarily cooperation (see for example Aggarwal 2000). By making house-
holds that benefit from semi-public SWC structures contribute proportionally to the 
costs of maintenance, free rider behaviour might still be controlled.  
Although this dissertation will not elaborate whether and how individual mainte-
nance responsibilities might be assigned, the analysis is likely to provide some clues 
as to how this might be done. For example, the analysis in chapters 4 and 5 is ex-
pected to generate insight into the factors determining SWC contributions and the 
analysis in chapter 6 evaluates the relative importance of downstream externalities.  Participatory watershed development       
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2.3.2 The external environment 
The socio-economic environment for agricultural production in India’s semi-arid re-
gions is generally characterized by poor infrastructure, poor access to agricultural 
services and little use of improved production techniques (Walker and Ryan 1990, 
Fan and Hazell 1999). These factors are likely to influence SWC maintenance as 
they determine the benefits that can be gained. For example, poor market access in-
creases the transaction costs of agricultural marketing and high transaction costs gen-
erally cause farm-households to rationally settle for the production of low-return sub-
sistence crops (De Janvy et al. 1991, Omamo 1998). Similarly, lack of access to im-
proved production techniques, agricultural inputs and improved seeds generally re-
duces the value of agricultural production, thus lowering the incentive for households 
to invest.  
Poor infrastructure and underdeveloped markets can however also reduce the avail-
ability of so-called ‘outside options’. This is expected to make farm-households more 
likely to contribute to SWC maintenance as it reduces the opportunity costs of la-
bour. With the development of rural transport services, even in remote areas the 
availability of outside options has increased (Deshingkar and Start 2003). Whether 
and how this is likely to have influenced the long-term effectiveness of WSD will be 
addressed in chapter 3. The impact of poor market access is addressed in chapter 4. 
The external context is not only important in determining the costs and benefits of 
cooperation, it is important in determining the institutional environment for commu-
nity-based resource management as well. Formally, the village council, or Panchayat 
Raj institution (PRI), is responsible for resource management at the village scale. 
However, since PRIs usually do not have the capacity or resources to manage natural 
resources effectively, WSD programs have focused on local communities instead
4. 
By creating a watershed committee, existing political and institutional complexities 
can  be  avoided  and  resources  can  be  earmarked  for  local  resource  conservation 
alone. However, the fact that the watershed committee has no formal responsibilities 
or entitlements might impede the management of SWC structures as well. In this dis-
sertation we do not pay much attention to the broader institutional environment but 
instead concentrate on the conditions for voluntary cooperation.    
2.3.3 User group characteristics 
User group characteristics are important as they help determine the level of social in-
teraction that takes place. If households frequently interact this creates a set of social 
norms, preferences and expectations that help facilitate cooperation in the long run 
(Gächter and Fehr 1999, Sethi and Somanathan 2003, Fehr and Gächter 2000, Sig-
mund et al. 2002).  
                                                   
4 Clearly, with the new Hariyali guidelines (GOI 2003), which emphasize the role of the village 
council in WSD management, this changed. However, as PRIs are hardly capacitated to take up their   Chapter 2   
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Socio-cultural or socio-economic factors can, however, also complicate social inter-
action. In the Indian context, caste heterogeneity and socio-economic inequality are, 
for example, likely to play a role. In the literature on WSD effectiveness, the impor-
tance  of  caste  heterogeneity  has  hardly  been  addressed
5.  The  impact  of  socio-
economic inequality has received some attention, local elites dominating collective 
decision-making more often in unequal villages, reducing consensus and commit-
ment regarding the WSD investment plan (Farrington et al. 1999). As the literature 
on voluntary cooperation indicates, consensus is crucial to control free rider behav-
iour when external enforcement mechanisms lack (Ostrom et al.1992, Finus 2003). 
This has led for example Kerr (2002) to argue that to improve WSD effectiveness in-
terventions might need to be targeted at homogeneous communities. Whether this 
can be expected to improve WSD effectiveness depends on the relative importance 
of village heterogeneity as compared to other factors. Khwaja (2004) suggests for 
example that better project implementation is more important than socio-economic 
homogeneity, and that well-implemented projects can succeed in making even het-
erogeneous communities voluntarily cooperate in the long run. In chapter 4 we ana-
lyze the relative importance of income inequality at the village scale. In chapter 5 the 
relative  importance  of  caste  heterogeneity  for  voluntary  cooperation  will  be  ad-
dressed.  
2.3.4 Institutional arrangements  
With regard to the institutional arrangements for SWC in semi-arid India, Mosse 
(2003) indicates that in some regions traditional arrangements did exist. Local war-
lords, kings and priests invested in water storage and conservation and local commu-
nities  contributed  by  giving  part  of  their  harvest  and  voluntary  labour  in  return 
(Mosse 2003). Increased population pressure, the formalization of natural resource 
management to government agencies and the development of deep groundwater irri-
gation caused traditional arrangements to become dysfunctional and dissolve (Jodha 
1996). Still, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) convincingly show how long discarded institu-
tions might significantly influence current resource use. Long abolished land tenure 
systems can still explain differences in agricultural productivity and socio-economic 
development between regions. Although the shift from surface to groundwater irriga-
tion seems to have structurally changed the way water resources are used still regions 
with a tradition of voluntary cooperation in reservoir maintenance or temple restora-
tion might have an advantage over regions that do not. In the analysis of chapter 4 
these factors will be controlled for in the watersheds fixed effects, because informa-
tion about the historical background of the study sites unfortunately lacks.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
responsibility in WSD management, community cooperation remains crucial to maintain SWC. 
5  Kerr (2002b) does mention the role and importance of village homogeneity in discussing the 
success of Sukhomajri watershed, India’s most famous example of successful WSD. Participatory watershed development       
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Since in most watersheds no explicit institutional arrangements to coordinate SWC 
maintenance exist, the coordination of resource use and control of free rider behav-
iour  is  expected  to  largely  depend  on  whether  communities  can  meet  the  self-
enforcement requirement and whether interventions succeed to reach consensus re-
garding the WSD investment plan. Although this dissertation will not analyze the 
process of consensus building or the specific impact of the different investments in 
community organization, the analysis in chapter 4 will describe some of the invest-
ments  in community  organization  and  the  impact  investments  in  local institution 
building seem to have. The self-enforcement requirement is the subject matter of 
chapter 3.  
2.4 The project sites   
The empirical analysis in this dissertation makes use of data collected for the project 
“Livestock-Environment  Interactions  in  Watersheds”.  This  study,  undertaken  by 
IWMI-India  and  partners
6,  focused  on  livestock  production  vis-à-vis  the  use  and 
availability of natural resources in semi-arid watersheds. Study sites were defined at 
the scale of the meso-watershed (5,000-10,000 ha), each project site comprising 10-
26 villages of which 4-6 villages were selected for further analysis. In each water-
shed,  the  LEAD  study  team  and  the  author  of  this  dissertation  collected  agro-
ecological, hydrological, village-level and household-level data. To address some of 
the specific questions of this dissertation, the LEAD study team allowed for some ex-
tra questions to be added to the household questionnaire. The relevant parts of the 
questionnaire can be found in annex B.   
                                                   
6 The LEAD partners are the NGOs Seva Mandir (Rajasthan), WOTR (Maharastra), Wassan (Andhra 
Pradesh), SAMUHA (Karnataka) and Sampark (Madhya Pradesh). The study was financed by the 
Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and was 
undertaken between 2002-2005.    Chapter 2   
 














Figure 2.1  Location of the study sites. 
 
Roughly, the study sites were selected on the basis of their natural resource endow-
ment and socio-economic context
7. Table 2.1 shows the categorization of the water-
sheds, using rainfall as proxy for resource endowment and market access as a proxy 
for socio-economic embeddedness.    
Table 2.1   Categorization of the study sites. 

















To account for possible up-down stream externalities, the LEAD study explicitly se-
lected villages from the upper, middle and lower region of the meso-scale watershed. 
Also,  the  selection  of  study  villages  included  villages  that  had  undergone  WSD 
treatment and villages that had not. In two of the watersheds we could even distin-
guish between villages that had been treated by the government or by an NGO.  
                                                   
7 In fact, five study sites were selected by the LEAD study team, but since the fifth site (Ladki Nadi 
watershed, Madhya Pradesh) showed considerable overlap with Kalyanpur watershed, Rajasthan, I did 
not include this watershed in the analysis of this dissertation. Participatory watershed development       
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Table 2.2 presents data on the number of villages and WSD treatment in the four wa-
tersheds.  
Table 2.2   Investments in soil and water conservation per watershed. 









Costs per ha 
treated area (USD/ha) 
Kosgi  DPAP* (GO)  4  3  3,460  58%  80 
Kanakanala  SAMUHA (NGO)  6  3  13,064  48%  60 
Kalyanpur 
DPAP (GO) and 
Seva Mandir (NGO) 
7  6  7,488  27%  125 
V.Babulgaon 
DPAP (GO) and 
WOTR (NGO) 
5  3  4,876  24%  155 
 Source:  IWMI (2005). *DPAP=Drought Prone Areas Program, GO= governmental organization, 
NGO= non-governmental organization  
Since exact data on treatment costs and area treated were hard to come by, the fig-
ures presented are only indicative of WSD treatment in the four study sites. The size 
of the different watersheds varies because size is defined on the basis of the hydro-
logical boundaries of the ‘area from which all water flows to a common drain’ (i.e. 
the definition of a watershed). 
In the following we will introduce the study sites and elaborate the differences in re-
source endowment and market access that exist between the study sites. Also, we de-
scribe the WSD interventions undertaken and the perceived impacts this has had. The 
information  used  is  mostly  based  on  field  visits  and  village  meetings,  although 
household survey data and secondary data are used for the description of the study 
sites too.  
2.4.1 Resource endowment and the agro-ecological context 
Table 2.3 presents a summary overview of the parameters indicative of the relative 
resource endowment of the different watersheds.  
Table 2.3   Rainfall, aridity and slope in the study sites. 
  Kosgi  Kanakanala  Kalyanpur  V.Babulgaon 
Average rainfall/year  739 mm  499 mm  584mm  430 mm 
Aridity (P/Pet)
a   0.5  0.31  0.39  0.32 
5 % slope/total  0  17%  49%  42% 
 Source: IWMI (2005)  
aP/PET= precipitation/potential evapotranspiration 
The average amount of rainfall is indicative of water scarcity, but aridity is a better 
indicator as it reflects the rate of water ‘lost’ to transpiration too. If the aridity pa-
rameter is high, a larger share of rainfall can effectively be used.    Chapter 2   
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In  Kalyanpur,  Vaiju  Babulgaon  and  Kanakanala  watershed,  most  of  the  steeply 
sloped lands are government lands. Most of this land is highly degraded due to de-
forestation and over-grazing: Government control is poor and community monitoring 
and control lack (Puskur et al. 2004). In Kosgi watershed there is no common land 
since due to high population pressure all common land has been divided into private 
parcels and is being used as agricultural land.  
Soil quality and depth are highly variable within each watershed. Under low rainfall 
conditions, black soils are generally more productive than red soils because of their 
high soil moisture retention capacity. In each watershed both red and black soils ex-
ist, but since no soil maps were available the distribution of soil type, depth and fer-
tility could not be assessed. Generally, soil depth and quality are lower in the upper 
regions of the watershed, especially when slopes are steep. Although investments in 
soil conservation can improve soil quality, degraded soils take a long time to recover 
and especially in the upper regions of the study watershed soils are often so degraded 
that agricultural productivity is extremely low.   
Agricultural productivity clearly does not only depend on natural resource endow-
ment, it depends on the investments in the agricultural resource base as well. Invest-
ments in land levelling, for example, increase agricultural productivity by changing 
the initially negative condition of having steeply sloped land. Similarly, in the highly 
uncertain climatic conditions of India’s semi-arid regions, investments in irrigation 
access not only increase crop yields but reduce the risk of crop loss as well. Three 
types of irrigation broadly exist: i) canal irrigation from small surface water reser-
voirs, ii) supplemental irrigation from shallow groundwater wells, and iii) tubewell 
irrigation from deep groundwater aquifers. In the project sites, surface water irriga-
tion is only an option in Kalyanpur watershed.  
Generally, tubewell irrigation is preferred over open well irrigation as it supplies a 
more continuous flow of water. However, the investment costs of tubewell irrigation 
are high and depending on the hydrogeology of the watershed the risk of failure are 
substantial. Once farm households start investing in tubewell irrigation, the shallow 
open wells used for seasonal irrigation often fall dry. This is what actually happened 
in Kosgi watershed, where groundwater levels have dropped to 300 ft. In Kalyanpur 
and Vaiju Babulgaon watershed the number of tubewells is relatively low and has not 
affected  water  levels  in  open  wells.  In  Kanakanala  watershed,  investments  in 
tubewell irrigation recently increased, but the number of tubewells is still very low.  
Although  in  all  watersheds,  traditionally,  some  investments  in  SWC  were  made, 
Vaiju Babulgaon  has the highest percentage of  households investing in SWC. In 
Kosgi watershed, partly because the watershed is flat, prior to the WSD program 
very little investments in SWC were made. In Kanakanala and Kalyanpur watershed 
few farmers indicated they had invested in SWC prior to the WSD program. 
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Table 2.4   Population density, landholding size and irrigation access. 
  Kosgi  Kanakanala  Kalyanpur  V.Babulgaon 
Total no. of households   4242  2643  1711  1298 
Population density  
(hh/non-sloped land) 
1.23  0.24  0.45  0.47 










% irrigated area of total  30%  1-5%  10-20%  10-15% 
% HH with access to irriga-
tion  
72%  24%  80%  95% 
 Source: IWMI (2004, 2005). Hh=households 
Table 2.4 gives an impression of the differences in irrigation access and population 
density between  the  watersheds.  Generally, the  higher  the  population density the 
more households need to investment in agricultural intensification to increase the 
productivity of their (small) plot. This is especially notable in Kosgi watershed. Av-
erage landholding size is however even lower in Kalyanpur, which can be explained 
by the fact that a relatively large amount of land in this watershed is government 
owned. Irrigation access is best in Vajiu Babulgaon, where most households have ac-
cess to seasonal, open wells. Within the watersheds, irrigation access varies. For ex-
ample, in Kanakanala watershed no household in upstream Idlapur can get access to 
irrigation because the water table is too deep, whereas in downstream Garjanal even 
poor households invest in tubewell irrigation. Similarly, in Kosgi watershed some 
villages have no access to irrigation whereas in other villages some households have 
several tubewells. In Kalyanpur, downstream villages have access to surface water ir-
rigation, but in the upper region villages have no access to irrigation at all.  
Figure 2.2 presents rainfall pattern in the different study sites. The rainfall pattern is 
important as it largely determines the agricultural production season. There are three 
seasons, Kharif (monsoon), Rabi (post-monsoon) and summer. Depending on the lo-
cal rainfall pattern, the Kharif season starts around June/July with the harvest in Ok-
tober/November.  Rabi  season  starts  around  November/December  with  harvest 
somewhere in February/March. The summer season is from March till the monsoon 
begins, usually at the end of June. Generally, in Kharif , provided the rains are good, 
most farmers grow a crop. In Rabi, farmers with access to irrigation will grow a crop, 
but for rainfed farmers this will depend on whether it was a good monsoon. Farm 
households with poor quality land, i.e. a low soil moisture retention capacity, might 
not be able to grow a second crop. In summer, only households with access to deep 
groundwater irrigation can cultivate any crops. Farmers without irrigation usually 
migrate.   Chapter 2   
 
















Figure 2.2  Rainfall patterns in the study sites (days/month). 
Figure 2 indicates that Kosgi and Kalyanpur have a clear peak in days with rainfall, 
whereas in Kanakanala and Vaiju Babulgaon rainfall is more evenly spread. Because 
a peak in rainfall generally causes more surface water run-off this might be an indi-
cation that WSD in Kosgi and Kalyanpur generates higher returns. Although in the 
analysis we do not account for the peak run off flow, we do account for relative arid-
ity as a dummy variable, the value of which is zero for Kosgi and Kalyanpur and one 
for the other two.  
2.4.2 Market access and the socio-economic environment  
With regard to the influence of market access on agricultural production and SWC 
investments in the study sites, Kalyanpur and Kanakanala watershed can be charac-
terized  as  mostly  subsistence  economies,  whereas  the  well-integrated  watersheds 
Kosgi and Vaiju Babulgaon are largely cash based. In Kosgi, the share of the subsis-
tence crop sorghum decreased over the last 10-15 years to 30%, whereas in Kana-
kanala more than 60% of the area is still cultivated with sorghum (Bouma and Scott 
2006). In Vaiju Babulgaon many traditional subsistence crops are still grown, but 
this is mostly for its fodder production. Most households in Vaiju Babulgaon earn a 
good income from dairy production and the marginal value of fodder is high.  
Market access, or lack thereof, not only affects crop choice, it also has a strong influ-
ence on the composition of household income. In Kosgi and Vaiju Babulgaon a lar-
ger  share  of  income  is  derived  from  non-agricultural  sources.  Although  farm-
households in Kanakanala and Kalyanpur watershed also migrate temporarily for ad-
ditional income, in the two integrated watersheds non-agricultural income sources 
play a more structural role. This might influence the opportunity costs of labour and 
hence the willingness of households to cooperate in SWC maintenance.  Participatory watershed development       
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Also, farm households in Kosgi and Vaiju Babulgaon use more externally purchased 
inputs and high yielding varieties than in the other two watersheds. This is both re-
lated to the better availability of these inputs and the fact that when farmers earn cash 
they have cash to spend on inputs as well. In Kanakanala and Kalyapur, farmers 
hardly use any agricultural inputs at all.  
Local governments have an important role to play in providing agricultural services 
and extension services, especially when agricultural markets fail. Only in Vaiju Ba-
bulgaon watershed, however, do agricultural extension services exist. Government 
investments in infrastructure and services are notably higher in the more market-
integrated watersheds, i.e Kosgi and Vajiu Babulgaon. Infrastructure is basic in all 
four watersheds, but whereas in Vaiju Babulgaon and Kosgi a relative large share of 
the households owns bicycles or motorbikes, in Kanakanala and Kalyanpur water-
shed mobility is much less. Both Vaiju Babulgaon and Kosgi watershed are located 
within 2 hours from a major urban center (Ahmadnagar respectively Mahbubnagar). 
Bus transportation services to the main urban centers are available in all four water-
sheds.  
The socio-cultural differences between the study sites are large. As Table 2.5 shows, 
Kalyanpur and Vaiju Babugaon are relatively homogeneous watersheds in terms of 
caste membership, but Kosgi and Kanakanala watershed are relatively caste divers. 
Table 2.5 Caste composition in the study sites. 
  Kosgi  Kanakanala  Kalyanpur  V.Babulgaon 
Other caste   16%  15%  5%  81% 
Backward caste  68%  69%  0  9% 
Scheduled caste   17%  5%  2%  9% 
Tribal population  0  12%  94%  1% 
 
Kalyanpur is a so-called tribal watershed, with a population consisting mostly of the 
aboriginal population of India. Tribals generally have a low socio-economic status 
and tribal regions are usually the most neglected regions of India. In Kalyanpur wa-
tershed, the best lands are generally owned by non-tribals and a relatively large pro-
portion of the land, former forestland, is still government owned. In Vaiju Babulgaon 
watershed, on the other hand, most of the population belongs to the ruling Marathi 
caste. This caste has a high socio-economic status and has been the ruling class of 
Maharastra for a long time. In Kosgi and Kanakanala watershed the population is 
more diverse. This has resulted in serious caste related conflicts in Kosgi, but in 
Kanakanala watershed the effect of caste heterogeneity seems low. It is important to 
note that although case heterogeneity might be high at the scale of the watershed, at 
the scale of the village it is often (much) less. This is actually a specific attribute of 
the caste system that certain castes are not allowed to mix.   Chapter 2   
 
     
34 
 
2.4.3 WSD implementation in the study sites 
In Kosgi implementation was undertaken by the government and finished in 2001. 
Investments concentrated on ground and surface water recharge and horticulture de-
velopment. During project implementation little time was allocated to stakeholder 
involvement and few families benefited from the WSD program. Overall, invest-
ments concentrated on groundwater recharge and few investments in rainfed agricul-
ture were made. Also, the quality of investments was low. Of the four villages se-
lected for the study, three were treated.  
In Kanakanala, the NGO SAMUHA is implementing WSD. Of the villages selected 
for the study, watershed work is ongoing in two villages and treatment in three other 
villages was finished in 2001. In one village, no watershed work has taken place. 
Overall, investments focus on increased soil moisture and biomass, erosion reduc-
tion, and improved access to supplemental irrigation. Implementation has been par-
ticipatory and some investments in local institution and capacity building have been 
made. Although, due to the size of the watershed, investments per hectare are rela-
tively low, the quality of investments is high and most villagers have benefited in one 
way or the other. For investments on private lands, households contribute 25% of the 
costs with voluntary labour and for investments on common lands 10%.  
In Kalyanpur, the NGO Seva Mandir has implemented WSD in three of the selected 
villages, whereas in three other villages the government invested in WSD. Invest-
ments were finalized in 2001-2002 and focused on soil moisture and biomass im-
provement, reduction of soil erosion and improved access to supplemental irrigation. 
In the Seva Mandir villages substantial investments in institution and capacity build-
ing were made, but government implementation was non-participatory and top down. 
In  one  village,  no  WSD  treatment  took  place.  For  investments  by  Seva  Mandir, 
households contributed 15% with voluntary labour, for investments on common land 
the community contributed 10% voluntary labour. In case of government WSD in-
vestment contributions were 10% and 5% respectively.  
In Vaiju Babulgaon, the NGO Watershed Organisation Trust (WOTR) finished WSD 
implementation in two out of the five selected villages in 2002. In one other village 
government  investments  were  made.  Government  investments  were  non-
participatory and badly implemented, but investments by WOTR were thus that one 
of the two villages is considered a model site. Households contributed 16% to the 
costs for both investments on private and common land. In the remaining two vil-
lages no structural investments in WSD were undertaken, although under drought re-
lief some investments did take place.  
In terms of impacts, in Kosgi, farmers indicated that investments increased ground-
water levels. Farmers with no access to irrigation did not benefit from the WSD pro-
gram since no measures were taken to increase soil moisture on their lands.  
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In Kanakanala’s Phase 1 villages (where WSD implementation finished in 2001), 
crop yields reportedly increased by 30-50% (Samuha 2003). In Phase II villages, in-
vestments are still ongoing, but farmers say that received benefits from the invest-
ments upstream. 
In Vaiju Babulgaon, crop yields in the villages with NGO implementation increased 
for both dryland and irrigated crops. Whether these crop yields increased because of 
increased soil moisture or higher use of agricultural inputs is not clear since both fer-
tilizer and pesticide use increased considerably over the same period of time. Also, 
WSD allowed farmers to shift to higher value crops, like vegetables and fruit, as the 
irrigated area increased from 8% of the total cropped area to 21% (WOTR 2003). In 
the village with government WSD, no impacts were reported.  
In Kalyanpur watershed, NGO investments were said to have increased groundwater 
levels, reduced soil erosion and increased the availability of biomass on common 
lands. Both households with and without access to irrigation benefited, but house-
holds with land downstream benefited most. In government implemented WSD pro-
grams impacts were perceived to be less.  
Due to the poor availability and quality of hydrological data we could not quantita-
tively assess the importance of up-down stream externalities in the different water-
sheds. Also, we could not assess whether the reported impacts were real. The infor-
mation from village meetings and household interviews indicates however that posi-
tive externalities exist at the meso-watershed scale. Downstream villagers indicated 
to have benefited from the SWC investments upstream. Finally, in all four water-
sheds, respondents suggested that due to the extended drought the impact of WSD 
had been relatively low. In all four watersheds, rainfall was below normal for the last 
three years (i.e. 2000-2002) and several respondents confided that results from the 
WSD program were yet to be seen. 
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The  literature  on  community  resource  management  has  credibly  established  that 
communities are capable of managing collective and semi-public resources in a so-
cially efficient way (Ostrom 1990, Bowles and Gintis 2002). However, most of the 
literature  concentrates  on  traditional  cases  of  community  resource  management, 
where, over time, communities established behavioural rules and internal sanctioning 
mechanisms to control free rider behaviour and coordinate use. In newly established 
community based projects such mechanisms might not be in place. Also, external en-
forcement mechanisms are generally lacking since community-based approaches ef-
fectively decentralize local resource management to the village scale. The question is 
whether  under  these  circumstances  sustained  voluntary  cooperation  is  likely,  i.e 
whether households are likely to voluntarily maintain the semi-public good.  
The literature on international environmental agreements suggests that sustained vol-
untary cooperation is possible, even when no sanctioning mechanisms, institutional 
arrangements  or  behavioural  rules  exist.  Like  community-based  projects,  interna-
tional agreements lack mechanisms to control free rider behaviour and cooperation 
depends on the incentives of individual participants to contribute to the public good. 
The literature on international environmental agreements suggests that for sustained 
voluntary cooperation three conditions have to be met: (i) the agreement should be 
profitable (ii) it should be reached by consensus, and (iii) the agreement should be 
self-enforcing (Finus 2003). The profitability requirement has been widely elabo-
rated  in  the  literature  on  common  property  resource  management,  but  the  self-
enforcement and consensus requirement have received much less attention so far. 
Hence,  applying  the  framework  of  the  literature  on  international  environmental 
agreements to the case of community-based resource management might lead to new 
insights regarding the importance of consensus and self-enforcement for ensuring 
voluntary cooperation in the long run.  
                                                   
∗ This chapter is based on Bouma, J.A., D.P. van Soest and A.J. de Zeeuw (2007). 
The importance of cooperation being profitable has been well explo  red  in  the  litera-
ture on community resource management. Basically, individuals need an incentive to 





The consensus requirement is related to the process of agreement formulation. For an 
agreement to be kept it is important that the signatories agree about how the objec-
tives are defined and in what way the objectives should be attained (Finus 2001). Os-
trom et al. (1992) mention the importance of consensus for voluntary cooperation, 
indicating that consensus increases the commitment of individual agents to contrib-
ute to the joint plan. Applying the consensus principle to the case of community- 
based SWC suggests that WSD projects should make sure that the entire community 
agrees with the objectives of WSD and is committed to contribute to these objectives 
in the long run. This is exactly what participatory approaches try to do. By involving 
communities in project planning and implementation, households become more sup-
portive of the investments undertaken and are expected to become more committed 
to contribute to SWC maintenance in the long run (Mansuri and Rao 2004). It is im-
portant to note, however, that in the case of community-based SWC special efforts 
are made to create consensus regarding the WSD investment plan, but that the main-
tenance of SWC investments is not explicitly discussed. Households are simply ex-
pected  to  voluntarily  contribute  to  SWC  maintenance  and  project  implementers 
hardly invest in creating consensus regarding the maintenance plan.  
The self-enforcement condition requires that the collective agreement is formulated 
in such a way that signatories have an incentive to contribute. In the case of commu-
nity-based SWC, ‘signatories’ would be the participating households. By decentraliz-
ing long-term maintenance to local communities, we basically expect these house-
holds to implicitly form a coalition to cooperate in SWC management and maximize 
the welfare of the group. The question we focus on in this chapter is whether a group 
of initially cooperative households can be expected to maintain a socially efficient 
level of SWC. This largely depends on the stable size of the coalition (Barrett 2003, 
Carraro and Marchiori 2002, Finus 2003). For a coalition to be stable those in the 
coalition should have no reason to leave (internal stability) and those outside the coa-
lition should have no reason to join (external stability). This is only the case if either 
coalition  membership  is  fixed,  or  if  the  net  benefits  of  cooperation  and  of  non-
cooperation are the same. Clearly, in the case of participatory WSD coalition mem-
bership is not fixed. Hence, for the coalition to be stable the benefits of cooperation 
and non-cooperation need to be the same.  
With respect to the interaction between the coalition of cooperative households and 
the  non-cooperative  households,  or  the  fringe,  the  standard  assumption  of  non-
cooperative coalition theory is that agents choose their contributions simultaneously 
(the Nash-Cournot assumption). Hence, coalition members jointly decide the effort 
level of the group and, at the same time, non-participating households individually 
choose their effort level. An alternative assumption (the Stackelberg assumption) is 
that  the  coalition  chooses  first,  taking  into  account  the  best-response  by  non-
participants. Because of the strategic advantage of being the first mover, the size of 
the coalition tends to be larger under Stackelberg than under Nash-Cournot (Finus 
2003).  Voluntary cooperation in the provision of a semi-public good       
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In our model we assume the coalition behaves according to Stackelberg and, hence, 
to have a strategic advantage. The rationale for this assumption is that households in 
the coalition can communicate about a joint strategy. Ostrom et al (1992) indicate 
that communication increases commitment to cooperate, which gives coalition mem-
bers an advantage over non-cooperative households that act alone.  
To analyze the conditions for coalition stability we develop a simple model in which 
households divide their time between agricultural production and investment in a 
public good, SWC. Investing in SWC increases the (public) amount of water avail-
able for agricultural production, but reduces the (private) availability of agricultural 
labour. We assume agents are symmetric and that the benefits of SWC investments 
are equally shared. Because the benefits of SWC investment are shared, households 
have an incentive to free ride on the contributions of others. Households committed 
to SWC provision form a coalition to maximize returns for the group. Whether a so-
cial optimum level of SWC provision can be reached depends on coalition stability.   
To evaluate how changes in the external environment affect coalition stability we 
analyze  the  impact  of  emerging  labour  markets.  Although,  traditionally,  off-farm 
employment opportunities were hardly available in India’s semi-arid regions, with 
the development of rural transport services farm households have started to migrate 
for part of the year (Deshingkar and Start 2003). This might have affected the incen-
tives for voluntary cooperation, but its impact of WSD effectiveness has been widely 
ignored. One reason for this could be that the WSD program started as an employ-
ment generation program and project-implementing agents still assume the opportu-
nity costs of labour to be very low. Another reason might be that project implemen-
ters generally view migration as a sign of distress (Chopra and Gulati 2001) whereas 
households mostly migrate during summer season when few crops are grown.  
Hence, we elaborate a model with and without external labour markets to evaluate 
the impact of emerging labour markets on the provision of a local public good
1. For 
both models we compare the outcomes of having a coalition of cooperative house-
holds with the social optimum outcome and the non-cooperative outcome. We derive 
three  main  results.  First,  the  relationship  between  the  external  environment  and 
community cooperation goes both ways. Emerging labour markets influence the in-
centives for village cooperation, but village cooperation also influences the impact 
emerging  labour  markets  have.  Second,  a  coalition  of  cooperative  households  is 
unlikely to maintain a socially optimal level of public good provision. With full mo-
bility between coalition and fringe it is not possible to fulfil the self-enforcement 
condition at a conservation level above the non-cooperative solution, unless the stra-
tegic advantage of the coalition is such that all households join the coalition.  
                                                   
1 Tarui (2007) also pays attention to influence of outside options on common property resource 





Third, the availability of an outside option tends to lower the level of water conserva-
tion, but might also enforce the strategic position of the coalition and, thus, improve 
SWC.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model. In sec-
tion three we solve the model for the case of no labour market. We derive the Nash 
equilibrium and the social optimum level of SWC and compare this with the invest-
ments provided by a stable coalition of cooperative households. In section four we do 
the same for the case with a labour market. The conclusions ensue.  
3.2 The role of SWC for agricultural production 
Households maintain resource conservation structures to increase the amount of wa-
ter available for their crops. Because of the public good externalities associated with 
water conservation, water availability depends on the efforts of the entire commu-
nity. Denoting the water conservation effort of individual household i by lwi, the 
amount of water available for agricultural production is a function of collective in-
vestment in water conservation ( ) ∑ =
N
i wi l
1 :  
( ) ∑ = =
N
i wi l R W
1 σ , with  ( ) 1 0
1 < ≤ ∑ = σ
N
i wi l ,  (1) 
where R is annual rainfall and σ is a parameter reflecting the share of rainfall that can 
maximally be captured (which depends on, for example, the hydro-geological char-
acteristics of the watershed).
2 Water is accessible by multiple users from the same 
village, N. We assume the share each user can appropriate is equal to 1/N, so that the 
amount of water an individual household can appropriate is equal to wi= W/N.
3  
Agricultural output of household i is produced using water (wi) and labour allocated 
to cultivation,( ) ci l , according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
β α
i ci i w l y =  with α+β <1.  (2) 
We can now determine the Nash equilibrium water conservation levels. We consider 
two cases; one where labour markets are missing, and one where households are able 
to trade labour at a given wage rate, ω. 
                                                   
2 For simplicity, we assume farm households treat water as a flow resource. This might seem like a 
strong assumption, but in practice households tend to neglect the sustainability issues associated with 
the maintenance of water stocks.    
3 This implies that water is a pure public good, and also that we do not account for unequal access to 
water resources. Allowing for heterogeneity in impact does not affect the Nash equilibrium and social 
optimum effort levels of our model.  Voluntary cooperation in the provision of a semi-public good       
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3.3 No labour markets 
Starting from the assumption of no labour market, households can decide how much 
labour to allocate to agricultural production  ci l , and how much to resource conserva-
tion  wi l . The total amount of labour of household i is fixed, and each household faces 
the following time constraint: 
ci wi l l l + =   (3) 
3.3.1 The social optimum and Nash equilibrium 
Using P to denote the agricultural output price, revenues of household i are equal to: 
( )
β
α π ∑ = =
N
i wi ci i l cl











P c .  (4) 
With no coordination between households to invest in resource conservation, each 
household maximizes individual profits, taking the water conservation decisions of 
all other households ( ) ∑ ≠ − =
i j wj i W l L  as given.  
The first-order conditions yield:  
ci W l L β α =  with   ∑ = =
N
i wi W l L
1 .  (5) 
Hence, the relative productivity of labour in agricultural production α and water con-
servation β determines the way labour is divided. The individual households’ best re-
sponse function for every possible level of water conservation efforts by all other 
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Note  0 / < ∂ ∂ N l
Nash
wi ; individuals have less incentive to contribute as the village gets 
larger.   
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Welfare would increase if households would coordinate their efforts. By maximizing 
village production the social optimum level of water conservation can be derived:   
max 
β α ) (





S l l c   (9) 
The first order conditions now result in:  
ci W l N L β α =   (10) 
 







=   (11) 
Upon comparing the socially optimal and Nash-equilibrium allocation of labour it is 
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 (for all N>1). Individual welfare under the social optimum sce-























i   (12) 
This is higher than individual welfare under Nash, if N>1.  
3.3.2 Coalition formation and stability   
Now, consider the case where a coalition of villagers aims to maximize the income 
of the coalition. This is basically a two-stage problem, where households first decide 
whether to join the coalition or not, and second what the effort level of the coalition 
should be. Typically, these problems are solved through backward induction. First 
the level of conservation effort is determined, given the size of the coalition, and 
second the number of signatories is derived. In accordance with the Stackelberg as-
sumption we assume that once the coalition is formed, coalition members strategi-
cally choose the level of water conservation investment based on the expected behav-
iour of non-member households. Although we start from the assumption of no labour 
markets, in section 3.4 we extent the analysis to the case with outside employment 
opportunities. First, let us derive the best response of non-cooperating households. 
Assume a non-cooperating fringe of n, hence a coalition of size N-n. Using super-
scripts C and D to denote coalition members and non-members, the objective func-
tion of non-members reads as: 
β α








i L L cl + = , 











W l L l L
1 1 ,     , i=1,2,….,N 
(13) 
or labor input in water conservation by the Coalition and by Defectors, respectively.  Voluntary cooperation in the provision of a semi-public good       
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  (14) 
Note that when the coalition reduces conservation effort by one unit, there is a less 
than proportionate increase in conservation effort by the defectors.  
 
In turn, the Coalition maximizes payoff given the fringe’s best response: 
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Consequently, the amount of labour defectors put into water conservation and agri-
cultural production is:  
( )( )
( )( ) ) ( ) (
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 the coalition will allocate all its labour to agricultural produc-














the fringe will allocate all its labour to agricultural production and conservation ef-
fort will be determined by (11)
4.  
 
                                                   
4 With total conservation effort: (N-n)(β/β+α)l . Basically, the coalition maximizes welfare for its 





What do these results mean? It basically means that only for a certain coalition size 
and for  α β >  both the coalition and the fringe contribute to soil and water conserva-




, the coalition stops contributing 




















N , the 
fringe stops contributing. Whether the resulting level of water conservation is higher 
than the level without a coalition depends on whether  l
N
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holds. Since this holds for every N, the total level of water conservation is higher 







N .  
The question is whether these results hold if there is full mobility between coalition 
and fringe. With full mobility between coalition and fringe, the stable solution in the 










  is  the  solution  for  which 
) 1 ( ) ( + ≥ − n n N
D C π π  (internal stability) and  ) 1 ( ) ( + − ≥ n N n
C D π π  (external sta-
bility) hold. Substituting the profit functions: 
β α
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and  
β α
α β β α
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, internal stability results.  



















. This means that the only 
possible stable coalition size results in water conservation levels that are close to 
those in the non-cooperative Nash solution. Hence, with free mobility between coali-
tion and fringe, the only possible stable coalition is the coalition where effort levels 
for the coalition and defectors are the same and equal or close to the Nash levels.  Voluntary cooperation in the provision of a semi-public good       
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3.4 With labour markets 
Introducing a labour market, the individual households’ time constraint becomes  
mi wi ci l l l l + + =   (22) 
where  mi l  denotes off-farm labour activities undertaken by household i.  
3.4.1 The social optimum and Nash equilibrium  
Given the presence of a labour market, the objective function has to be rewritten to 
allow households to allocate their labour off-farm and earn a fixed wage rate ω. 
( ) ) ( max
1 mi
N
i wi ci i l l cl ω π
β
α + = ∑ =   (23) 
This results in the following first order conditions:  
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Hence, by introducing a labour market the shadow price of labour becomes equiva-
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wi .  (26) 
Equations (25) and (26) show us that by introducing a labour market the level of wa-
ter conservation is no  longer  determined by the relative  productivity  of water as 
compared to labour, but by the relative benefits of any of these activities in compari-
son to the external wage rate. If external wages exceed a certain threshold, farm 
households move labour out of agriculture (and hence water conservation) until the 
opportunity costs of on and off farm labour are the same
5. The comparatative statics 
show that with an external wage rate the effectiveness of water conservation invest-
ment starts playing a role. The higher rainfall (R), the absorptive capacity of the wa-
tershed (σ) and agricultural prices (P), the more labour is allocated to water conserva-











P c ).  
                                                   
5 Note that households will never completely move out of agriculture according to this model, 





If we define  w ~  as the threshold value where wages are such that household invest-
ments in SWC are the same with or without a labour market, using (7) and (25) we 
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c result in a Nash labour input in water conservation that is 
lower than that without a labour market. For wages below the threshold value, Nash 
input in water conservation is in both situations the same.  
When households cooperate, the threshold wage changes. Using (11) and (26), the 
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N , the threshold wage with 
village cooperation is higher than the threshold wage with no cooperation. This can 
be explained by the fact that the productivity of on-farm labour is higher when vil-
lagers cooperate. It is an interesting result, as it shows that the relationship between 
the external environment and village cooperation goes both ways: the external envi-
ronment influences village cooperation, but the extent to which villages are coopera-
tive also determines the impact external factors have.  
3.4.2 Coalition formation and stability 
With a labour market and sufficiently high wages, the Defectors’ first order condi-
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  (31) 
Since every increase in effort by the coalition is now completely offset by a decrease 
in conservation effort by the fringe, the coalition does not contribute to water conser-
vation if wages are sufficiently high, or  ) ( ~ n w w ≥ . Defectors undertake all invest-
ments in water conservation, but with free mobility between coalition and fringe they 
are likely to also join the coalition. This reduces the number of defectors, thus in-
creasing the opportunity costs of water conservation and, hence, the threshold wage. 













  (32) 
If more households leave the fringe, or n’<n, the level of water conservation be-












. Now, the coalition can do two things. It can either continue to do 
nothing or it can start contributing to water conservation. If it chooses to do nothing, 












. However, if the coalition would 











welfare of the coalition is increased. In fact, the coalition would like to contribute 
more























 results in an equal decrease in water conservation effort by the fringe, this 
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6 Given the behaviour of the fringe, the first order conditions of the coalition are equal to (17) for N-n. 
Hence, the coalition would like to internalize the externalities of water conservation for its members, 
and invest more in water conservation than (33). 


































0    ,   (34) 
Defectors do not work on the labour market, but spend their remaining time on agri-
cultural production:    

















  (35) 
 











































' 1   (36) 
the fringe has an incentive to join the coalition until no defectors remain.  
Once the grand coalition has been reached, the coalition starts investing the socially 
optimal amount of water conservation as there are no more free-riders to neutralize 
this effect.  Hence, ultimately the emergence of a labour market positively influences 
the level of water conservation as it increases the strategic power of the coalition. 
This is in accordance with Finus (2001, 2003), who claims that when the slope of the 
best reply function is –1, the stable coalition under the Stackelberg assumption is the 
coalition with size N.  
3.5 Discussion   
The conditions for voluntary cooperation in  semi-public  good provision  have  re-
ceived relatively little attention in the literature on community resource management. 
This chapter has analyzed the conditions under which a coalition of initially coopera-
tive households is likely to voluntarily maintain a socially optimal level of semi-
public SWC investment. The analysis suggests that it is unlikely that a socially opti-
mal level of SWC investment is maintained, unless all households join the coalition 
and a grand coalition is reached.  
The emergence of a labour market negatively influences the level of semi-public 
SWC provision, unless it strengthens the strategic position of the coalition.  If the 
coalition has a strong strategic advantage it can credibly threaten not to contribute to 
SWC. This leaves defectors no other option than to either unilaterally provide all 
SWC investments or to join the coalition as well. Since the benefits of joining the 
coalition are always greater than the benefits of free riding, no free riders remain. Voluntary cooperation in the provision of a semi-public good       
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It is important to note that outcomes are radically different if the coalition does not 
behave according to Stackelberg. Under the Nash-Cournot assumption, the stable 
coalition is of size one and water conservation effort is close to Nash. Hence, the 
question is whether it is realistic to assume the coalition has a strategic advantage. 
Finus (2001) argues it is not, but he associates the strategic position of the coalition 
with the coalition having an informational advantage. Clearly, a signatory leaving the 
coalition is unlikely to lose the informational advantage of being a former coalition 
member. However, if we picture the coalition as having a strategic advantage be-
cause coalition members can communicate and agree upon a joint strategy whereas 
defectors act alone, it seems realistic to assume that the coalition behaves according 
to Stackelberg, and not Nash-Cournot.  
Using a model developed in the literature on international environmental agreements 
to explain community resource management has proven useful, as it has highlighted 
the importance of consensus and self-enforcement for sustained voluntary coopera-
tion. Overall, results indicate that explicit attention for the role of emerging labour 
markets and strategic coalition formation is important to improve the effectiveness of 
community-based approaches, like participatory WSD.  
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4. The effectiveness of participatory watershed 
development
∗  
4.1 Introduction  
Participatory WSD has become a good example of the so–called community-based 
approaches that have become one of the fastest growing mechanisms for channelling 
development assistance (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). The popularity of the approach 
stems from the claim that involving communities in project design and implementa-
tion improves investment targeting, increases government responsiveness, empowers 
the poor and strengthens community governance. However, evidence of the extent to 
which community-based approaches live up to these expectations is scarce: Mansuri 
and Rao (2004) detect a general dearth of well–designed evaluations with few cases 
proving a causal link between the participatory intervention and project outcomes. 
With respect to participatory WSD in India, a major evaluation was undertaken by 
Kerr et al. (2002). This study found participatory approaches to be more effective 
than the earlier top–down approaches, attributing success mainly to its responsive-
ness to local requirements and needs and to the time and resources committed to 
community organization.  
The main objective of this chapter is to assess the extent to which participatory ap-
proaches are also more effective in the long run. Whereas most studies focus on the 
short–term effectiveness of participatory WSD, there are indications that its long–run 
impact is much smaller. ODI et al. (2002) conclude from a qualitative study of sev-
eral WSD projects that maintenance of SWC is poor because institutions for commu-
nity governance fail to manage resources in a sustainable way. Kerr et al. (2002) ar-
gue that poor maintenance can be attributed to poor investment targeting and over–
subsidization. If households receive SWC structures they do not really want, these 
structures are unlikely to be maintained in the long run. Although over-subsidization 
might definitely be a factor, we would expect participatory implementation to partly 
compensate this effect. Better investment targeting is likely to increase the incentives 
for SWC maintenance and investments in consensus building can be expected to im-
prove cooperation as well (Ostrom et al. 1992, Finus 2003). 
                                                   





To what extent investments in community organization actually result in better in-
vestment targeting
1 and stronger conservation management at the village scale, is 
however an open question. We address this question by analyzing the impact of par-
ticipatory WSD on the intention of households to contribute to SWC in the long run 
while controlling for household characteristics and factors such as market access, in-
come inequality and resource scarcity. This allows us to identify conditions under 
which WSD efforts are more likely to succeed. The methodology used is a cross–
sectional analysis of data from 682 randomly selected households in four meso–scale 
watersheds
2. To distinguish between short– and long–term impacts, we study the ef-
fect of interventions on – stated – actual household investments in SWC, and on the 
intention  of  households  to  contribute  to  the  operation  and  maintenance  of  SWC 
structures in the future. Whereas our analysis of actual household SWC investments 
confirms that participatory approaches are more effective than top–down approaches 
in the short run, our analysis of household intentions indicates that investments in 
community organization do not increase the sustainability of WSD in the long run. 
However, as participatory implementation does increase the critical mass of house-
holds with SWC investment, participatory WSD indirectly does affect SWC mainte-
nance in a positive way.  
To get an understanding of the impact of participatory WSD at the village scale we 
then extend the analysis with an in-depth study of several of the study villages. We 
specifically focus on the role of maintenance funds and the distribution of WSD 
benefits. Maintenance funds are a recent addition to participatory WSD projects and 
little about their effectiveness is known. Because the statistical analysis indicates that 
the  availability  of  a  maintenance  fund  has  a  significant,  negative  impact  on  the 
household’s commitment to voluntarily contribute to SWC, it seems relevant to study 
their functioning at the village scale. Although the sample is not representative of 
WSD projects in general, by including two known success stories and one apparent 
failure we try to get insight into the range of effects. In the next section we present 
the conceptual framework. In the third and fourth section we present the approach 
and results of the household level analysis assessing the impact of participatory WSD 
on SWC maintenance. In the fifth section we present the results of the qualitative vil-
lage case study analysis and in the sixth section we conclude.  
4.2 Conceptual framework  
Extensive research has shown that SWC can increase the productivity of dryland ag-
riculture  and  improve  the  sustainability  of  resource  use  (e.g.  Wani  et  al.  2002, 
Honoré 2002).  However, a recurring concern is that farm households are reluctant to 
invest in SWC (e.g. Barbier 1990, Heerink et al. 2001, Pender and Kerr 1998).  
                                                   
1 Kerr et al. (2002) suggest that the negative impact of subsidization on SWC maintenance seems less 
pronounced in participatory projects.   
2 Although in the four study sites a total of 803 households were surveyed, due to missing data we 
could only include data from 682 households in the analysis.  The effectiveness of participatory watershed development       
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There are two explanations for why this may be the case.  First, the private benefit–
cost ratio of  SWC tends  to be low,  especially when compared to  investments in 
(groundwater) irrigation and agricultural intensification (Walker and Ryan, 1990).  
Low farm gate prices, uncertain revenues and increasing opportunity costs of labour 
due to improved off farm employment opportunities tend to make investment in rain-
fed agriculture rather unattractive.  
Second, investments in SWC have important public good externalities that give indi-
vidual households an incentive to free ride (Baland and Platteau 1996 and 1997). 
Depending on the type of investment, the size of the externality varies. For example, 
in situ investments in soil conservation tend to have fewer externalities than invest-
ments in water harvesting, because with water harvesting more of the benefits of 
conservation are shared. In the presence of significant externalities, investment deci-
sions depend on the expected behaviour of others. If people trust others to recipro-
cate SWC investment, or if a local authority exists to control free rider behaviour, the 
likelihood of collective investments increases. Since in most dryland watersheds no 
organizations exist to coordinate SWC, investments in community organization are 
needed to facilitate local cooperation and to enhance local commitment and trust.  
To address the low benefit-cost ratio of SWC investments, and to stimulate poor 
households to take up conservation measures on their plots, interventions in WSD 
heavily subsidize SWC investment. Depending on the program, households contrib-
ute voluntary labour but in most cases investments are effectively subsidized by over 
100% (Kerr et al. 2002). An important reason for the over–subsidization of WSD in-
vestments is the fact that in most regions the WSD program did not start as a project 
aimed at increasing the productivity of dryland agriculture, but as a program to offer 
employment in times of drought (Shah 2005). Although the focus shifted over time, 
subsidy rates remained high. 
To stimulate local cooperation, project implementers make substantial investments in 
community organization. There are several reasons why such investments are ex-
pected to increase the sustainability of WSD. First, investments in community or-
ganization increase the effectiveness of participation and create consensus regarding 
the WSD investment plan. This is important for better-targeted investments and for 
reaching a socially acceptable distribution of project benefits. Second, investments in 
community  organization  are  supposed  to  strengthen  local  institutions  and  hence 
community governance. At the most basic level, this implies the establishment of a 
watershed committee, but investments in local capacity building, empowerment and 
communication might also enhance community governance in the long run (Joy and 
Paranjape 2004). Evidence of the extent to which investments in community organi-
zation have indeed improved the sustainability of WSD is sketchy. In the short term, 
investments in community organization seem to have improved effectiveness through 
better–targeted investments and a better distribution of project effects (Kerr et al. 





In the longer term, however, the impact of investments in community organization is 
less clear and it is difficult to assess whether lack of SWC maintenance is caused by 
over–subsidization, lack of investment in community organization or because of ex-
ternal effects. This is what this study attempts to contribute: to assess (i) whether in-
vestments in community organization have improved the sustainability of SWC in 
India’s semi–arid watersheds, and (ii) whether any effects can be attributed to SWC 
subsidization, investments in community organization or external factors. 
With  regard  to  the  importance  of  external  factors,  from  the  literature  on  farm-
household decision making and local resource management, the impact of contextual 
factors such as resource scarcity, market access and inequality is well known (e.g. 
Ray  1999,  Bardhan  and  Udry  1999,  Agarwal  2001,  Wade  1988,  Ostrom  1990, 
Baland and Platteau 1996). The incentive to invest in SWC, or, for that matter, to co-
operate in semi-public good provision, largely depends on the net benefit the house-
hold expects to make. With regard to the impact of resource scarcity, Kadekodi and 
Chopra (1999) argue that the relationship between resource scarcity and cooperation 
is non–linear. Users do not cooperate if resources are very scarce, but may decide to 
cooperate if the resource base is rehabilitated and the expected benefits of coopera-
tion increase.  
Similarly, increased market integration is expected to have an ambiguous impact on 
local resource management. An increased value of resource use associated with mar-
ket integration affects the conditions for local management positively, but the in-
crease in “exit options” and volatility of income may affect resource management in 
a negative way (Kurian et al. 2002).  The impact of inequality on community re-
source management is also ambiguous (Baland and Platteau 1999, Mansuri and Rao 
2004). If the distribution of resource access is highly unequal, resource conservation 
might improve as those with access have higher individual benefits. But high ine-
quality can also affect community resource management negatively, in reducing the 
incentive to cooperate and decreasing the transparency of village decision-making.  
4.3 Methodology and data collection  
To analyze the impact of investments in community organization on the sustainabil-
ity of participatory watershed development, we use household survey data from 682 
randomly selected, landowning households in four meso–scale watersheds. In each 
site, we selected 4–6 villages on the basis of their location in the meso–watershed. 
From the selected villages, 20% of the households were randomly drawn to partici-
pate in the survey. Of the total of 22 villages selected for the household survey, some 
had been treated by a NGO, some had been treated by a governmental organization 
(GO) and some had not been treated at all. Overall, NGOs invested much more in 
community organization, participatory planning and implementation than GOs. In 
fact, the NGOs represented include some of the most successful examples of WSD in 
India. In the following, when we mention participatory we refer to the NGO ap-
proach. The effectiveness of participatory watershed development       
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The selection of villages for WSD treatment is based on the location of the village in 
the meso–watershed. As treatment of the upper catchment of the watershed tends to 
benefit  downstream  villages,  WSD  programs  target  upstream  villages first.  Since 
geographical location is something we can control for, project selection of upstream 
villages does not necessarily bias our results (Ravallion and Wodon 1998). However, 
upstream villages might also be poorer than downstream villages, which could con-
stitute another WSD selection criterion, or there could be other project placement cri-
teria that bias results in an unobservable way (Baker 2000). 
To detect a potential selection bias we conducted several tests. First, assuming aver-
age income to be a reasonable indicator for the level of economic development and 
poverty, we performed a t-test to see whether treatment was in any way correlated 
with average income. The lowest p–value being 0.79, there seem to be no significant 
differences in average income between treatments and sites. Second, we estimated 
the probability of a village having received NGO, GO or no treatment, i.e. propensity 
score matching, using village level indicators such as village homogeneity, average 
income, location and inequality. Except for location, none of the factors were signifi-
cant. Hence, we can safely assume that project placement does not significantly af-
fect our results, except for effects associated with the geographical location of the 
village in the meso–watershed for which we added a separate control. In Table 4.1, 
we present the distribution of sample household in terms of received WSD treatment 
and location in the watershed.  
Table 4.1  Representation of households in terms of WSD treatment & location. 
  Not treated  GO treated  NGO treated 
Number of sample villages  7  7  8 
Number of sample households   234  320   249 
Location in watershed 
(% of households) 
Up            0% 
Middle    68% 
Down      32% 
Up          37% 
Middle   63% 
Down       0% 
Up         54% 
Middle     0% 
Down     46% 
Source: IWMI (2004) 
4.4 Analytical approach and results 
To empirically test the impact of participatory WSD on household contributions to 
SWC, we specify two models. In the first model the regressand is a binominal vari-
able that reflects whether the household has actually invested in SWC or not
3. This is 
a stated variable, based on whether the household indicated that investments in SWC 
were made at the plot level. Since most households only invested in SWC on one of 
their plots we conduct the analysis at the household -level. For households that in-
vested in several plots we only included the largest plot.  
                                                   





Our main interest is whether outside intervention influences the probability of house-
hold SWC investment. We tested the following model: 
i i i V X I C SW ε β β β β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 constant   (4.1) 
where SWi is a discrete measure of household investment in SWC, C is a vector of 
contextual variables, I is a vector of variables measuring the type of intervention, Xi a 
vector of household level control variables including income per capita, land holding, 
access to irrigation, land quality and the households’ influence in village decision 
making and V a vector of community characteristics.   
Our intervention variables, I, capture the nature of the agent implementing WSD.  In 
Kanakanala an NGO initiated watershed investments, in Kosgi a GO, and in Vaiju 
Babulgaon and Kalyanpur a GO treated some villages whereas other villages were 
treated by an NGO. In all four sites at least one of the selected villages was not 
treated at all.
4  As mentioned before, NGO’s spent more on community organization, 
but they often spent more on physical SWC investments as well. In the first model, 
we cannot separate these two effects since data on investment costs per household or 
village lack. In the second model we attempt to separate these two effects by using 
direct and indirect intervention effects.
5 
In the second model the regressand is a binominal variable that expresses whether the 
household has the intention to contribute to SWC in the future. Again, this is a stated 
variable. Since different answers were possible, we defined two regressands: In the 
first,  all  positive  answers  (use  less  water,  operation  and  maintenance  (O&M)  of 
structures on own plot, O&M collective structures etc.) are grouped into one cate-
gory (‘Planned contribution All’), in the second definition only the answers specify-
ing  O&M  activities  were  taken as  a  positive  answer  (‘Planned  contribution  only 
O&M’).
6  The  two  definitions  allowed  for  extra  robustness  tests,  which  showed 
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4 Villages in the process of treatment have been included under the ‘not treated’ category. 
5 Since NGO’s do not offer higher subsidies (they often offer lower subsidies) we do not expect higher 
investments to result in extra distortions. Instead, we expect higher investment cost to translate into 
higher quality investment and better coverage of households in the area treated. This has actually been 
confirmed in village meetings and household interviews. 
6 See also question 48 in the household questionnaire, Annex B. The effectiveness of participatory watershed development       
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The model basically uses the same set of control variables as the SW model, except 
that to test for the indirect effect of more households having invested in SWC we 
used the predicted SW from the first model and calculated the average predicted SW 
at the village scale (PI). Also, we added a variable representing the existence of a 
maintenance fund (M)
7.   
We expect participatory WSD interventions to influence the households’ intention to 
contribute to sustained SWC in two ways. First, we expect participatory WSD inter-
ventions to directly influence the households’ intention to contribute through invest-
ments in community organization. This is captured by the relevant coefficient on 
vector I. Second, we expect an indirect effect, as WSD interventions are likely to in-
crease the number of households with investments in SWC. We expect this to have a 
positive impact on the households’ intention to contribute because the more house-
holds invest in SWC the greater the critical mass of households that are likely to con-
tribute to SWC in the future as well.  This indirect effect, which is basically the ef-
fect of effective subsidization, is captured by the coefficient on PI. M is a vector of 
dummy variables representing whether the village has a functional maintenance fund 
or not. Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for Xi, or the vector of control variables.  
Table 4.2   Summary statistics  
  Kosgi  Kanakanala  Kalyanpur  V.Babulgoan 
No. of observations  153  181  174  178 
HH with investments in SWC   30%   35%   36%   61% 
HH that intent to contribute to SWC-All    17%   12%   59%   93% 
HH that intent to contribute to SWC-O&M   13%   11%   52%   79% 
No.of household members 
  6.6  
(2.6) 
  6.7 
 (2.5) 
  6.6 
 (2.2) 
  5.6 
 (2.3) 









Gini coefficient income 
   .41 
  (.07) 
   .35 
  (.06) 
   .38 
  (.08) 
   .36 
  (.04) 



















HH with black soil in relevant plot (%)    33%   17%   21%   31% 
HH Influence on village decision-making (%)   23%   39%   18%   47% 
HH is member of village majority case (%)   68%   69%   98%   81% 
Source: IWMI 2004 (standard deviations in parentheses). 
                                                   
7 Village maintenance funds were established by several NGO’s to finance the maintenance of 
collective structures on the long run. The watershed committee generally manages this fund. Of the 22 
villages included in the sample, 3 villages have a functioning maintenance fund. Household interviews 
and village meetings showed that most households in villages with a maintenance fund believe the 





The figures presented in table 4.2 show that average income is four times higher in 
Vaiju Babulgaon watershed vis-à-vis the other watersheds. This can be explained by 
the  fact  that  the  overall  level  of  socio-economic  development  is  higher  in  Vaiju 
Baulgaon as compared to the other watersheds. Besides, most households gain a sub-
stantial income from dairy production and have at least one household member with 
a stable non-farm income source. To control for differences in the level of socio-
economic development, we include the variable ‘average village income’ in the re-
gression analysis.  
Differences in household income are especially large in Kosgi watershed, which is 
reflected in the high Gini coefficient for income.
8 Although we would have preferred 
to include a Gini coefficient representing inequality in irrigation access, due to the 
fact that data were collected in a drought year, data reflecting the irrigated area were 
distorted and could not be used. Hence, access to irrigation is defined as a dummy 
representing whether a household has access to surface water (a village tank), deep 
groundwater (a tube well) or shallow groundwater (open well) irrigation through the 
ownership of pumps, wells or land located near the irrigation canal.  
Land holding size is relatively large in Kanakanala because population pressure is 
low. In Kalyanpur, average landholding size is smallest since more than 50% of the 
watershed has a slope of over 5%. Land quality, mainly determined by soil type and 
slope, is heterogeneous in all four watersheds. For the analysis, we used only land 
quality information regarding the plot where investments in SWC were made. Be-
cause of the poor quality of slope data, these were not included. The household’s 
perceived influence on village decision-making is a dummy variable, which meas-
ures whether the household feels capable to influence village decision-making or not. 
With this variable we expect to measure the households’ position in village decision-
making and its impact on the choices the household makes
9. The number of house-
hold members is relatively equal, except for Vaiju Babulgaon. We include a variable 
reflecting whether the household is a member of the village majority caste group 
since this might affect the household’s commitment to cooperate as well. For more 
information about the household survey data and the variables used we would like to 
refer to Annex A and B. 
                                                   
8 To control for the potential endogeneity of household income, we included the predicted value of 
household income (with the explanatory variables Kosgi, Kanakanala, Kalyanpur, average village 
income, household membership of majority caste group, number of household members and 
household access to black soil. R2= 0.40). However, since this did not change the results, we report 
the stated variable in table 4.3 and 4.5.  
9 Although we expected the type of intervention to influence the household perceived ability to 
influence decision-making, we could not properly determine whether this was the case as the 
explanatory power of the model was very low (R2= 0.08). Still, the type of intervention had no 
significant impact, so we do not need to use the predicted value to control for potential endogeneity 
problems and can use the stated variable instead.   The effectiveness of participatory watershed development       
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Table 4.3 presents the results of the first model. Since in both cases the regressand is a 
discrete variable we use Probit analysis
10. 
    Table 4.3 The impact of WSD interventions on household SWC investment 
 
Household SWC investment 
 
  Coefficient (S.E.)  Marginal effects 
Average village income (Rs ‘000) 
 
Market access # 
    0.06*  
   (0.03)  
    0.02   
   (0.18) 
    0.02 
 
Very low rainfall region # 
  –0.39*   
   (0.21) 
  –0.15 
NGO investment WSD # 
    0.67 ***  
   (0.18) 
    0.26 
GO investment WSD # 
  –0.06   
   (0.17) 
 
Downstream location in watershed # 
  –0.35  ** 
   (0.17) 
  –0.13 
Upstream location in watershed # 
    0.23   
   (0.18) 
 
Land holding size (acres) 
    0.04 ***  
   (0.01) 
    0.01 
Household has access to irrigation # 
    0.29 ** 
   (0.14) 
    0.11 
Income per capita (Rs ‘000) 
    0.01  
   (0.01) 
 
Gini coeff. income capita 
–  4.44***  
   (0.94) 
  –1.7 
Black soil # 
    0.32 *** 
   (0.12) 
    0.13 
No.of household members 
    0.00   
   (0.02) 
 
Household is member village majority caste # 
  –0.17   
   (0.14) 
 
Household can influence decision making # 
    0.06   
   (0.11) 
 
Constant 
    0.72   








         105.5 (15) 
        0.13 
The outcomes presented are the result of a Probit analysis. *10% significant ** 5% significant 
*** 1% significant. Robust standard errors are presented between brackets. #= dummy variable 
                                                   
10 In the absence of specific knowledge about the distribution of data there exist no general criterion 
to determine whether Probit is the most suitable method to use (Greene 2003).  However, since the 





The regression analysis confirms the results of earlier studies that participatory ap-
proaches are more effective: The probability of households investing in SWC in-
creases with 26% in watersheds subjected to participatory intervention. Government 
intervention, in contrast, does not have a significant effect. Households with larger 
landholdings, access to irrigation and with black soil are more inclined to invest in 
SWC than households with smaller, dryland plots and red or other soils. This con-
firms the finding that small landowners are less willing to invest because the fixed 
costs  of  land  loss  to  SWC  investment  are  relatively  high.  Also  it  confirms  that 
households with black soil are more likely to invest since the soil moisture retention 
capacity of their soil is relatively high (Wani et al. 2002, 2003).   
Village income inequality has a negative impact on household SWC investment. This 
might be an indication of rent seeking behaviour by the local elite. The significant, 
positive effect of average village income could either indicate that average income 
levels are important for household SWC investment, or that the specific characteris-
tics of Vaiju Babulgaon watershed are conducive for household investment in SWC.   
The predictive accuracy of the model is relatively low. Whereas the model estimates 
the probability of overall household SWC investment with 98% accuracy, for indi-
vidual households the accuracy is only 68%. An explanation for the low predictive 
accuracy could be that data on household specific factors, like slope and location in 
the micro-watershed, are missing. Hence, whereas on average the model is accurate 
in predicting household participation, the variation at household level cannot be ex-
plained. 
Table 4.4 Hit and miss table of the predictive accuracy SWC investment model 
  SWC=1  SWC=0  Total 
Probability > 0.5  139  69  208 
Probability < 0.5  152  337  489 
Total  291  406  697 
 
Now that we have confirmed the result that participatory approaches are more effec-
tive in the short run, we turn to our key question, whether participatory approaches 
are more effective in the long run.  In table 4.5 we present our main results. The effectiveness of participatory watershed development       
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Table 4.5   The impact of WSD interventions on future SWC contributions 









Average income village (Rs ‘000) 
Market access # 
   0.51 *** 
  (0.10) 
– 1.23 *** 
  (0.25) 
    0.20 
  –0.46 
   0.32 *** 
  (0.07) 
– 1.07 *** 
  (0.23) 
  0.12 
 
–0.39 
Very low rainfall # 
– 2.04 *** 
  (0.48) 
  –0.69 
– 1.41 *** 
  (0.35) 
–0.51 
NGO investment WSD # 
   1.38  
  (0.89) 
 
   0.47  
  (0.66) 
 
GO investment WSD # 
– 0.64 *** 
  (0.24) 
  –0.25 
–  0.67 *** 
   (0.21) 
–0.25 
Downstream location in watershed #  
– 0.37  
  (0.54)  
 
–  0.16  
   (0.43) 
 
Upstream location in watershed # 
   1.03 *** 
  (0.33) 
    0.38 
   0.45 * 
  (0.25) 
  0.18 
Land holding size (acres) 
   0.04  
  (0.04) 
 
   0.02  
  (0.02) 
 
HH access to irrigation # 
   1.23 *** 
  (0.37) 
    0.46 
   1.00 *** 
  (0.25) 
  0.35 
Income per capita (Rs ‘000) 
   0.04  * 
  (0.02) 
    0.02 
   0.01  
  (0.02) 
   
Gini coeff. Income per capita 
– 7.74  
  (5.35) 
 
– 1.15  
  (3.88) 
 
Black soil # 
   0.77 ** 
  (0.39) 
    0.29 
   0.29  
  (0.26) 
 
Predicted probability of HH invest-
ment in SW (%) 
– 4.85  
  (3.31) 
 
– 3.13  
  (2.02) 
 
Average predicted SW investment in 
village (%) 
   0.41  
  (1.98) 
 
   3.12 * 
  (1.87) 
  1.20 
No.of  household members 
   0.04  
  (0.03) 
 
– 0.00 
  (0.03) 
 
Household is member village major-
ity caste # 
–  0.16 
   (0.26) 
 
– 0.03  
  (0.18) 
 
Availability of maintenance  
fund # 
HH capability to influence decision 
making # 
–  0.73 ** 
   (0.31) 
   0.41 *** 
  (0.16) 
  –0.28 
    0.16 
– 0.81 *** 
  (0.28) 
   0.31  ** 
  (0.13) 
–0.27 
  0.12 
Constant 
   2.07  
  (2.68) 
 
– 0.96  
  (1.99) 
 
         
# Observations 
Log Likelihood 





          269.8 (18) 




          228.22 (18) 
     0 .31 
The outcomes presented are the results of a Probit analysis. *10% significant ** 5% significant *** 





Table 4.5 shows some interesting results. First, external factors become highly sig-
nificant once households have to finance investments in SWC themselves: Market 
access and aridity both have a significant, negative effect. The negative impact of 
high aridity suggests that high resource scarcity reduces the incentive for resource 
conservation, possibly because the benefits of investment are relatively low. The sig-
nificant, negative effect of market integration seems to indicate that with the devel-
opment  of a  cash economy, the opportunity costs  of labour start to  play  a more 
prominent role.  Since more market-integrated watersheds tend to have better access 
to labour markets, the incentive for households to maintain SWC in these watersheds 
could be attenuated.  
Second,  household  access  to  conservation  benefits  (i.e.  irrigation,  black  soil)  in-
creases the probability of households significantly contributing to resource conserva-
tion. This is in accordance with the results of Kerr et al. (2002), who show that 
households with access to irrigation invest structurally more in operation and main-
tenance. Similarly, influential households are more likely to contribute to long-term 
SWC, possibly because they had more influence on where WSD investments were 
made.   
The most striking and interesting result, however, is that investments in community 
organization,  i.e.  implementation  by  an  NGO,  have  no  significant  impact  on  the 
household’s intention to contribute to SWC in the long run. This result is robust for 
the alternative definition of the regressand (i.e. including only planned contributions 
to O&M). Interestingly, implementation by a GO does have a significant, negative 
impact. This seems to indicate that if households cannot actively participate in WSD 
planning and implementation they do not feel responsible for the maintenance of 
these structures in the long run. This is in line with the theoretical analysis of chapter 
three.  With  no  consensus  regarding  the  WSD  investment  plan,  households  are 
unlikely to voluntarily cooperate in the long run. Although we would also expect a 
positive sign for NGO implementation, the fact that this impact is insignificant could 
also be an indication that investments in community organization failed to create 
consensus at the village scale.  
Indirectly, NGO approaches do influence household intentions possitively. By in-
creasing the critical mass of households with investments in SWC the intention to 
contribute increases. This only holds for the alternative definition of the regressand; 
more investments in SWC do not improve the incentive to reduce water use or con-
tribute to SWC in other ways. The availability of a maintenance fund negatively af-
fects the household’s intention to contribute to future SWC, probably because house-
holds believe the fund takes full responsibility for SWC maintenance.
11  
                                                   
11 Results are also robust for estimation with a fixed effect model, where contextual variables are 
replaced by watershed scale fixed effects.  The effectiveness of participatory watershed development       
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With respect to the predictive accuracy of the model, the model predicts long-term 
household participation accurately at 93% (Planned contribution- All) respectively 
91% (Planned contribution- only O&M). For individual households, accuracy is also 
relatively good at 85% respectively 82%.   
Table 4.6  Hit and miss table of predictive accuracy future SWC model*   
Classified  PLANOM=1  PLANOM=0  Total 
Probability> 0.5  265   (221)  34    (55)  299 
Probability < 0.5  73     (72)  325  (349)  398 
Total  338   (293)  359  (404)  697 
*Figures between brackets reflect the predictive accuracy of ‘Planned contribution- only O&M’.   
The results indicate that whereas participatory approaches might increase the critical 
mass of households willing to contribute to SWC, investments in community organi-
zation do not seem to have much effect. The establishment of a maintenance fund 
further decreases household commitment to contribute to SWC. However, if mainte-
nance is successfully taken over by village level institutions, outsourcing might im-
prove the sustainability of participatory WSD. Whether this seems to be the case will 
be the subject of the next paragraph.  
4.5 The impact of participatory WSD at the community scale 
To analyse the impact of participatory WSD on community resource management we 
selected 6 villages for further case study analysis. Due to logistical problems, we 
could not select any villages in Kanakanala watershed, but in the remaining three wa-
tersheds we selected two villages of similar size and location but of a different treat-
ment type. To focus on well-implemented participatory projects, we selected two 
known success stories, Bicchiwara and Vaiju Babulgaon. In each village, 20 of the 
households  that  participated  in  the  household  survey
12  were  further  interviewed 
about the investments made in SWC, the operation and maintenance of these invest-
ments and community resource management. Interviews and village meetings took 
place between October-December 2004 and were performed by local research assis-
tants on the basis of core questions and structured questionnaires.  
The main aim of the case study analysis is to get better insight into how investments 
in community organization influence community resource management, in particular 
the functioning of local watershed committees and maintenance funds. Table 4.7 pre-
sents the characteristics of the case study villages
13.  
 
                                                   
12 In most villages, except for Dagawadi and V.Babulgaon, this constituted for all the households that 
had participated in the household survey.  
13 In the same six villages we conducted trust game experiments, the results of which are presented in 





Table 4.7  Characteristics of the case study villages  





Dagawadi  223  Up  GO treated  No  Homogeneous  V.Babulgaon  
V.Babulgaon  264  Up  NGO treated   Yes  Homogeneous 
Bicchiwara  243  Up/Middle  NGO treated  Yes  Homogeneous  Kalyanpur  
Karji  115  Up/Middle  GO treated   Yes  Heterogeneous 
Sampally  164  Middle/Down  GO treated  No  Heterogeneous  Kosgi 
Kadampally  187  Middle/Down  Not treated  No  Heterogeneous 
 
With regard to the functioning of the watershed committee, in the NGO villages sub-
stantial investments were made in community organization. In both villages, invest-
ments in community organization started prior to the establishment of the watershed 
committee. After a substantial period of awareness raising and training, watershed 
committee  members  were  elected  democratically.  Once  the  watershed  committee 
was established, meetings were open for everybody to attend. Committee members 
received training to ensure accountability and most villagers knew what decisions the 
watershed committee  had  made.  In  both  NGO villages, the  project-implementing 
agent also created a maintenance fund. The watershed committee manages this fund 
to finance the material costs of collective SWC structures.
14  
In the WSD projects implemented by the government, few investments in commu-
nity organization were made. The project-implementing agent basically selected the 
watershed committee members, who were often members of the local elite. Some-
times, low-caste households or women were also included in the watershed commit-
tee, but when interviewed they indicated to have had no influence on project out-
comes at all.
15 Watershed committee meetings were not open to attend and most vil-
lagers were not aware of the decisions that had been made. Whereas in the GO vil-
lages the watershed committee stopped functioning after project implementation, in 
the NGO villages it continued to work. The main function of the remaining commit-
tees was the management of the maintenance fund. In Karji, the GO village with a 
maintenance fund, people did not know who managed the fund. In all three villages 
with a maintenance fund, respondents complained that the allocation of funds was 
not transparent and that rules regarding fund management were not clear.  
                                                   
14 The establishment of a maintenance fund is no common practice. We explicitly selected cases with 
a maintenance fund to analyze whether the existence of a maintenance fund seems to ensure the 
maintenance of SWC structures in the long run.  
15 In some cases, members did not even know they were officially a member of the watershed 
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In general, there seemed to be quite some mistrust regarding the watershed commit-
tee. An important reason for the mistrust seemed to be that respondents felt the bene-
fits of WSD had not been equally distributed, and that in the allocation of SWC sub-
sidies the watershed committee had played an important role. This might also pro-
vide an explanation for why investments in community organization do not seem to 
influence the household’s intention to contribute to SWC maintenance. If villagers 
feel that the watershed committee does not represent the interests of the entire vil-
lage, consensus regarding  the WSD investment plan is  likely to be low. In geo-
graphically  and/or  social-economic  heterogeneous  communities,  households  com-
plained more about an unequal distribution of benefits than in homogeneous commu-
nities. For example, in Rajasthan, the geography of the area greatly determines the 
distribution of benefits. According to several respondents, members of the watershed 
committee assured investments benefited their households most. Even in the most 
participatory projects, capture by local elites could not be avoided, however.  
Elite-dominated village decision-making might also explain why in the preceding 
analysis economic inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, had a significant 
negative effect on actual household SWC investment but did not significantly affect 
the household’s intention to contribute to future SWC. With higher inequality, local 
elites are more likely to capture part of the project funds, but this does not necessar-
ily influence the incentives of households to contribute to SWC in the long run.  
When we asked respondents whether they thought collective structures were properly 
maintained, respondents from NGO initiated interventions more often replied that 
maintenance was satisfactorily than those from GO villages
16. However, the differ-












Figure 4.1   Perceived maintenance of collective SWC structures  
                                                   





An  important  reason  for  the  higher  satisfaction  levels  in  participatory  projects 
seemed to be the higher quality of investment. For example, in Sampally (GO), re-
spondents mentioned that no collective investments were made as contractors, to-
gether with the local elite, pocketed the money. In Dagawadi and Karji village (both 
GO), respondents said that structures had already fallen apart because of the poor 
quality of the material used. On the other hand, in Bicchiwara and Vaiju Babulgaon 
(both NGO), most structures were still functional and respondents were more satis-
fied. Hence, participation seems to have a positive influence on the quality of project 
implementation. This is in accordance with Galasso and Ravallion (2005) who sug-
gest that community based approaches might reduce rent-seeking behaviour of gov-
ernment officials and project implementers through local monitoring and control. 
Turning  to the impact of participatory watershed development on community  re-
source management, impacts were perceived to be very small. Although in some vil-
lages (i.e. Vaiju Babulgaon and Bicchiwara) the watershed committee established 
rules to ban the drilling of new tubewells, respondents complained that rules were 
abolished as soon as the project implementers left the stage. Also, there was a lack of 
clarity with regard to the maintenance of collective structures and the rules and re-
sponsibilities regarding the use of the maintenance fund.  
In Bicchiwara and Karji, respondents did perceive participatory WSD to have posi-
tively influenced resource management, but this was largely because the implement-
ing NGO still plays an active coordinating role.  
4.6  Conclusions  
We have examined whether investments in community organization increase the sus-
tainability of WSD interventions in India’s semi-arid watersheds. While participatory 
approaches are associated with more effective WSD project implementation, we find 
that interventions have no direct impact on the intention of households to contribute 
to SWC maintenance. Indirectly, participatory WSD does influence SWC mainte-
nance positively by increasing the critical mass of households with SWC. However, 
this seems to be the result of effective subsidization rather than of investments in 
community organization.   
The main impact of participatory WSD seems to be that more funds reach the target 
group: this not only causes the indirect effect of having a larger critical mass of 
households with SWC investments, it results in higher quality SWC investments as 
well. This is important for the sustainability of participatory WSD for the simple rea-
son that structures are less likely to fall apart. The positive impact of having a larger 
critical mass of households with SWC investment is in line with the analysis in chap-
ter 3. A larger group of cooperative household’s increases the likelihood that a so-
cially efficient level of semi-public SWC investments is maintained in the long run.  The effectiveness of participatory watershed development       
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The  investments  in  community  organization  that  characterize  participatory  ap-
proaches were not found to have much effect. First, household commitment to SWC 
maintenance did not improve with investments in community organization. However, 
since GO implementation was shown to have a significant, negative impact, invest-
ments  in  community  organization  seem  to  at  least  help  neutralize  the  over-
subsidization effect. Besides, the case study analysis indicated that investments in 
community organization might not have succeeded in creating consensus regarding 
the WSD investment plan. This could help explain why investments in community 
organization had no significant impact on the intention to cooperate in SWC mainte-
nance in the long run.  
Second, local rent-seeking behaviour could, even in the most participatory projects, 
not be controlled. Higher income inequality caused fewer households to invest in 
SWC, which seems to reflect local rent-seeking behaviour, i.e. the capture of WSD 
benefits by the local elite.  This result was confirmed in the case study analysis 
where even in the most successful examples of WSD implementation respondents 
complained members of the watershed committee had disproportionately benefited 
themselves.  
Third, even in the most participatory projects, the watershed committee did not gain 
much authority and its role in community resource management was perceived to be 
small.  
The establishment of a maintenance fund did not seem to safeguard the long-term 
maintenance of SWC. Respondents indicated that funds were used rather arbitrary 
and that no rules regarding fund allocation and contributions did exist. Although fur-
ther analysis would be required to evaluate the role of maintenance funds, since the 
household analysis indicated that the existence of a maintenance fund erodes house-
hold  commitment  to  contribute  voluntarily,  the  existence  of  a  maintenance  fund 
might end up worsening the situation if not managed in an effective way.  
Finally, the analysis indicated that higher aridity and better market access negatively 
influence the household’s intention to contribute to SWC maintenance. This might be 
explained by the fact that higher aridity reduces SWC benefits and better market ac-
cess increases SWC costs, i.e. the opportunity costs of labour. Since in semi-arid In-
dia even remote watersheds are becoming more integrated in the market economy, 
this could actually be an indication that it might be difficult to structurally improve 
the effectiveness of WSD in the long run.  





        
69 
5. Social capital and community resource management
∗  
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we analyzed whether investments in community organization 
can improve the effectiveness of WSD in the long run. However, involving commu-
nities in project planning is already expected to enhance voluntary cooperation as 
communities are expected to control a stock of social capital that facilitates local co-
operation and collective action in the long run (Bowles and Gintis 2002, Gächter et 
al. 2004). While the exact definition of social capital is subject to debate, most ana-
lysts treat it as a characteristic of communities, and describe it in terms of trust, 
norms  and  networks  that  enable  collective  action  (e.g.  Putnam  1993,  Fukuyama 
1995, Woolcock and Narayan 2000, Bowles and Gintis 2002).
1 Social norms influ-
ence people’s preferences and constraints, lower transaction costs (as they preclude 
the necessity to write contracts that capture all contingencies), and facilitate the ex-
change of information (Bowles 2005). Most empirical work – be it based on cross 
section  analysis  or case studies –  suggests  a positive  relationship  between  social 
capital, the quality of governance and economic development (e.g. Putnam 1993, 
Knack and Keefer 1997, Knack 2002, Pretty and Ward 2001). This is likely to ex-
plain the popularity of community-based approaches, which make use of the existing 
stock of social norms and expectations to facilitate voluntary cooperation and com-
munity resource management.  
In this chapter, we focus on the role of trust for voluntary cooperation. We interpret 
trust as ‘the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and coop-
erative behaviour based on commonly shared norms on the part of other members of 
that society’ (Fukuyama 1995), a causal definition that allows for empirical interpre-
tation (Durlauf 2002). We believe attention for the role of social capital in voluntary 
cooperation is important as improved understanding of the importance of trust en-
ables NGOs and government agencies implementing community-based development 
projects to tailor their efforts in areas where the returns to investment are largest.  
                                                   
∗ This chapter is based on Bouma, J.A., D.P. van Soest and E.H. Bulte (2007). 
1 An alternative approach is to view social capital as an individual’s social characteristics and skills 





The main objective of our analysis is to analyze i) how trust is correlated with socio–
cultural community characteristics, and ii) how social capital affects community re-
source management. To measure trust, we use data from experiments we conducted 
in three of the project sites (Kosgi, Kalyanpur and Vaiju Babulgaon).  Based on ac-
tual behaviour of the respondents, rather than stated beliefs
1, in these trust game ex-
periments we construct a measure of social capital, based on ‘trust.’ We then relate 
experimental play and the measure of social capital to real behaviour in terms of vol-
untary contributions to SWC – something that few other studies have done (Gächter 
et al. 2004, Cramb 2005).  
Since in caste heterogeneous villages  social interaction is  expected  to take  place 
along caste lines (Dumont 1970), the availability of social capital in heterogeneous 
communities is expected to be less. In fact, caste heterogeneity might be a good 
proxy for the availability of social capital. Hence, we compare the effectiveness of 
using trust as an indicator for social capital and using caste homogeneity. The advan-
tage of using caste homogeneity is that it is easily observable, which would reduce 
data collection costs.  
With respect to the experimental proxy of social capital, a key hypothesis is that “so-
cial capital” identified in the experiment generalizes to other behaviours and contexts 
– higher levels of trust in the experiment are expected to translate into higher propen-
sities to invest in SWC. Falk (2004) demonstrates that social preferences identified in 
experiments indeed spill over to other domains such as voluntary contributions to 
charities.  Interestingly, List (2005) finds that this is not true for domains where par-
ticipants feel the pressure of the market.  While agents display social preferences in 
laboratory settings, the same individuals’ behaviour in the marketplace is best de-
scribed as self–interested, and the main reason for deviating from self–interest in 
List’s study is concern about one’s reputation. Since we are interested in individual 
contributions to a semi-public good, we expect that the experimental results will spill 
over, i.e. that trusting behaviour in the experiment translates into a higher propensity 
to contribute to future SWC.  
The main objectives and findings of the analysis are as follows. First, we find that the 
household’s trusting behaviour is not directly determined by socio-cultural commu-
nity characteristics, but rather by the social position the individual has. For example, 
participants that belong to the majority caste group are more trusting, whereas par-
ticipants that depend on outside sources of income trust less. Second, social capital is 
a significant determinant of the household’s intention to contribute to future SWC, 
social capital being proxied as the average trust level at the village scale.  
                                                   
1 Empirical work has been plagued by problems that emerge when one attempts to measure social 
capital.  For example, using trust as an indicator, analysts typically resorted to survey questions to as-
sess whether respondents feel that other people can be trusted or not. The potential divergence, be-
tween stated versus actual preferences and beliefs, has been elaborated elsewhere and is a potential 
concern for trust surveys.  Social capital and community resource management       
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Interestingly, the individuals trusting behaviour is not significantly correlated with 
SWC investment.  So, while we are unable to predict individual behaviour in real life 
from experimental play, we do find a significant correlation between aggregate play 
and individual behaviour.  This suggests that the trust game may be used to measure 
social capital, provided social capital is interpreted as a community characteristic. 
Third, we find that caste homogeneity is a significant determinant of voluntary coop-
eration, its explanatory power being comparable to that of the average level of trust. 
This suggests that the easily observable indicator of caste homogeneity can be used 
as a proxy for social capital.       
The chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section we summarize the literature 
on the use of experimental methods to measure social capital, and outline the trust 
game.  In section three we present key results from the experiment and analyze the 
determinants of trust. In section four we analyze the role of social capital for com-
munity resource management and in section five we conclude.  
5.2   Measuring social capital using field experiments  
Economists  have  successfully  studied  individual  behaviour  using  experimental 
games. By having participants perform simple tasks or play simple games in the con-
trolled environment of a laboratory, the factors influencing individual behaviour can 
be carefully assessed. More recently, economists and others have also started to con-
duct experiments in ‘the field’. A good example is the work by Henrich et al. (2004), 
who conducted experiments in 15 small-scale societies all over the world with ‘real’ 
people instead of the students who usually participate in experimental games. They 
concluded that ‘experimental play often mirrors patterns of interaction found in eve-
ryday life’ (Henrich et al. 2004: 10–11) and that people use their experiences in eve-
ryday life to solve the problems they encounter in the experiment. For example, indi-
viduals from societies depending on collective activities are more cooperative than 
those from societies in which the family is the key decision making unit. Hence, us-
ing ‘real’ people instead of students seems to significantly influence results.  
Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) confirm this result, showing that the outcomes of ex-
periments conducted with students differ significantly from those conducted with 
non-students. Similarly, Harrison and List (2004) conclude that the outcomes of field 
experiments differ fundamentally from lab experiments, but their conclusion is based 
on a much wider range of differences than the difference in subject population alone.  
In fact, Harrison and List (2004) distinguish four types of experiments, i) conven-
tional lab experiment, ii) artefactual lab experiment (same as i) but with ‘real’ peo-
ple), iii) framed field experiment (same as ii) but with field context in either the 
commodity task or information set that subjects can use) and iv) natural field ex-
periment (when subjects do not know they are participating in an experiment). Fol-
lowing their taxonomy, the experiment we use to measure the availability of trust at 





Hence, although we conducted the experiment with Indian farmers, the experimental 
transactions were kept abstract, and were not translated to reflect actual situations 
from daily life. The advantage of this approach is that the interpretation of the ex-
periment can be better controlled; the possible disadvantage that participants might 
not associate the experiment with situations from daily life.
2 However, post–game 
evaluations revealed that subjects understood the game, and that they did compare 
the game  to situations from daily  life.  For example, in Kadampally participants 
compared the game to helping a friend (with the expectation that help is recipro-
cated) and in Bicchiwara a participant said the game showed that there are good and 
bad people, good people being individuals who adhere to the social norm of return-
ing what is being sent and bad people neglecting this norm. Hence, we expect that 
the experimental results will spill over to actual behaviour ‘in the field’.   
The game we conducted is the so-called trust game (Berg et al. 1995).  In this game, 
there are two participants, investor i and trustee j, who play the game anonymously. 
Investor i receives an amount of money  S  > 0 from the experimenter, and can “in-
vest” any amount  S Si ≤ ≤ 0 by sending it to trustee j.  The experimenter triples the 
amount sent, so the trustee receives 3Si.  Next, the trustee can send back any amount 
Rj between 0 and the received amount 3Si ( i j S R 3 0 ≤ ≤ ).  The sum of payoffs to the 
investor and the trustee is maximized if the investor sends the total endowment S  to 
the trustee, so that the aggregate payoff is 3S .  However, in the absence of sufficient 
trust that a share of the surplus will be returned, the investor sends nothing. 
One of the controversies in this field is about what trust games actually measure.  For 
example, Cox (2004) focuses on altruism and reciprocity, Bohnet and Zeckhauser 
(2004)  consider  fear  of  trust  betrayal,  and  results  by  Johansson–Stenman  et  al. 
(2005), Karlan (2005) and Schechter (2006) suggest that trust games measure both 
trust and risk preferences (e.g., a propensity to gamble).
3  While confounding altru-
ism and trust might not be such a problem, given that both are elements of social 
capital, it is evident that confusing risk preferences and trust could invalidate the re-
sults.  This however seems unlikely since there is no reason to believe that risk will 
                                                   
2 Levitt and List (2006) argue human decisions are not only influenced by monetary payoffs but also 
by (i) the nature and extent to which one’s behaviour is scrutinized (by the experimenter or 
otherwise), (ii) the context and process by which a decision is embedded, and (iii) self selection of the 
participants.  We argue that (i) and (iii) are unlikely to bias our results because our experiment was 
double blind (participants were informed about this so experimental scrutiny should not play a role) 
and because selection was by means of random design.  Nevertheless, the context of the experiment 
may affect behaviour as compared to behaviour outside the lab and, like other studies, we cannot 
control for this. 
3 Johanson–Stenman and colleagues find that the amount sent in trust games is a function of the stake 
size, Karlan finds that investors who send high shares are the same people who are more likely to 
default on loans in real life and Schechter finds that omitting risk aversion as a regressor might 
significantly affect the coefficients of explanatory variables such as gender and wealth.  Social capital and community resource management       
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vary systematically over the villages considered.  Still, in what follows we try to con-
trol for characteristics that are indicative of risk.  
Experimental data were gathered during February 2005 in the villages presented in 
chapter 4, table 4.8. Unfortunately, we had to discard all data from Dagawadi since 
participants turned out to be family related, which became obvious because in the 
Trust Game all participants sent the maximum amount. The same households that 
participated in the household survey were invited, some 100 in total (20 per village), 
to  send  one  member  to  participate  in  the  experiment  in  which  they  played  with 
households from their own village.  
The  experiment  closely  followed  the  trust  game  instructions  of  Barr  (2003)  and 
Burks et al. (2000). The English version is in Appendix C, but instructions were 
translated into the three local languages (Marathi, Telugu and Merwari).  The ex-
perimenter read out the instructions in all villages, and was assisted by local assis-
tants who had received extensive instructions and training beforehand. Transactions 
were performed with coded envelopes, and the experimenter was the only one with 
access to the codes.  The experimenter herself did not interact with the participants 
during play, so that interaction was double blind. To ensure random selection and 
transparency,  participants  drew  numbers  from  a  box  to  select  their  (anonymous) 
partner. The investor’s investment fund (S ) was Rs 50 (US$1.15), roughly equiva-
lent to one day’s wage. To induce participants not to communicate during the ex-
periment, those who did communicate did not receive another Rs 50 after the ex-
periment finished. This incentive proved to be effective as no communication oc-
curred during the actual experiment.  
Because of the low level of education of the respondents (33% was illiterate), in-
structing the participants posed a challenge.  Instructions needed to be read out aloud 
but also acted out, and were hence time consuming; it took between 2 and 3 hours to 
explain the game, and another 3 hours to (i) test each participant’s understanding of 
the game
4, and (ii) actually implement the game itself.  
To make sure that the participants remained concentrated, we decided to separate the 
instructions from the actual implementation of the experiment: The instructions were 
provided on one day, and the test and the experiment itself took place on the next.  
This implied a loss of control, as respondents were able to discuss strategies. Such 
group discussions took place in two villages: Kadampally and Bicchawara. This did 
not compromise our approach to measuring trust, because agents in the experiment 
were anonymous and any agreements were not enforceable. Potential agreements are 
cheap talk, and agents will only respect the joint strategy in case of sufficient trust – 
which is exactly what we intend to measure.  
                                                   
4 We allowed all participants to complete the game (to prevent uproar as the stakes – in local real 
income– were significant), but the data from seven participants are not used in the analysis as these  





But, since it is known that communication can affect the outcomes of play (Ostrom 
2006, Ledyard 1995), we do control for ex ante group discussions by including a 
dummy variable (with value one for Kadampally and Bicchawara, and zero for the 
other three villages) in the regression analysis below. 
In the instructions, participants were given a generic explanation of the game without 
announcing what role a particular participant was going to play. The experiment was 
set up such that each subject played both the role of the investor as well as that of the 
trustee, in line with the experiment conducted by Burks et al. (2000). Participants 
were not informed about this on beforehand. By letting participants play both roles, 
the  number  of  observations  was  doubled.  Besides,  information  was  gained  about 
each subject’s characteristics since we could use a subject’s play as a trustee to ex-
plain his/her decisions as an investor (and vice versa).   
Previous research suggests that having participants play both roles, but without in-
forming them about this on beforehand, should not affect the participants’ trust deci-
sion as compared to their actions when playing just one role (Burks et al. 2000).  
However, the same study also finds that the role reversal significantly reduces recip-
rocity.  Since our results are consistent with those of Burks et al., we base the social 
capital measure only on the trust decision, and not on ‘trustworthiness.’  
Finally, the fact that people’s behaviour may be influenced by contextual variables as 
well as household and village characteristics, posed some methodological difficul-
ties.  To determine the magnitude of social capital effects from individual data re-
quires that the impact of contextual variables on behaviour is properly addressed.  
While ideally this requires including village dummies as well as group averages of 
the variables used to control for household characteristics (Durlauf 2002), this was 
not possible due to the small size of our database (5 villages only) and multicollin-
earity problems.  Instead, we control for contextual variables by including a water-
shed dummy and by including group averages for key characteristics like household 
income.  
5.3   Trust and its determinants 
Table 5.1 presents a comparison of the results of the original trust game (Berg et al. 
1995), the trust game played by Barr (2003) with Zimbabwean farmers, and the In-
dian results.  We have also added the results obtained by Burks et al. (2000) as this 
study also used the ‘double–role’ playing strategy.   Social capital and community resource management       
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Table 5.1  Comparison of trust game results.  
  Single role  Double role 
 
Berg et al. 
(1995)
 



















Initial endowment  US$ 10.00  US$ 10.00  Zimb$ 20.00 
1  US$ 10.00  Rs 50.00
2 










Full day’s  
wage 
Proportion of ‘investors’ in-
vesting zero 
0.06  0.14  0.09  0.06  0.13 
Mean investment by inves-
tor (Si) 
0.52  0.65  0.43  0.62  0.49 
Mean return on investment 
for investor i (Rj/Si) 
0.89  1.31  1.28  0.78  0.87 
1 Zimb$ 20.00 = US$ 0.80. 
2Rs. 50 = US$ 1.15. 
In an overview of trust games conducted all over the world, Cardenas and Carpenter 
(2005) find that on average, participants sent 0.51 of their initial endowment, with a 
mean return on investment of 75%. However, amongst non-student populations the 
return on investment is 85%, which corresponds nicely with our result.
5  
Substantial variation underlies the average numbers, and investments in the villages 
where pre–game discussions took place are somewhat higher than in other villages.  
However, amounts sent in Kadampally and Bichiwara are not significantly higher 
than amounts sent in Karji, and the multivariate regressions below indicate that pre–
game discussions are not a significant variable.  This gives some credence to the no-
tion that such discussions are to a large extent cheap talk. 
Table 5.2  Means and standard deviations of investor and trustee behaviour  
  Kadampally  Sampally  Bicchiwara  Karji  V.Babulgaon 
Investor's  share  of 
endowment sent (Si) 
0.61 (0.23)  0.35 (0.23)  0.66 (0.37)  0.52 (0.36)  0.33 (0.22) 
 
Trustee's  share  re-
turned  of  amount  re-
ceived (Rj/3Si)  
0.25 (0.20)  0.29 (0.18)  0.32 (0.27)  0.27 (0.21)  0.32 (0.19) 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
With respect to trustee behaviour, the share returned is very similar in all five vil-
lages.  Closer inspection revealed little correlation between investments and the share 
returned across villages (for the entire sample the correlation coefficient is 0.15).  
                                                   
5 Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) give an overview of 28 trust game experiments, 12 of which are 
conducted with non-students. The average amount sent by non-students is 48% of the initial 
endowment.  Although a significant number of the experiments are conducted with non-student 





Indeed, consistent with Burks et al. (2000), we find that “role reversal” seems to have 
compressed (and possibly biased) trustworthiness.  For this reason we will focus on 
trust as a proxy for social capital in what follows, and only use the data on returner 
behaviour as a control variable in the trust regression.
6 
To analyze the determinants of the amount sent by the investor we estimate a regres-
sion equation using interval regression since participants were confined in their deci-
sion making to Rs10 notes (Greene 2003). We use the following specification:  
 Sik = constant + β1Xik + β2Gik + β3Ck + εik,   (5.1) 
where i indexes investors in village k. Xik is a vector of investor characteristics (caste 
group membership,
7 dependency on agriculture, income per capita, landholding per 
capita, literacy, access to irrigation, soil quality, sex of participant, family size, age 
class dummies, and the perceived ability to influence decision making at the village 
level – see appendix A for details), Gik is a vector of game specific events, and Ck is 
a vector of contextual variables (watershed fixed effects, average income in the vil-
lage). Finally, εik is the error term. Since per capita income is potentially endoge-
nously determined, we also try to instrument for per capita income in an additional 
IV regression analysis.
8 These results serve as a robustness check. 
The elements of the vector Gik were inspired by prior research of Barr (2003).  She 
found that the amount sent by the investor was a positive function of expected trust-
worthiness, or the behaviour of the average trustee.  Expected trustworthiness can be 
measured in two ways. The participant may have a notion of the average trustworthi-
ness in the village, or she may base her expectations on her own personal behaviour 
(introspection). Therefore Gik contains expected trustworthiness or average share re-
turned, as well as own behaviour as a trustee. Finally, we control for pre–game com-




                                                   
6 In future research it may be interesting to also base a social capital proxy on trustworthiness as 
measured in the Trust Game.  Our results, and those of Burks et al., suggests that it is best then to not 
ask respondents to play roles as both investor and receiver.  
7 We include case membership as a control variable because social interaction tends to take place 
along caste lines, which may affect trust game decisions. 
8 The results of the Wu test indicated that income per capita is not endogeneous, but for completeness 
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Table 5.3  Summary statistics  
Watershed  Kosgi  Kalyanpur  V.Babulgaon 
Village  Kadampally  Sampally  Bicchiwara  Karji  V.Babulgaon 
Total number of households  











% participants that are a member 
of the majority caste group # 
 70%   47%  100%   86%   90% 
% female participants#    15%   26%   37%   24%   25% 
%  participants  not  dependent  on 
agriculture# 
 10%   32%   21%   14%   10% 
% illiterate participants#    45%   47%   32%   29%   10% 
% participants older than 50   55%   26%   11%   17%   35% 
% participants between 20 and 50 
years old 
 45%   63%   74%   57%   45% 
Village  homogeneity  (%  partici-
pants from same caste) 
 70%   47%  100%   86%   90% 






























% HH with investments in SW #   44%   33%   37%   66%   80% 
% HH that intend to contribute to 
maintenance# 
 30%   21%   26%   33%   85% 
% HH with access to irrigation #   67%   87%   53%   57%  100% 
% HH with black soil #   39%   33%    5%    0   40% 
% HH able to influence decision–
making # 
 25%   42%   42%   10%   50% 
IWMI (2004) Standard deviations in parenthesis. # =dummy variable 
 
Table 5.4 presents the results of the interval regression explaining trust. Column (1) 
presents the results of a comprehensive set of explanatory variables, column (2) is a 
more parsimonious specification, and column (3) presents the 2
nd stage results of an 
IV regression to control for a potential endogeneity of income. Since in Vaiju Babul-
gaon watershed only one village is represented, to economize on degrees of freedom 
we included just one watershed dummy for Kalyanpur. We chose Kalyanpur since 
socio-culturally this watershed is the most different from the other two watersheds. 




                                                   
9 Neither Kosgi nor Kalyanpur is significant in the trust regressions when we include average income 
as control variable.  If we omit average income as control variable both watershed dummies are 





Table 5.4   Determinants of the amount sent by individual i (Si)  
  (1)Standard  (2)Standard  (3)IV 
Constant 
   36.36
*     
  (19.37) 
   37.27
**   
  (18.06) 
   27.86      
  (18.24) 
Kalyanpur# 
     5.28       
    (6.82) 
     4.47        
    (5.81) 
–   1.74        
    (6.98) 
Average income village (Rs ‘000) 
–   2.01       
    (1.56) 
 –  2.03
*  
    (1.15) 
–   4.48
**      
    (1.81) 
Share returned by individual i (%) 
   22.03
***   
    (8.01) 
   19.93
***    
    (7.11) 
   23.69
***    
    (6.86) 
Average share returned in the village (%)
  – 90.06      
  (82.12) 
– 71.91      
  (79.15) 
– 30.27      
  (80.91) 
Pre–game discussion # 
     5.66       
    (4.78) 
     5.49        
    (4.06) 
     1.12        
    (4.71) 
Participant is member majority caste# 
   11.07
***    
    (4.34) 
   12.61
***     
    (3.63) 
   19.12
***    
    (4.84) 
Income per capita (Rs ‘000) 
     0.53
**     
    (0.26) 
     0.59
**     
    (0.23) 
 
Predicted per capita income
10 (Rs‘000)
     
     1.56
**     
    (0.70) 
Landholding per capita (acres) 
–   3.83
***    
   (1.26) 
–   3.41
***    
    (0.92) 
–   2.77
***    
    (1.25) 
Access to irrigation # 
     9.69
**     
    (4.00) 
     8.58
**     
    (4.07)
 
     9.75
**     
    (3.96) 
Dependency on agriculture # 
–  13.19
***    
    (4.60) 
 – 13.40
***  
     (4.47) 
–  11.30
***    
    (4.42) 
Participant is literate# 
     5.02        
    (3.96) 
   
Participant is female# 
     0.77        
    (4.44) 
   
Influence decision making# 
     0.74        
    (3.33) 
   
Number of household members 
–   0.23        
    (0.71) 
   
Black soil # 
     1.45       
    (4.08) 
   
Participant is older than 50 # 
     3.19        
    (5.50) 
   
Participant’s age is between 20 and 50 # 
     4.45        
    (4.80) 
   
No. of observations  84  84  85 
Log likelihood  –128.49  –130.07  –131.18 
Wald chi2 (df)         102.7 (17)            69.43 (10)            76.03(10) 
Pseudo R2       0.15       0.14       0.14 
The outcomes presented are the result of an interval analysis. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
                                                   
10 Predicted income per capita calculated using OLS regression. Explanatory variables: Kosgi, Kaly-
anpur, household head is older than 50, household head is between 20 and 50, household head is liter-
ate, household is member majority caste, household has access to fertile land R
2=0.30, F (8, 83) =4.49. 
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The results for the three specifications are rather similar. First, in both the interval 
and IV analyses we find that, contrary to Barr (2003), the average share returned is 
not significantly correlated with the amount sent. In Barr’s study, both the average 
share returned and its variance were higher, possibly because that experiment was 
not double blind (as ours was). Alternatively, participants in a non–repeated trust 
game may base their expectations on their own behaviour (and have an imperfect un-
derstanding of the average behaviour of the group). This is what our analysis indi-
cates; a 10-percentage point increase in share returned by the participant translates 
into about a 2 rupees increase in the amount sent (or 4% of the initial endowment).   
We also find that agents tend to send more money (i) when they are member of a ma-
jority caste (so that they are more likely to interact with a member of their own 
caste), (ii) when they have access to irrigation and (iii) when they have higher per 
capita income. The result that being a member of a majority caste positively affects 
the amount sent supports the finding that caste homogeneity positively affects trust-
ing behaviour.
11 The result that higher per capita income positively influences the 
amount sent might be an indication of risk aversion (Schechter 2006) and is robust 
for the instrumentation of income. The result that having access to (groundwater) ir-
rigation is associated with more trusting behaviour is perhaps caused by the fact that 
groundwater  stocks  are  a  shared  resource.  Following  the  logic  of  Henrich  et  al. 
(2004), farmers may be more cooperative because they depend on choices of others 
in the community and take these experiences to the experiment.   
Controlling for income we also find (iv) that people who own relatively large areas 
of land are less likely to send large amounts to their fellow villagers and that (v) par-
ticipants who work outside the village sent less. This last result is another indication 
that the households position in the village matters, and that participants who depend 
less on collective resources trust less. Interestingly, we find that pre–game group dis-
cussions do not significantly impact the amount sent – suggesting that such discus-
sions are indeed cheap talk.
12As robustness check to see if these results may be con-
taminated by risk preferences (as opposed to trust or altruism) we have also ran these 
regressions without the richest village in the sample, V. Babulgaon.  We found that 
none of the results were affected.  
The explanatory power of the model is rather low (the pseudo–R
2 is 14% for most 
specifications), which may be indicative of omitted variables. For example, the ‘fun-
damental differences in religion, culture and institutions’ on which trust levels are 
also said to depend (e.g. Fukuyama 1995, Willinger et al. 2003) are not explicitly ac-
counted for in the analysis, except for the watershed dummy for Kalyanpur.  
                                                   
11 When we include village level homogeneity instead of the watershed dummy, homogeneity is not 
significant. Hence, it is the households position in the village that determines individual trusting 
behaviour, not homogeneity as such.. 
12 However, if instead of average income we include another watershed dummy, Kosgi, then strategy 





5.4 Social capital and resource management 
In this section we analyze whether the results of the trust game are useful in explain-
ing behaviour of participants in terms of voluntary provision and maintenance of 
SWC investments. Based on the analysis of trust we define an indicator of social 
capital based on an aggregate measure of trust (the average amount sent). In addition, 
since  conducting  economic  experiments  and  household  surveys  is  expensive  and 
time–consuming,  the  question  naturally  arises whether  directly  observable  village 
characteristics would not perform equally well in serving as a proxy for social capi-
tal.  Hence, we test whether our measure of social homogeneity, or the percentage of 
participants in a village that belongs to the majority caste, explains participation in 
community resource management as well as trust. 
How does social capital affect the incentives of people to contribute to SWC?  To 
address this issue, we again consider both investments in SWC (SW), and efforts to 
uphold  and  maintain  existing  conservation  infrastructure  (operations  and  mainte-
nance, OM).  For our purposes there exists a crucial difference between these activi-
ties.  SW activities are subsidized by NGOs or government agencies, and are there-
fore privately rational to undertake.  In contrast, the costs of OM efforts are fully 
borne by households, and reflect voluntary contributions to a good with private and 
public benefits. Hence, we hypothesize that social capital is important for household 
participation in OM, but that it may not play a role for household investment in sub-
sidized activities SW.  
For both the SW and OM models we use the following specification:  
Zik= constant + β1Sk+ β2Xik +β3Ck+ εik,  (5.2) 
where i indexes households in village k.  Zik is measured as either SWik or OMik, Sk is 
a vector of social capital indicators at the village scale (average trust or social homo-
geneity), Xik a vector of individual household characteristics (own amount sent in the 
Trust Game,  caste group membership, income per capita, landholding per  capita, 
household access to irrigation, soil quality, number of household members, depend-
ency on agriculture and the household’s perceived influence on decision making) and 
Ck captures context variables (average income in the village, the dummy variable for 
an NGO established maintenance fund and watershed dummy).
13 To deal with the 
endogeneity of own amount sent, Si, with respect to income and other variables we 
instrument for that variable in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, using the results from the 3
nd col-
umn of Table 5.4 as the first stage.  Moreover, in Table 5.5 we instrument for income 
because of the potential for reverse causality between this variable and ongoing SW 
efforts (note that this is not relevant for Table 5.6 because the intention to invest in 
OM cannot affect current incomes). The SW results are provided in Table 5.5. 
                                                   
13 Note that we do not include all the participant variables that we included in Table 4 to explain SW 
and OM (e.g., sex, age class, literate).  This is because such variables may be relevant for individual 
play in the Trust Game but not for household decisions regarding soil and water management. Social capital and community resource management       
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Table 5.5 Household investment in soil and water conservation   
  Trust Game results as proxy for social capital  Observable as proxy 





















  (1.54) 
 
– 2.99 




  (1.49) 
 
Kalyanpur#     0.78
* 
  (0.43) 
0.28 
   0.81
* 
  (0.49) 
0.30 
   0.76 
  (0.72) 
 
Average income village 
(Rs ‘000) 
   0.20 
  (0.14) 
 
   0.25 
  (0.23) 
 
   0.23 
  (0.21) 
 
Amount sent by participant (Rs)  –  0.01 
   (0.01) 
         
Predicted  amount  sent  by  par-
ticipant
a (Rs)
      
   0.00 
  (0.03) 
 
   0.00 
  (0.03) 
 
Average amount sent in village 
(Rs) 
   0.02 
  (0.04) 
 
   0.00 
  (0.05) 
     
Village homogeneity (%) 
       
   0.11 
  (1.53) 
 
Household  is  member  majority 
caste# 
– 0.12 
  (0.43) 
 
   0.06 
  (0.79) 
 
   0.07 
  (0.79) 
 
Income per capita (Rs ‘000)     0.16
** 
  (0.07) 
0.06         
Predicted per capita income
b  
(Rs ‘000) 
   
   0.09 
  (0.10) 
 
   0.09 
  (0.10) 
 
Dependency n agriculture #  – 0.26 
  (0.42) 
 
   0.13 
  (0.57) 
 
   0.14 
  (0.57) 
 
Landholding per capita (acres)     0.24 
  (0.26) 
 
   0.40 
  (0.31) 
 
   0.40 
  (0.31) 
 
Access to irrigation #  –  0.59 
   (0.37) 
 
– 0.75 
  (0.49) 
 
– 0.75 
  (0.49) 
 
Black soil #  –  0.13 
   (0.41) 
 
– 0.14 
  (0.41) 
 
–  0.14 
  (0.41) 
 
Number of household members      0.13
** 
   (0.07) 
0.05 
   0.16
** 
  (0.08) 
0.06 
   0.16
** 
  (0.08) 
0.06 
Influence decision making#      0.07 
   (0.34) 
 
   0.00 
  (0.34) 
 
   0.00 
  (0.34) 
 
    No. of observations 
    Log likelihood 
    Wald chi2 (df) 
    Pseudo R2 
          92 
       – 49.14 
          19.27 (12) 
            0.22 
      85 
   – 46.55 
      19.44 (12) 
        0.21 
      85 
   – 46.55 
      19.44 (12) 
        0.21 
The outcomes presented are the result of a Probit analysis
 a Derived from IV estimation of trust; see 
Table 4, column (2). *10% significant ** 5% significant *** 1% significant.  # = dummy variable. 
Robust standard errors presented in brackets. 
 





Columns (1) – (2) report the results where we use the Trust Game data as a proxy for 
social capital.  Column (1) presents the regular probit results and in column (2) we 
present   IV estimates.  In column (3) we use “village homogeneity” as an alternative  
proxy for social capital (the correlation with “average amount sent” being ρ = 0.45).  
Consistent with intuition we find that social capital, regardless of whether we proxy 
it by trust or social homogeneity, is not a significant determinant for household SWC 
investment  when  such  investments  are  subsidized.    Households  undertake  such 
efforts regardless of the level social capital as proxied by the average amount sent in 
the  experiment.  Regarding  other  regressors,  the  three  specifications  yield  similar 
results with respect to family size – not surprisingly we find a positive association 
between the number of household members and SW efforts.  The Probit regression 
indicates that the only other significant variable is per capita income, the coefficient 
of which is significant and positive.  Possibly this reflects that the hourly wage of 
subsidized  labour  typically  exceeds  wages  paid  on  local  labour  markets  so  that 
community members compete for such jobs (with richer households better able to 
secure such positions).  However, this result is not robust.  When we instrument for 
income it disappears. 
None of the variables reflecting personal stakes in SW investments are found to be 
significant,  as  reflected  by  the  lack  of  significance  of  the  variables  access  to 
irrigation, fertile soils, and the household having non–agricultural sources of income 
too.  Most importantly, note that individual behaviour in the Trust Game – or own 
amount  sent  –  is  not  significantly  associated  with  subsidized  soil  and  water 
conservation efforts.  This is true regardless of whether we instrument for it, or not.   
Turning to our main results, Table 5.6 documents how social capital impacts on the 
intention  to  maintain  community  resource  infrastructure  when  labour  is  not 
subsidized.    Again,  we  test  specifications  using  two  different  proxies  for  social 
capital: trust (columns 1–2) and social homogeneity (column 3).   Social capital and community resource management       
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Table 5.6 Household contribution to SWC maintenance  
  Trust Game results as proxy for social capital 
(Robust SE) 
Observable as proxy 
(Robust SE) 






























  (2.84) 
 
Kalyanpur#     2.75
*** 
  (0.68) 
  0.83 
   2.34
*** 
  (0.78) 
  0.75 
–  0.55 
  (0.80) 
 
Average income village 
(Rs ‘000) 
   1.35
*** 
  (0.31) 
  0.54 
   1.29
*** 
  (0.39) 
  0.51 
   0.40 
  (0.26) 
 
Amount sent by participant 
(Rs) 
   0.00 
  (0.01) 
         
Predicted  amount  sent  by 
participant
a  (Rs) 
   
  0.02 
 (0.04) 
 
   0.02 
  (0.04) 
 
Average  amount  sent  in 
village (Rs) 
   0.27
*** 
  (0.08) 




  0.10     
Village homogeneity (%) 




  3.23 
Maintenance fund #  – 1.99
*** 








  (0.85) 
–0.62 





  0.40 
  1.14 
 (0.75) 
 
  1.14 
 (0.75) 
 













  0.05 
Dependency on agriculture 
# 
  0.33 
 (0.51) 
 
  0.58 
 (0.74) 
 
  0.58 
 (0.74) 
 
Landholding  per  capita 
(acres) 
– 0.22 
  (0.17) 
 
– 0.24 





Access to irrigation #      0.65
* 
  (0.40) 








  0.34 
Black soil #     0.86
* 
  (0.48) 
  0.33 
  0.77 
 (0.49) 
 
  0.77 
 (0.49) 
 
Number  of  household 
members 
   0.02 





















  0.55 
   No. of observations 
   Log likelihood 
   Wald chi2 (df) 
   Pseudo R2 
     92 
  – 32.38 
     45.07(13) 
       0.49 
     84 
  – 28.04 
     36.34 (13) 
       0.51 
    84 
 – 28.04 
    36.34 (13) 
      0.51 
The outcomes presented are the result of a Probit analysis
  aDerived from IV estimation of trust; see 
Table 4, column (2). *10% significant ** 5% significant *** 1% significant.  # indicates a dummy 
variable. Robust standard errors between brackets.  
 





Consistent  with  Gächter  et  al.  (2004)  we  now  find  that  social  capital  (“average 
amount sent”) has a significant and positive impact on the provision of the public 
good.  This is true both in the Probit and IV regression.
14 Our interpretation is that in 
villages with high levels of trust, agents can expect that their investment efforts are  
‘rewarded’ by voluntary contributions of their peers, so that they are more likely to 
contribute to SWC themselves.   
The  village  homogeneity  variable  in  column  (3)  is  significant  and  positive.  The 
coefficients and significance levels of the other variables, as well as the share of the 
variance explained, are largely the same as in Column (2). This suggests that the 
easily observable homogeneity variable might act as a substitute for our Trust Game 
based social capital proxy.    
Both  the  Probit  and  IV  Probit  estimates  reveal  that  OM  efforts  are  positively 
correlated with (i) average income in the region, (ii) own income, (iii) the extent to 
which households feel they can influence village decision–making, (iv) whether or 
not the household belongs to a majority caste, (v) access to irrigation and (vi) soil 
type. The positive impact of the household belonging to the village majority caste 
group and household access to black soil are not robust for the instrumentation of 
trust. The robust results are in accordance with the analysis of chapter 4, which also 
showed irrigation access and the households perceived ability to influence decision 
making to affect the households’ intention to contribute in a significant way. Also 
consistent with the results from chapter 4 is that the establishment of a maintenance 
fund significantly crowds out the incentive for voluntary participation of villagers.  
Interestingly,  we  don’t  find  a  significant  correlation  between  “amount  sent  by 
participant” in the Trust Game and  investments in soil  and water conservation – 
neither in the Probit, nor in the IV regressions.  So, while average behaviour in the 
trust game is associated with conservation efforts, suggesting that the Trust Game 
may be used to measure social capital, we also find that the play in the game is a bad 
predictor of individual behaviour in the field.
15  
                                                   
14 This result is robust for clustering of standard errors at the village level.  The same holds for the 
results in table 5.5 
15 We also ran a few regressions using average trustworthiness as measured in the Trust Game as a 
regressor to proxy for social capital.  Surprisingly, we find that average trustworthiness – arguably an 
alternative proxy for social capital – is negatively associated with the provision of the public good. We 
did not expect such an effect, and consider it an anomaly, possibly reflecting that our measure of 
trustworthiness is contaminated by our empirical strategy of role reversal without informing the 
respondents about this prior to the game.  However, it is perhaps important to note that Barr’s study 
also finds puzzling results for trustworthiness.  Barr (2003, p.628) speculates that the different results 
for trust and trustworthiness are caused by “asymmetries” in the game.  The trust game implies 
looking forwards, considering future rewards, and thinking about all fellow villagers.  This is perhaps 
not unlike real projects in the community.  In contrast, the trustworthiness game implies looking 
backwards – they react to the action of one specific villager.  As such this might be expected to be less 
informative about investment choices in a public good situation.   Nevertheless, the awkward Social capital and community resource management       
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Whether the impact of trust and social homogeneity on the probability of household 
contribution to soil and water conservation is high or low is open for debate. The 
marginal effects of the relevant variables indicate that trust or social homogeneity is 
about  equally  important  as  some  of  the  other  variables:  the  availability  of  a 
maintenance fund, the households access to irrigation, and the perceived influence on 
decision making affect the probability of household contribution with, respectively, -
60,  +34  and  +55%.  To  achieve  a  roughly  similar  increase  in  the  probability  of 
households investing in OM (i.e. 50%) the average amount sent in the Trust Game 
should increase with 5 Rs., or 10% of the initial endowment.   
5.5 Conclusions  
We have undertaken an experimental study to uncover the interlinkages between so-
cial capital, community characteristics, and the provision of a local public good, i.e. 
investments in SWC maintenance. Our results indicate that social capital is an impor-
tant  determinant  of  the  households’  intention  to  contribute  to  SWC  maintenance, 
both when proxied by village average trust levels and when proxied by caste homo-
geneity. In terms of economic significance, or impact, we find that social capital is 
about equally important as other variables in fostering participation in community-
based resource management.   
We find that individual trusting behaviour is determined mostly by the individual’s 
own  characteristics.  Participants  base  their  expectation  regarding  the  amount  re-
turned mostly on their own behaviour. Being a member of the village majority caste 
group and being employed outside the village significantly influence the household’s 
expectation as well. Especially this last result is interesting as it suggests that in-
creased migration might not only increase the opportunity costs of labour but reduce 
village trust levels too.  Results further indicate that in caste homogeneous villages 
the likelihood of sustained resource conservation is larger that in heterogeneous vil-
lages. This could be an indication that targeting homogeneous communities might 
improve the sustainability of community-based projects. However, given the fact that 
the household’s perceived influence in village decision-making is also an important 
indicator for explaining the household’s intention to voluntarily cooperate in the long 
run, better project interventions might be able to improve project effectiveness as 
well.  
We believe results are not only relevant for analysts of social capital and common 
pool management.  The results also add to the emerging literature on the ‘generaliza-
bility’ of experimental results to other behaviours and contexts. Whereas individual 
behaviour in the game does not seem ‘generalizable’ to actual behaviour in the field, 
the average,  village  level  of  trust  does  significantly  predict  individual behaviour. 
                                                                                                                                                
trustworthiness result could be important in light of the remark by Glaeser et al. (2000: 811) and 
Karlan (2005) that currently most social capital surveys might measure trustworthiness (rather than 





This suggests the trust game may be used to measure social capital, provided social 
capital is interpreted as a community characteristic. Whether this could solve some of 
the  empirical  problems  associated  with  measuring  social  capital  is  an  interesting 
topic for further research. 
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6. The downstream externalities of watershed 
development in India  
6.1 Introduction  
Several studies have shown that watershed development (WSD) can significantly en-
hance welfare at the village scale.
1 There are few studies, however, that also account 
for  the  possible  welfare  impacts  of  WSD  downstream.  Hydrological  analysis  has 
shown that WSD reduces the downstream flow of surface water by allowing more of 
the rainfall to be locally absorbed (Madsen 1988, Ramireddygari et al. 2000, Burt  
2002, Batchelor et al. 2003). Under high rainfall conditions this might benefit down-
stream users by reducing the risk of flooding. However, under conditions of water 
scarcity it can also cause severe water stress downstream. Batchelor et al. (2003) ar-
gue that in the case of India’s semi-arid regions this last example is actually the case. 
Capturing rainfall upstream reduces water levels in downstream irrigation reservoirs, 
which negatively impacts agricultural production downstream. Whether the upstream 
gains of WSD are sufficient to compensate for potential downstream losses remains 
unclear. Although it is generally agreed that the downstream effects of water related 
investments should be accounted for (Shah and Raju 2001, McKinney et al. 1999) 
few studies have actually estimated welfare impacts at the basin scale (exceptions are 
Chakravorty and Umetsu 2003 and Rosegrant et al. 2000). 
This chapter attempts to assess the downstream externalities of WSD in India’s semi-
arid regions. Historically, water was relatively abundant in India’s downstream re-
gions since upstream few investments in irrigation infrastructure were made. Hence, 
most of the rainwater from upper catchment areas was captured in large irrigation 
reservoirs downstream. The reason investments in irrigation infrastructure concen-
trated on downstream regions is that downstream the conditions for agricultural pro-
duction are generally better (Molden et al. 2001): water can be captured from a larger 
catchment area, the land is flatter, soils are more fertile and climatic conditions are 
better too. In fact, the better conditions for agricultural production and large public 
investments  resulted  in agricultural  productivity  being  on  average  78%  higher  in 
downstream irrigated regions than in the dryland regions upstream (Fan et al. 2000). 
                                                   
1 See for example Kerr et al. 2002, Farrington et al. 1999, Joshi et al. 2005, Joy and Paranjape 2004, 
Boersema 2001, Chandrakanth et al. 2004, Ratna Reddy et al. 2004.  





One of the objectives of the WSD program has been to reduce the gap in agricultural 
productivity by capturing and using more of the run-off upstream. Over the last dec-
ades, however, water scarcity in several of India’s river basins strongly increased, re-
sulting in dropping water levels in downstream reservoirs (Amarasinghe et al. 2004, 
Biggs et al. 2007). Climatic variability partly explains the drop in reservoir levels, 
but the development of upstream groundwater irrigation seems to be an important 
factor as well (Bouwer et al. 2006, Biggs 2005). Prior to the 1980s, upstream regions 
could  only  irrigate  from  small  surface  water  tanks,  but  with  the  development  of 
groundwater  irrigation  the  total  irrigated  area  increased  (Shah  et  al.  2003).  This 
caused a reduction in the flow of surface water to downstream reservoirs since more 
of the surface runoff became locally absorbed and recharged to groundwater. Also, it 
caused  a  drop  in  groundwater  levels,  which  resulted  in an  increased  demand for 
WSD in upstream regions in order to recharge groundwater aquifers at a faster rate. 
The result is that in the canal  irrigated systems that  were earlier relatively water 
abundant farmers have to leave their land un-irrigated (Gaur et al. 2007). Although at 
the basin-scale, runoff reduction has often been attributed primarily to upstream sur-
face irrigation projects, the WSD program increased the trend in reduced reservoir 
inflow by creating more water storage capacity upstream and by recharging ground-
water aquifers at a faster rate.  
To evaluate the welfare impacts of WSD at the basin level there are two factors that 
need to be taken into account. The first is that by using water ‘where it falls’
1, and 
recharging it to soil and groundwater, storage losses can be avoided. Storing water in 
large-scale irrigation reservoirs causes approximately 20% of the water to be lost to 
evaporation.
2  Under  conditions  of  high  water  scarcity  this  is  a  significant  ineffi-
ciency, which can be avoided by using the water upstream. Second, re-allocating wa-
ter from down- to upstream regions might lower water productivity. As mentioned 
before, agricultural productivity is generally higher in downstream regions and by re-
allocating water from down to upstream regions the productivity of water might ac-
tually come down. This would basically result in less ‘crop per drop’ or a lower effi-
ciency of water use at the basin scale.   
To analyze these trade-offs and assess the impact of WSD at the basin scale we use a 
simple model in which up and downstream users share a fixed amount of water. In-
vestments in WSD reduce the availability of water downstream, and the welfare im-
pact of WSD is equal to the change in agricultural value produced. For the estimation 
of costs and benefits, we use hydrological, land use, water use and crop data from the 
Krishna basin in Southern India.
3  
                                                   
1 To use water ‘where it falls’ is the slogan the influential Center for Science and Environment 
(CSE) uses to promote rainwater harvesting and watershed development.  
2  Oral communication, Anju Gaur, project leader IWMI Krishna basin project.   
3 Data are taken from the IWMI-Krishna Basin study, which looks at water allocation in the Krishna 
basin. For more information contact dr. Luna Bharati: L.bharati@cgiar.org The downstream externalities of watershed development in India       
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The Krishna basin is a good example of a river basin where water scarcity strongly 
increased since the 1960s (Biggs et al. 2007). Also, in the upper catchment areas of 
the  Krishna  basin  substantial  WSD  investments  are  being  undertaken,  the  down-
stream impacts of which have not yet been addressed. We concentrate the analysis on 
the allocation of irrigation water, and do not consider other potential WSD effects. 
For example, WSD might reduce soil erosion which not only provides the basis for 
improved soil quality but which can also reduce the costs of reservoir siltation down-
stream. For lack of data we cannot consider these effects. However, since in the sub-
basin considered the landscape is relatively flat we expect the relative importance of 
this effect to be rather small. WSD investments might also improve the productivity 
of rainfed agriculture by increasing soil moisture in rainfed plots. Since we only have 
data about the impact of SWC investments in terms of the additional water storage 
capacity created, we unfortunately cannot consider this potential impact here.  
The results of the analysis suggest that the likely welfare effect of WSD is negative, 
since under all scenarios WSD benefits are insufficient to pay back investment costs. 
This might not be problematic if WSD succeeds in reducing poverty at the basin 
scale. Several studies have shown the impact of WSD on poverty alleviation to be 
disappointing however (Farrington et al. 1999) and the effectiveness of WSD for 
poverty alleviation is generally considered low (Fan et al. 2000). Upstream benefits 
do exceed downstream losses but only when the water productivity of upstream agri-
cultural production is relatively high. When the shadow price of water upstream is 
lower, upstream benefits are not sufficient to compensate losses downstream. In the 
sub-basin considered, upstream water productivity is relatively high. In most, more 
remote, watersheds the value of agricultural water use is, however, likely to be much 
lower and, under these circumstances, WSD is unlikely to have a positive welfare ef-
fect. More research is required however to include the impacts of WSD on soil ero-
sion and rainfed agriculture and to consider welfare impacts when a flow of ground-
water between up and downstream users exists.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next paragraph we introduce the 
Krishna basin and elaborate how WSD investments affect users downstream. In the 
third part we evaluate the welfare impacts. For this purpose, we formulate an eco-
nomic model to optimize crop water use at the basin scale. In the fourth part we test 
the robustness of results with a Monte Carlo simulation and in the last part we dis-
cuss the wider welfare implications and conclude.  
6.2 The impact of watershed development at the basin scale 
The Krishna basin is one of India’s major river basins located in the Southern penin-
sula  and  spread  over  three  states.  Water  is  scarce  in  the  basin and  only  a  small 
amount of water still reaches the sea (Biggs et al. 2007). In one of the sub-basins of 
the Krishna, the Musi sub-basin, substantial WSD investments have been made. The 
city of Hyderabad is located in the sub-basin, with approximately 6.5 million inhabi-





WSD investments upstream of the city of Hyderabad caused water levels in two of 
the cities drinking water reservoirs to drop. To compensate for the reduced supply of 
drinking water from the two reservoirs, the city of Hyderabad started pumping extra 
water from the Nagarjuna Sagar irrigation reservoir, 120 km downstream. Although 
the extra water extracted from the Nagarjuna Sagar irrigation reservoir accounts for 
less than 1% of the total water volume stored, due to high water scarcity any reduc-
tion in reservoir storage is likely to cause a loss of irrigated area downstream (Van 
Rooyen et al. 2005).  
Watershed development, especially the establishment of check dams and groundwa-
ter recharge structures, decreases inflows to reservoirs by capturing overland flow.  
The surface water retained by the check dams recharges the groundwater, which en-
courages farmers to either establish or continue groundwater irrigation and switch 
from rainfed to irrigated crops.  Due to a lack of soil moisture stress, irrigated crops 
have higher rates of ET than rainfed crops, so the total amount of water evaporated 
from the upstream watershed increases. Groundwater in the upper Musi is not closely 
connected to groundwater in the mainstream Krishna River, due to both the distance 
of the upper Musi from the Krishna and the low hydraulic conductivity of the hard-
rock aquifers in the region. Hence, any benefits in terms of recharged groundwater 
aquifers do not reach the users downstream.  
The case of WSD investment in the Musi sub-basin presents a unique opportunity to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of WSD at the basin scale. Data are available regard-
ing both WSD investments and the flow of surface water to the reservoirs down-
stream. Usually, multi-year, hydrological data are not available and no linkage be-
tween upstream investments and downstream impacts can be made. Besides, we have 
data from the IWMI Krishna basin project to estimate the changes in cropping pat-
terns resulting from the reallocation of water at the basin scale.  
However, the case also has a serious disadvantage in not being very representative 
for WSD.  Most WSD projects are undertaken in remote areas with poor market ac-
cess, whereas the farm households in the Musi-sub-basin are located near Hyderabad 
city with good infrastructure and market opportunities. As a consequence, the per-
centage of high value crops like vegetables, fruits and spices is relatively high, which 
is likely to positively influence the estimation of WSD benefits. In the discussion of 
results we will pay specific attention to this bias and discuss potential impacts.  
In the analysis, we will not pay attention to the urban costs associated with WSD. 
The value of drinking water being much higher than that of irrigation water (Saleth 
and Dinar 2001), accounting for urban costs is likely to strongly influence the results. 
Since in most cases WSD projects are not located upstream of major drinking water 
reservoirs, accounting for urban costs would make the analysis even less representa-
tive.  The downstream externalities of watershed development in India       
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Figure 6.1 Schematic representation of water flows in the Musi basin 
Between 1975 and 2002, the annual inflow of water to Hyderabad’s two drinking 
water  reservoirs  decreased  by  a  total  of  17  million  cubic  meters  (MCM)  (Biggs 
2005). (Biggs 2005). Between 1970 and 1985 an average rainfall of 600-700 mm 
rainfall  was  sufficient  to  fill  up  the  reservoirs,  but  in  the  period  1985-2003  this 
changed to a minimum rainfall level of 800-900 mm (Biggs 2005).
4 Interestingly, 
government data on WSD investment in the catchment area of the two reservoirs in-
dicate that between 2000 and 2005 in the most conservative estimate (i.e. assuming 
structures fill up once a year) an additional 15 MCM of water storage was created 
upstream.
5  
Although the reduction in inflow started prior to the WSD investments, WSD is ex-
pected to have deepened and extended the reduction of inflow by recharging depleted 
groundwater aquifers at a faster rate. This is confirmed by several studies in the re-
gion. For example, Ratna Reddy (2005) shows that in villages with no WSD the irri-
gated area seriously declined due to groundwater depletion. Another case study in the 
same region shows that WSD increases groundwater recharge by 25-70 % (Chandra-
kanth  et  al.  2004).  We  do  not  expect  upstream  groundwater  recharge  to  benefit 
downstream users because in the hard rock conditions prevailing in the Musi sub-
basin no lateral flow of groundwater between up and downstream regions is known 
to exist (Biggs 2005).  
                                                   
4 Average rainfall is approximately 800 mm per year. 
5 The district statistical office provided data on the costs, number of structures, and storage volume 
created. The total volume of storage created in the catchment was determined by multiplying the 
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In  sum,  WSD  in the  Musi  sub-basin increased upstream water availability  by 15 
MCM per year and decreased downstream water availability by 12 MCM (i.e. minus 
the 20% transpiration loss due to reservoir storage). To estimate the welfare implica-
tions of this re-allocation of water, in the next paragraph we elaborate an economic 
model  to simulate  the  impact  on cropping patterns and to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of WSD at the basin scale.    
6.3 Evaluating basin-scale costs and benefits  
To evaluate the costs and benefits of WSD in the Musi- sub-basin we need to know 
what an additional liter of irrigation water is worth. If the total value of the increase 
in irrigated area upstream exceeds the value of the loss in irrigated area downstream, 
upstream  users  can  compensate  downstream  users  and  welfare  might  improve. 
Whether the total impact on welfare is positive however also depends on whether to-
tal benefits are sufficient to pay back investment costs. If costs exceed benefits, the 
investment is unlikely to be economically efficient and welfare would increase if the 
money is otherwise spent. If investments however improve the distribution of wel-
fare, welfare might still improve even when benefits are insufficient to compensate 
costs. The second welfare theorem states that when resource endowments are not 
equally distributed, redistribution can improve welfare if resources are re-allocated 
from individuals with higher utility levels to individuals with lower utility levels. 
Hence, if WSD succeeds in reducing upstream poverty (without causing increased 
poverty downstream) total welfare might increase, even if costs exceed benefits. In 
this chapter we concentrate the analysis on the efficiency of water use, but in the dis-
cussion of results we will pay attention to the distributional impacts of WSD as well.     
Since markets for water are missing in the Krishna basin we need to infer the value 
of irrigation water from the agricultural value produced. Agro-economic models gen-
erally show water to be a crucial determinant of agricultural production (Cai et al. 
2001). More water increases agricultural yields and better access to irrigation water 
generally allows for the production of more water intensive, higher value crops. In 
line with Rosegrant et al. (2000), one of the few other studies that evaluate the wel-
fare impacts of water re-allocation at the basin scale, we use the producer surplus 
method to assess the value of irrigation water.  
The producer surplus method estimates the change in producer’s surplus resulting 
from a change in resource use, assuming that, apart from water, all other production 
factors are accounted for in the production costs. Using the producer surplus method 
has an advantage over, for example, a consumer surplus or willingness to pay ap-
proach, in that data are more readily available. Crop prices, costs and land use data 
can be collected from secondary sources, whereas willingness-to-pay figures or water 
consumption figures are much harder to collect.  
                                                                                                                                                
mandal (= administrative unit) -level statistics by the fraction of the mandal in the catchment. Data 
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However, using the producer surplus method has one important drawback as it basi-
cally assumes that markets are functioning perfectly and that except for water, no 
other missing markets exist. Especially in India’s rural regions, this is hardly the case 
(Walker and Ryan 1990, Bardhan and Udry 1999). By focusing the analysis on semi-
commercial crops like vegetables, rice, cotton and oilseeds we try to avoid some of 
the problems associated with missing markets. Also, in the discussion of results we 
pay explicit attention to the limitations of the analysis and to how the assumption of 
well functioning markets might bias our results. Still, further analysis is needed to 
better include market imperfections and to assess how this might influence the re-
sults.    
To estimate how changes in water allocation affect cropping patterns, and hence pro-
ducer surplus, we develop an economic model. We assume there is a social planner 
who wants to maximize basin welfare based on the following production function:  
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γ α α β − = Π
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= = ∑ ∑ with  1 0 ≤ ≤α  and  1 > γ   (6.1) 
and with i=1,2,3 for the different crops, j= u,d for location in the sub-basin (up and 
downstream), p for net prices, e for crop water use, h for crop land use, A is a techni-




γ β a cost function reflecting increasing production costs per ha.  
The direct costs of production are already included in p, but cultivating an extra ha is 
expected to generate extra costs since during harvesting season there are additional 
costs in terms of peak labour demand. Since labour markets and production costs dif-
fer between up and downstream regions, the cost function 
j
ij jh
γ β  differs between the 
two regions as well.   
The water intensity of agricultural production α is also location specific. In fact, the 
water intensity of agricultural production also differs per crop, but with crop specific 
water intensity variables the model becomes analytically unsolvable. Hence, we as-
sume the same water intensity for all crops at one location. This might somewhat 
bias the outcomes of the analysis, but since we calibrate the model using actual crop-
ping patterns we do not expect this assumption to affect outcomes much. However, 
we will pay explicit attention to the potential impact of this assumption in the discus-
sion of results.  
The main constraint the social planner faces is that total crop water demand should 
not exceed supply (Ej): 
0 = ∑ ij j e - E .  (6.2) 
Clearly, if WSD investments are undertaken Eu increases and Ed is reduced. By com-
paring outcomes with and without WSD investment the impact of WSD on basin 





We use the assumption of a social planner because in the context of India’s river ba-
sin management water is allocated from the top down: Water markets do not exist 
and the allocation of irrigation water is largely controlled by the state. An exception 
is the investments that are undertaken in upstream groundwater irrigation, which are 
largely private and lack state coordination and control. However, given that without 
government WSD investments the area irrigated with groundwater would strongly 
decrease, we might consider the re-allocation of water to upstream users through 
WSD investment partly state controlled as well.  
Although cropping patterns are decided individually, for most crops the state offers 
minimum support prices and effectively most of India’s agricultural production is 
state planned. We consider three crop groups, two of which, rice and oilseeds/pulses, 
are largely state controlled. For the third crop group we consider, high value, high 
water intensity crops like vegetables, spices and fruit, no state support prices exist. In 
this case the assumption of a constant demand function, i.e. fixed prices regardless of 
the amount supplied, is rather strong, but for lack of data we cannot assess what the 
actual demand function would be.  
The social planner maximizes welfare by setting marginal benefits equal to marginal 
costs. To get an explicit function for the shadow price of water µ, we use (1) and (2) 
to form the Langrarian function of which the first order conditions are: 
0
1 1 = − =
∂
∂ − −
j ij ij j ij ij
ij
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Substituting (6) into (4) we get the following expression for crop water demand  i e   
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Using (5) and (7) we get an expression for the shadow price of waterµ  
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From which it follows that 
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Hence, the optimal allocation of land and water depends on the total amount of water 
E and relative crop water productivity W, the marginal costs of cultivation β and γ in 
relation to the water intensity of cultivation α and the value of crop production p to-
gether with crop productivity A. Depending on the value of β, γ and α the social 
planner decides how much land is cultivated with a certain amount of water.  
If the marginal costs of cultivating an additional ha of irrigated land are high, the 
amount of water used per ha of land will be higher than when the marginal costs are 
low. To estimate the value of the technical parameter A for the different crop types 
we use data from the Krishna basin regarding crop water use and crop yields. Since 
  ) / (
α j
ij ij ij ij ij h e A /h Q = we can estimate A and α with data on    ij ij/h Q , crop yield per 
ha, and    /
j
ij ij h e , crop water use per ha.  
Although data linking crop water use to crop yield are very difficult to come by, we 
managed to collect some indicative data for both variables. We collected data for 
three data points: a) maximum yield and the optimal crop water requirement, b) ac-
tual yield and actual crop water use and c) rainfed yield and crop water use under 
rainfed conditions, i.e. without irrigation. We used the data regarding actual crop wa-
ter use, together with data on actual cropping patterns, to estimate E, the total avail-
ability of water up and downstream.  
 





Table 6.1 Total water availability and actual crop water use 
 
Actual land use 
(ha) 
Actual water use 
(m3/ha) 
Total water (E) 
(MCM) 
Upstream       
Paddy  10585  6500  261 
Vegetables, fruit, spices, cotton  26712  4860   
Oilseeds, maize and pulses  19443  3200   
 
Downstream 
     
Paddy  251255  7350  4028 
Cotton, vegetables, fruit, spices  274625  5000   
Oilseeds, maize and pulses  218513  3700   
Source: Government of India/www.indiastat.com  and District statistical handbook 2000-2001 
In line with the actual cropping patterns in the Krishna basin we use vegetables as the 
reference crop for high value crops in the upstream region and cotton as the reference 
crop downstream. For the third crop group we use oilseeds as the reference crop.   
Optimal crop water requirements are calculated on the basis of the FAO Penman-
Monteith equation, which uses information about local climatic conditions to esti-
mate potential crop water use, where soil moisture does not limit evapotranspiration 
(see also Allen et al. 1998). Assuming that all other production requirements are met, 
supplying crops with the optimal crop water requirement results in the maximum 
yield. Clearly, in India’s semi-arid regions it is hardly the case that all other produc-
tion requirements are met. Hence, we took the highest yields we encountered in the 
region to reflect the maximum yield. The data on actual crop water use and crop wa-
ter use under rainfed conditions were taken from two studies using remote sensing 
data to estimate agricultural water use in the Krishna Basin (Bouwer et al. 2007, 
Biggs and Turral 2007). Data regarding crop water requirements of rainfed rice were 
taken from a study by Bouman and Tuong (2000) in central India. In the annex of 
this chapter we present the indicative figures used and the sources of these data.  
In table 6.2 we present the empirical estimates for A and α together with the figures 
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Table 6.2   Estimates for the technical coefficiencts A and α 
  Actual  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
Upstream       
a1 (paddy)  .77 
a2 (vegetables)  .85 
a3 (oilseeds)  .74 
.79  .75 
A1 (paddy)  2.7  2.6  2.8 
A2 (vegetables)  10.1  3.4  3.6 
A3 (oilseeds)  1.7  1.9  2 
 
Downstream 
     
a1 (paddy)  .79 
a2 (cotton)  .72 
a3 (oilseeds)  .79 
.77  .75 
A1 (paddy)  2.6  2.8  2.8 
A2 (cotton)  0.6  1.6  1.6 
A3 (oilseeds)  1.4  1.9  1.9 
 
As mentioned before, we unfortunately could not estimate the model with crop spe-
cific water intensity parameters and had to assume some average value for the three 
crop groups together. This also affected the value of the crop specific technical coef-
ficient A. Clearly, different estimates of the location specific, average value of α 
were possible. Hence, we estimated two scenarios, one in which the water intensity 
of agricultural production is higher upstream (scenario 1) and one where it is the 
same for the up and downstream region (scenario 2).  
As the figures in table 6.2 show, the estimates of the average water intensity of agri-
cultural production over estimate the water intensity of upstream production (except 
for vegetable production) and underestimate the water intensity of downstream pro-
duction (except for cotton). The impact this has on the outcomes of the model will be 
later discussed.  
We first calibrated the model using actual cropping patterns. We minimized the dif-
ference between the estimated and the actual cropping patterns, letting the model de-
termine the values of β and γ. Table 6.3 presents the results.  
Table 6.3   Key parameters of the two scenarios  
 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
  Up  Down  Up  Down 
Shadow price water (µ) (Rs./liter)  0.85  0.73  0.61  0.60 
Increasing costs of peak labor de-
mand (γ) 
1.54  1.66  1.55  1.67 
Cost factor land (β)  4.73  0.19  3.77  0.16 





As the figures in table 6.3 show, the shadow price of water in scenario 1 is higher up-
stream than downstream whereas in scenario 2 the shadow price is in both regions 
the same. This reflects the higher water intensity of upstream production in scenario 
1. We estimate the model with the Excel based Solver model, an optimization model. 
Since the model we want to estimate is non-linear, the outcomes of the Solver model 
are sensitive to the initial values used. As initial values we used the values presented 
in tables 6.2 and 6.3. However, in the last section of this chapter we undertake a sen-
sitivity analysis of these figures as well. 
Before we can estimate the impact of changes in water availability on cropping pat-
terns we need information about p, or the net prices of the different crops.  Informa-
tion about farm harvest prices and production costs is generally hard to come by. Al-
though the government of India publishes some statistics on crop prices and the costs 
of inputs, data often concern different years or regions, which makes them hard to 
compare. Based on the information we could find regarding farm harvest prices and 
production costs, we used the following indicative figures for our analysis. As the 
variance of these figures is likely to be large, we pay explicit attention to the sensitiv-
ity of these figures in the last section.  
Table 6.4   Prices, costs and net prices per crop (Rs./kg) 





Upstream       
Rice  5  2.5  2.5 
Vegetables  4.5  2.5  2 
Oilseeds  12  8.5  3.5 
 
Downstream 
     
Rice  5  2.5  2.5 
Cotton  20  15.5  4.5 
Oilseeds  12  8.5  3.5 
Source: Government of India, www.indiastat.com *Production costs include costs of (family) labour. 
In table 6.5 we present the baseline scenario, or the outcome of the calibrated model.  
Table 6.5   Simulated versus actual cropping patterns   
  Actual  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
Upstream       
Paddy  10585  12659  12955 
Vegetables, fruit, spices, cotton  26712  19562  19835 
Oilseeds, maize and pulses  19443  13380  13741 
 
Downstream 
     
Paddy  251255  251255  251246 
Cotton, vegetables, fruit, spices  274625  274625  274632 
Oilseeds, maize and pulses  218513  218513  218516 
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As the results in table 6.5 show, the model estimates downstream cropping patterns 
perfectly, but underestimates upstream vegetable and oilseed production and overes-
timates upstream production of rice. The reason for this result is that the model un-
derestimates the water productivity of vegetable crops and overestimates the water 
productivity of rice, as mentioned in the explanation of table 6.2. 
To assess the impact of water re-allocation in the sub-basin, we compare total wel-
fare with and without watershed investments for five different investment levels. We 
define the investment levels on the basis of current WSD investments, average in-
vestment costs per ha and the total harvestable amount of rainwater. Actual WSD in-
vestments in the Musi sub-basin increased upstream water availability with 15 MCM 
at a cost of 8 million USD.
6 Since the total watershed area is 80,000 ha, this trans-
lates into an average investment cost of USD 100 per ha.  
To define the potential for additional WSD investments, the question is what the 
maximally harvestable amount of runoff would be. Most of the rain in semi-arid ar-
eas infiltrates into the soil profile and is subsequently evaporated to the atmosphere, 
resulting in relatively low runoff coefficients.  For the watersheds draining to the 
drinking water reservoirs of the upper Musi (Figure 6.1), annual runoff was an aver-
age of 9.3% of annual precipitation (1981-1990) with a range of 1.6%-15%.  Runoff 
to the reservoirs fell to 7.5% of rainfall by 1994-2003.  Assuming that roughly half of 
the approximately 9% of rainfall can be successfully recharged and is useful to irri-
gated agriculture, the maximally harvestable amount from the upstream reservoirs 
would be 75 MCM. 
7 If we assume that costs increase linearly with the amount of 
water harvested, harvesting 75 MCM would cost approximately 500 USD per ha. 
Considering that WSD projects generally do not invest more than 150-200 USD per 
ha (see table 4.2) it seems more realistic to assume a maximum investment of 16 mil-
lion USD, with a maximum harvest of 30 MCM. If we take this to represent the 
100% WSD investment level, an investment of 20% would correspond to an increase 
in upstream water availability of 6 MCM (and a loss downstream of 4.8 MCM) at a 
cost of 3.2 million USD. Using these figures to estimate the impact of changes in wa-
ter availability, table 6.6 presents the results. 
                                                   
6 The district statistical office provided the data on WSD investment costs.  
7 The total amount of rainfall being 1690 MCM, or the equivalent of average rainfall (800 mm) times 





Table 6.6  Cropping pattern changes (in ha) resulting from WSD investments  
Scenario 1  20%  40%  60%  80%  100% 
Upstream           
Rice  +173  +344  +513  +681  +848 
Vegetables  +267  +531  +793  +1053  +1311 
Oilseeds  +182  +363  +543  +720  +896 
 
Downstream 
         
Rice  -161  -322  -483  -644  -805 
Cotton  -176  -352  -528  -704  -880 
Oilseeds  -140  -280  -420  -560  -700 
 
Scenario 2  20%  40%  60%  80%  100% 
Upstream           
Rice  +172  +257  +342  +426  +511 
Vegetables  +263  +394  +524  +653  +782 
Oilseeds  +182  +273  +363  +452  +542 
 
Downstream 
         
Rice  -159  -238  -317  -397  -476 
Vegetables  -173  -260  -347  -434  -520 
Oilseeds  -138  -207  -276  -345  -414 
 
As the results show, the impact of WSD is larger in scenario 1 than in scenario 2. 
This follows from both the higher water intensity of agricultural production (α is 0.79 
respectively 0.77 as compared to 0.75 in scenario 2) and the fact that the shadow 
price of water is significantly higher in scenario 1.  
Crop water use in the different scenarios is quite similar to actual crop water use for 
cotton, but for rice it is much less and for vegetables and oilseeds it is significantly 
more. In estimating the model, we actually defined a minimum crop water require-
ment to reflect crop water use under rainfed conditions when supplementary irriga-
tion is supposed to be nil. Although for oilseeds, vegetables and cotton the estimated 
crop water use is a bit higher than actual water use, for rice it is actually quite close 
to the amount of water supplied under rainfed conditions, i.e. half the actual water 
use. Again, this seems to be the result of assuming average water intensity for all 
three crops.  
The annual benefits of WSD are derived by deducting the total producer surplus gen-
erated under the base scenario (no WSD investment) from the value generated under 
the different WSD scenarios. Table 6.7 presents the results. 
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Table 6.7 Annual benefits of WSD (in million USD) 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
  Annual benefits  Annual Benefits 
20%  0.04  0.02 
40%  0.08  0.04 
60%  0.11  0.06 
80%  0.15  0.08 
100%  0.19  0.10 
 
In line with the results from table 6.6, the impact of WSD on basin welfare is almost 
twice as high under scenario 1. Interestingly, for both scenarios, benefits upstream 
are sufficient to compensate downstream losses. That is to say, the efficiency gains 
of avoiding the transpiration losses of water storage are larger than the efficiency 
losses of having a lower water efficiency of irrigation water use.    
In order to compare WSD benefits with WSD investment costs, we have to calculate 
the net present value of WSD benefits. To do this we first need to make an assump-
tion about the expected lifetime of WSD investments. With no maintenance, we as-
sume that the expected lifetime of investments is 10 years. When investments are 
maintained, we expect the lifetime of WSD investments to increase to 25 years. We 
evaluate  both  a  scenario  with  and  without  investment  maintenance.  We  assume 
maintenance is undertaken every 5 years at 5 % of the investment cost.  
Second, we need to make an assumption about the discount rate. Since the capital 
costs of WSD reflect a real financial expenditure, we use a discount rate of 5%. 
However, we also calculate the net present value at a 0% discount rate. With respect 
to the costs of WSD, different figures might apply. If we consider total government 
expenditure, a 10% increase in watershed investment increases costs with 1.6 million 
USD. If we consider the fact that the WSD program started as an employment pro-
gram, i.e. low opportunity costs of labour, it would seem more appropriate to only 
account for material costs
8. In that case a 10% increase in WSD investment increases 
costs with 0.64 million USD.
9  
Figure 6.2 and 6.3 present the net present value of scenario 1, with and without in-
vestment maintenance. As the figures show, even when investments are maintained 
and no discount rate is applied, WSD benefits are not sufficient to pay back WSD in-
vestment costs. 
                                                   
8 This might seem to be contradicting our earlier statement regarding increasing labor costs. 
However, there is a clear issue of seasonality here. WSD investments are generally undertaken in the 
dry season, when unemployment is high. In the harvesting season however labor is generally scarce.  




















* Lifetime investments 10 years, 0% discount rate 

















* Lifetime investments 25 years, 0% discount rate 
Figure 6.3 Net present value of costs and benefits scenario 1 - with maintenance  
Before discussing these results and their possible implications for the WSD invest-
ment program, in the next paragraph we first analyze their sensitivity.  
6.4 The robustness of results  
At several points in the preceding analysis we reported that data were only indicative 
since we had few data points and the data we had were of varying quality. To test 
whether the use of alternative figures would significantly alter the results, we per-
form a Monte Carlo simulation using a random sample of 75-125% of the data earlier 
used. Except for α, γ and E all other parameters were left to vary. Assuming data are 
uniformly distributed, with the Excel-based McSimSolver programme we estimated 
the model, for each WSD investment level, 5000 times (Barreto and Howland 2006).  The downstream externalities of watershed development in India       
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We then use these simulations to calculate the standard deviation of the two scenar-
ios in order to estimate the probability that watershed development would have a 
positive welfare impact, i.e. that WSD benefits would be sufficient to compensate 
costs. Table 6.8 presents the one sided p-values for scenario 1 and 2.  
Table 6.8   Probability that benefits ≥ full investment or material costs.  
  Without maintenance  With maintenance 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
















20%  12%  36%  8%  31%  33%  44%  27%  41% 
40%  1%  23%  0  15%  18%  39%  11%  31% 
60%  0  13%  0  6%  9%  35%  3%  24% 
80%  0  7%  0  2%  3%  29%  1%  16% 
100%  0  3%  0  0  1%  25%  0  11% 
The reported probabilities are one-sided P-values 
The results indicate that for most scenarios there is a probability that WSD generates 
a positive welfare impact, but that this probability is less than 50%. The probability 
decreases at higher investment levels and is, obviously, smaller when accounting for 
full investment costs. When we only allow prices to vary, and keep A and β fixed, the 
probability that WSD is welfare enhancing becomes less
10. Overall, SWC mainte-
nance increases the probability that WSD improves basin welfare with 10-20 %.  
In line with the empirical estimates for α and A we only evaluated scenarios for 
which the shadow price of water is higher upstream or the same. When upstream 
farmers are not in the position to produce high value crops the shadow price of up-
stream water is however likely to be lower. Since in most semi-arid watersheds this 
is actually the case, we re-calculated scenario 2 with higher values for downstream A, 
γ and β resulting in a shadow price of downstream water of 0.90 rs/liter (as compared 
to a shadow price of 0.60 rs/liter for users upstream). The results show that in this 
case upstream benefits are no longer sufficient to compensate downstream losses. 
Hence, if the shadow price of water downstream is significantly higher, the effi-
ciency gains of avoiding storage losses are no longer sufficient to compensate the 
loss in water use efficiency at the basin scale.  
Estimating the model with crop specific water intensity variables α might improve 
the results. At present, the model underestimates the water productivity of vegetable 
production, which reduces total WSD benefits upstream. Hence, using crop specific 
water intensity factors might slightly change the outcome in favour of WSD.  
                                                   
10 We also tested whether our conclusions hold if α is for example 0.5. Although again several 
specifications are possible, the specification with values for A, β and γ similar to the values in 
scenario 1 and 2 resulted in a much lower shadow prices for water (µ=0.04 upstream and µ =0.05 
downstream) and, hence, a much lower impact of WSD. Still, upstream benefits are sufficient to 





However, given that in most semi-arid watersheds upstream farmers hardly produce 
any vegetable crops, it does not change the general expectation that WSD is unlikely 
to be welfare enhancing at the basin scale. Still, further research seems required to 
test the effect of different scenarios and cropping patterns on the results.  
6.5 Discussion  
The idea to re-allocate water from the relatively water abundant regions downstream 
to the dryland regions upstream seemed like a good idea. Water scarcity being re-
garded as the main production constraint in most upstream, semi-arid regions, the 
idea to capture water ‘where it falls’ appealed to many, not in the least because the 
costs seemed relatively low. Although the benefits proved attractive, the externalities 
to downstream users were largely ignored. This chapter suggests that the downstream 
externalities of watershed development are substantial and that WSD benefits are on 
average insufficient to payback investment costs.  
If WSD interventions succeed to ensure SWC maintenance, the probability that WSD 
is welfare enhancing increases with approximately 10-20%. However, even when 
SWC structures are maintained the probability that WSD generates a positive welfare 
impact is less than 50%. Besides, the question is whether it is realistic to assume that 
SWC investments are maintained. The analysis in the previous chapters indicated 
that the likelihood of sustained SWC maintenance seems relatively low.  
Results are likely to worsen if we account for the market distortions that keep farm 
households from actually maximizing the value of their crops. Especially in upstream 
regions, infrastructure and market services tend to be poor as public investments in 
infrastructure and agricultural services traditionally focused on the higher productiv-
ity regions downstream. Hence, more semi-subsistence crops are produced and the 
value of agricultural production tends to be low. The analysis indicated that if the 
shadow price of water is downstream higher, upstream benefits are no longer suffi-
cient to compensate losses downstream.  
If we account for the urban costs of WSD the likelihood that WSD has a positive 
welfare impact becomes even less. In the case of Hyderabad city, due to WSD in-
vestments the annual costs of urban water supply increased with almost 5 million 
USD
11. If instead of using the actual costs of water supply, which are likely to reflect 
potentially large inefficiencies, we use consumer willingness to pay figures
12 to esti-
mate the increase in costs, the annual loss from diverting water from urban to agri-
cultural use would still be 2 million USD. Clearly, no watershed development pro-
gram can generate sufficient benefits to compensate such a loss.  
                                                   
11 The extra costs of pumping water from the Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir are 14.5 Rs./m3. 
12 Saleth and Dinar (2001) estimated consumer willingness to pay figures for Hyderabad in 1997.  The downstream externalities of watershed development in India       
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Under these circumstances, re-allocating water from down to upstream regions only 
makes sense if watershed development significantly contributes to poverty allevia-
tion or if it enhances welfare in another way. Looking at the wider welfare impacts of 
WSD, investments in the Musi sub-basin were mainly targeted at groundwater re-
charge, but might have benefited soil conservation as well. Since we lack data on the 
impacts of soil conservation, we cannot assess the importance of this effect. How-
ever, the sub-basin being relatively flat, we don’t expect the benefits in terms of re-
duced soil erosion or siltation to be substantial. Some investments were made in re-
forestation, but only for 7% of the total WSD budget. Again, we know little about the 
number of trees planted or the broader welfare impact this investment might have 
had. In terms of water conservation the longer term impact seems to be small: hydro-
logical studies in the region indicate that WSD does not improve long term ground-
water levels since all water harvested tends to be used (Batchelor et al. 2003).  
With respect to the impact on poverty alleviation, several studies have shown the im-
pact of WSD on poverty alleviation to be relatively small. Investments mainly bene-
fit farmers with access to irrigation and good quality land, something poor house-
holds tend not to have (Bouma and Scott 2006, Farrington et al. 1999, Kerr 2002). In 
fact, Fan et al. (2000) conclude that investments in watershed development are not 
effective to alleviate poverty and that investing in roads, education, agricultural R&D 
and extension services is likely to have a much larger effect. The poor usually de-
pend more on rainfed agriculture and agricultural labour and although they do benefit 
from the employment generated during project implementation, this is a relatively 
short-term effect. An improvement in the returns to rainfed agriculture might have a 
more structural impact on the poor. Besides, it might reduce the downstream exter-
nalities of WSD, as less rainfall would be captured upstream.  
Although this dissertation has not addressed the feasibility of improving rainfed crop 
productivity, the analysis does give some indications that such a strategy is unlikely 
to work. The returns to rainfed crops are generally lower than the returns to irrigated 
agriculture. This reduces the incentive to invest in SWC and increases the probability 
that investments are not maintained. Besides, to improve the yields of rainfed crops, 
analysts have indicated that investments in market access and agricultural extension 
services are required as well (Rosegrant et al. 2000). Also, the risks of crop loss are 
relatively high in rainfed agriculture. Stimulating poor households to invest in rain-
fed agriculture under conditions of increasing climate variability is unlikely to reduce 
poverty much.  





Annex to chapter 6 
 
Table 6.9   Crop yield and crop water use data 






Yield (kg/ha)  
 
ET (m3/ha) 
Rice  3200  9360 
Vegetables  20000  7700 
Oilseeds  1000  5520 
 
Downstream 
   
Rice  3600  8920 
Cotton   400  7850 
Oilseeds  1200  5300 
 
Yield data from Govern-
ment of India,  
(different sources) 
at www.indiastat.com 
ET calculated using the 
FAO Penman-Monteith 






   
 
Upstream 
Yield (kg/ha)  ET (m3/ha) 
Rice  2550  6500 
Vegetables  13500  4860 
Oilseeds  750  3590 
 
Downstream 
   
Rice  3250  7350 
Cotton  322  7090 
Oilseeds  1000  3590 





Yield data from  
Government of India, (dif-
ferent sources) at 
www.indiastat.com. 
ET data for oilseeds from 
Biggs and Turral (2007) 
and for rice, cotton, veg.  
from Brouwer et al (2007) 
 
Upstream 
Yield (kg/ha)  ET (m3/ha) 
Rice  2000  5000 
Vegetables  10000  3200 
Oilseeds  530  2260 
 
Downstream     
Rice  2200  5000 
Cotton  200  3150 
Oilseeds  580  2260 
 
 
Yield data calculated on 
the basis of crop yield fac-
tors from Biggs and Turral 
(2007). ET data for rice 
from Bouman and Tuong 
(2000) and for the other 
crops from Biggs and Tur-
ral (2007) 
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7. Discussion and Synthesis  
To transform India’s semi-arid, upper catchment areas, the WSD program has tried 
to reduce poverty and improve agricultural productivity by investing in SWC at the 
village scale. In this endeavour, local communities played an important role. They 
actively participated in investment planning and implementation and were supposed 
to engage in voluntary cooperation to maintain SWC structures in the long run. This 
dissertation has taken a closer look at the extent to which communities can be ex-
pected to voluntarily engage in long term SWC. Also, it has analyzed whether plan-
ning and implementing projects at the scale of communities might also have adverse 
impacts in causing welfare losses downstream. Together these two factors are an im-
portant indication of whether community-based WSD can be considered an effective 
strategy to reduce poverty and increase agricultural productivity in India’s semi-arid 
regions.  
Overall,  the  analysis  in  this  dissertation  suggests  that  community-based  WSD  is 
unlikely to transform India’s semi-arid regions in the long run. Although under fa-
vourable conditions households might voluntary cooperate in SWC maintenance, for 
the average household in the average village the incentive to contribute seems low. 
Involving communities in project planning and implementation does positively influ-
ence project effectiveness, but mainly by increasing the critical mass of households 
with SWC. Investments in community organization do not seem to significantly in-
fluence the household’s commitment to voluntary contribute to SWC maintenance, 
possibly because community investments do not always succeed in creating consen-
sus regarding the WSD investment plan.  
Generally speaking, WSD seems most likely to structurally improve agricultural pro-
ductivity in regions, and for households, that are already relatively well off. This im-
plies a trade-off between the WSD objectives of poverty alleviation and improved 
agricultural productivity since SWC investments in poor regions and for poor house-
holds are less likely to be effective, whereas these are the regions, and the house-
holds, that require public investments most. Another trade-off that arises is between 
the welfare of upstream regions and the welfare of regions downstream. In water 
scarce river basins, WSD effectively re-allocates water from high potential regions 
downstream to the lower potential watersheds upstream. Although under some cir-
cumstances upstream benefits are sufficient to compensate downstream losses, bene-
fits are on average insufficient to pay back investment costs.  





In the introduction of this dissertation I formulated four research questions to analyze 
whether communities can be expected to maintain semi-public SWC structures in the 
long run. In the following, I will address each of these questions to synthesize the 
conclusions and discuss the main results.  
The first question concerned the likelihood that households voluntarily contribute to 
SWC maintenance, given the semi-public nature of SWC investments and given the 
context of agricultural production in India’s semi-arid watersheds. The analysis in 
chapter 3 suggested that whether a coalition of households is likely to maintain a so-
cially efficient level of SWC investments depends on whether it has a strategic ad-
vantage as compared to non-cooperative households. If the coalition does not have a 
strategic  advantage,  and  coalition  membership  is  not  fixed,  initially  cooperative 
households will leave the coalition and a socially efficient level of SWC provision is 
unlikely to be reached. Household commitment might reduce mobility between coali-
tion and fringe but as it cannot increase coalition stability this does not improve the 
maintenance of SWC structures in the long run. If the coalition has a strong strategic 
advantage it can credibly threaten defectors to stay in the coalition or to have their 
welfare strongly reduced. Under these circumstances the entire community will join 
the coalition and a socially optimum level of SWC investment can be attained.  
With  regard  to  the  costs  and  benefits  of  cooperation,  the  analysis  indicated  that 
emerging labour markets tend to increase the opportunity costs of labour and, hence, 
to reduce voluntary contributions to the public good. Interestingly, the emergence of 
a labour market not only affects community cooperation, community cooperation 
also determines the impact emerging labour markets have. In intrinsically coopera-
tive communities, the external wage rate needs to be higher to reduce water conser-
vation levels than in communities that do not cooperate much. This can be explained 
by the fact that in cooperative communities the value of agricultural production is 
higher as more water is harvested for collective use. The impact of emerging labour 
markets on community cooperation is not necessarily negative. If it enforces the stra-
tegic position of the coalition, it can actually increase the level of SWC provided. 
Hence, it seems important to pay more attention to the influence of emerging labour 
markets on community resource management to improve the effectiveness of WSD.   
The influence of the external environment on community resource management was 
addressed in chapter 4. The analysis accounted for region, village and household 
specific factors, like market access, aridity, location in the watershed and soil type, 
and tried to assess the relative importance of these factors in determining the house-
hold’s intention to contribute to SWC. The results indicate that the poorer the condi-
tions for agricultural production, the lower the contribution of individual households 
to SWC. At the aggregate scale, low rainfall and poor quality soils reduce the incen-
tive to invest in SWC and at the household level, households with no access to irriga-
tion and good quality land benefit less. Hence, paradoxically, the regions and house-
holds that require subsidized SWC investment most are least inclined to maintain 
these structures in the long run.  Discussion and synthesis       
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With respect to the wider socio-economic context, poor market access was expected 
to reduce the incentive for voluntary cooperation due to its impact on market transac-
tion costs. However, the analysis in chapter 4 suggests that poor market access af-
fects voluntary cooperation positively. This seems to be an indication that the incen-
tive to invest in SWC is not so much influenced by poor market access in terms of 
agricultural input and output markets as it is by the opportunity costs of labour. In 
accordance with the analysis in chapter 3, better access to labour markets reduces the 
incentive of households to invest in SWC. Whether poor access to agricultural input 
and output markets is indeed less important for the safeguarding of SWC investment 
maintenance remains to be seen. The household’s access to irrigation, an indication 
that the household can grow high value cash crops, does have a strong, positive im-
pact, and so does average income at the village scale. Hence, further analysis seems 
required to assess the extent to which investments in infrastructure and agricultural 
input and output markets might improve the conditions for SWC maintenance, for 
example by separating labour market from in- and output market effects.  
The second question concerned the issue whether investments in community organi-
zation can improve SWC maintenance in the long run. The analysis in chapter 4 in-
dicates that the results are mixed. Investments in community organization do not 
significantly influence the household’s intention to contribute to SWC maintenance. 
However, community involvement in WSD project planning and implementation 
does increase the critical mass of households with investments in SWC. A greater 
critical mass of households with SWC investment positively influences the house-
hold’s intention to contribute to SWC maintenance, possibly because it increases the 
size of the coalition, as the analysis in chapter 3 would suggest.  
Besides, the household’s intention to contribute is positively affected by the house-
hold’s perceived influence in village decision-making. Although the analysis does 
not provide evidence of investments in community organization positively affecting 
village decision-making, case study analysis indicates that investments in awareness 
raising and empowerment have a positive effect (Joy and Paranjape 2004, Honoré 
2002). Also, non-participatory approaches affect the household’s intention to con-
tribute negatively. Hence, if households cannot participate in investment planning 
and implementation they are unlikely to contribute to the maintenance of these in-
vestments in the long run.  
The case study analysis in chapter 4 indicated that active involvement of villagers in 
project planning and implementation has a positive impact on investment targeting 
and the monitoring of project implementation. More money seems to reach the target 
group resulting in more and better quality SWC investments. This positively influ-
ences the effectiveness of WSD for the simple reason that SWC structures are less 
likely to fall apart. Even the most participatory projects, however, cannot ensure that 
benefits are equally shared. The analysis indicates that village level inequality does 





However, an unequal distribution of project benefits might also be an indication that 
investments in community organization did not succeed in creating consensus re-
garding  the  WSD  investment  plan.  This  could  help  explain  why  investments  in 
community organization have no significant impact on the household’s intention to 
contribute to SWC maintenance. Further research seems required however to analyse 
this effect, linking information about specific community organization investments to 
the level of consensus and distribution of project benefits at the village scale.  
Finally,  the  establishment  of  a  village  maintenance  fund  negatively  affects  the 
household’s intention to contribute to SWC maintenance. Since the case study analy-
sis suggests that the existence of a maintenance fund does not seem to improve SWC 
maintenance, the establishment of a maintenance funds might end up worsening the 
situation if funds are not managed well. More research seems required however to 
evaluate the functioning of maintenance funds and their long term impact on SWC.  
The relative importance of social capital for voluntary cooperation was the subject 
matter of chapter 5. The analysis suggested that the availability of social capital at 
the village scale is a significant determinant of the household’s intention to contrib-
ute to SWC. Using trust as a measure of social capital, higher trust levels positively 
influence household commitment to SWC maintenance.  Interestingly, the intention 
to cooperate is influenced not by the household’s own expectation, or trust, regarding 
the contribution of other households but rather by average trust levels at the village 
scale. This is in accordance with the definition of social capital as a community char-
acteristic, and implies that community characteristics are indeed important to facili-
tate cooperative behaviour at the village scale.  
Whether participants trust other participants to reciprocate pro-social behaviour does 
not directly depend on community characteristics, but rather on the household’s so-
cial position in the group. For example, participants that belong to the village’s ma-
jority caste group were shown to be more trusting, whereas participants that depend 
on outside sources of income trust less. This last result is especially interesting as it 
indicates that emerging labour markets might not only increase the opportunity costs 
of labour, but could erode village trust levels as well.  
When using caste homogeneity as a proxy for the availability of social capital, volun-
tary cooperation is shown to be higher in homogeneous villages. Hence, targeting 
homogeneous villages might improve project effectiveness in the long run. The rela-
tive importance of social capital for voluntary cooperation is comparable to that of 
other factors. This not only underlines the importance of social capital, it also indi-
cates that targeting homogeneous villages is not the only road to success. Improving 
the effectiveness of investments in community organization or reducing the negative 
impact of a village level maintenance fund might help increase voluntary cooperation 
as well. Besides, in heterogeneous communities explicit control mechanisms to fa-
cilitate cooperation might be developed, although the feasibility of this option has not 
been assessed.  Discussion and synthesis       
111 
The fourth research question concerned the possibly adverse impacts of WSD at the 
basin scale. The analysis in chapter 6 indicated that the downstream externalities of 
WSD are substantial. Although in the specific example of the case study region up-
stream gains were sufficient to compensate downstream losses, on average WSD 
benefits do not seem sufficient to pay back investment costs. Still, watershed devel-
opment might be socially desirable if it substantially reduces poverty upstream. Sev-
eral studies have shown the impact of WSD on poverty alleviation to be disappoint-
ing, however, and WSD does not seem an effective strategy to improve welfare at the 
basin scale.  
One possible exemption is a scenario where WSD interventions succeed to ensure 
SWC maintenance in the long run. In this case, there is a 40% probability, at low in-
vestment levels, that benefits are sufficient to pay back investment costs. The ques-
tion is, however, whether such a scenario seems realistic. First, in the case study 
evaluated the value of upstream production is relatively high. Most WSD projects are 
however targeted at more remote regions where the transaction costs of agricultural 
marketing are such that farm households rationally decide to cultivate low value, 
semi-subsistence crops. Hence, the economic value of agricultural production in up-
stream regions is often lower than in the case study evaluated in chapter 6, and up-
stream benefits are less likely to be sufficient to compensate losses downstream.   
Second, in line with the overarching research question of this dissertation, the ques-
tion is whether households can be expected to voluntarily cooperate in the provision 
of a semi-public good. Overall, the likelihood that households in semi-arid water-
sheds  will  voluntarily  maintain  SWC  investments  seems  relatively  low.  With  no 
mechanisms to control free riding behaviour, the incentive to defect is high and espe-
cially in arid watersheds with poor soils and little access to irrigation, the expected 
benefits are low. Increased migration and the emergence of labour markets are likely 
to worsen the incentives for voluntary cooperation, as this increases the opportunity 
costs of labour and lowers trust levels at the village scale. In highly committed, ho-
mogeneous villages with relatively high-income levels and good access to irrigation 
and fertile land, voluntary cooperation for SWC maintenance might work. However, 
if conditions are less favourable, the establishment of explicit contribution mecha-
nisms seems required to ensure SWC maintenance in the long run. 
Analyzing the conditions for successful community resource management has helped 
in understanding the factors that determine the effectiveness of WSD. Emerging la-
bour markets, contextual factors and community and household characteristics were 
all shown significant, whereas the existing literature mostly concentrated on inter-
vention-related  factors  instead.  Although  the  type  of  project  implementation  was 
shown to play an important role, for long term project effectiveness contextual fac-
tors seem to matter more. Further analysis seems required to analyze how the welfare 
impacts of WSD can be improved. In this analysis, specific attention should be paid 
to the allocation of water user rights and rainfed agriculture. Besides, the role of ex-





With respect to community-based approaches in general, the main lesson seems to be 
that community involvement in project planning and implementation is crucial to en-
sure project effectiveness. For sustained community resource management it is also 
necessary,  however,  that  the  conditions  for  voluntary  cooperation  are  met.  The 
analysis  in  this  dissertation  has  stressed  the  importance  of  consensus  and  self-
enforcement for sustained voluntary cooperation. Besides, the importance of house-
hold incentives for voluntary cooperation has been underlined. If cooperation has no 
particular advantage or if households cannot expect other households to cooperate 
too, decentralizing resource management to local communities is unlikely to be suc-
cessful in the long run.  
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift richt zich op de vraag of je van individuele huishoudens kunt ver-
wachten dat ze vrijwillig samenwerken om zorg te dragen voor het beheer en de 
voorziening van een semi-publiek goed. Publieke goederen zijn gedefinieerd als goe-
deren waarbij 1) het moeilijk is anderen van gebruik buiten te sluiten en 2) gebruik 
niet rivaliserend is. Bij semi-publieke goederen is het gebruik wel rivaliserend, wat 
feitelijk impliceert dat gebruik van het goed niet zonder consequenties voor anderen 
is. De vrije toegankelijkheid van semi-publieke en collectieve goederen en hulpbron-
nen bemoeilijkt het beheer aangezien individuen geneigd zijn af te wachten totdat 
iemand anders de noodzakelijke investeringen maakt. Dit gedrag wordt ‘free-riding’ 
genoemd, aangezien men feitelijk gratis meelift op de investeringen van anderen. Als 
iedereen wil meeliften op de investeringen van anderen komt de voorziening van het 
semi-publieke goed in gevaar. Zelfs als er grote waarde wordt gehecht aan het be-
schikbaar zijn van het semi-publieke goed geldt dat als meelift gedrag niet in toom 
kan worden gehouden het niveau waarop semi-publieke goederen beschikbaar zijn 
zal liggen onder het maatschappelijk optimale niveau. 
Gedurende een lange tijd zijn economen ervan uit gegaan dat semi-publieke goede-
ren alleen door een overheid kunnen worden beheerd. Daarbij werd gepropageerd dat 
het toewijzen van individuele eigendomsrechten, waarmee het buitensluiten van ge-
bruik door anderen mogelijk wordt, de meest efficiënte oplossing zou zijn. Dat groe-
pen individuen of gemeenschappen zelf in staat zouden zijn om semi-publieke goe-
deren te beheren werd lange tijd niet mogelijk geacht. De empirisch gebaseerde lite-
ratuur ten aanzien van ‘common property resource management’ heeft echter over-
tuigend aangetoond dat onder bepaalde omstandigheden gemeenschappen prima in 
staat zijn zelf zorg te dragen voor de voorziening en het beheer van semi-publieke en 
collectieve goederen en hulpbronnen. Het decentraliseren van het beheer van semi-
publieke goederen naar lokale gemeenschappen bleek bovendien een aantal voorde-
len te hebben. Allereerst zijn op decentraal niveau de kosten van het in toom houden 
van meelift gedrag over het algemeen lager dan op centraal niveau. Daarbij is gede-
centraliseerd beheer beter in staat in te spelen op de behoeften en wensen van ge-
bruikers en kunnen investeringen optimaal aan de lokale context worden aangepast. 
Decentralisatie heeft echter ook een paar nadelen. Zo is de toegankelijkheid van het 
semi-publieke goed niet perse gewaarborgd en ontbreekt coördinatie op een hoger 
schaalniveau. Dit laatste kan bijvoorbeeld problemen opleveren als het gebruik van 
het semi-publieke goed en/of de collectieve hulpbron ook effect heeft op niet-lokale 





Concreet richt dit proefschrift zich op de vraag of het reëel is te verwachten dat huis-
houdens in semi-aride gebieden in India vrijwillig publieke investeringen in bodem- 
en water conservering zullen onderhouden. Bodem- en water conserveringsmaatrege-
len hebben belangrijke semi-publiek eigenschappen aangezien een belangrijk deel 
van de baten wordt gedeeld. Met name investeringen gericht op waterconservering 
(kleine reservoirs, dammen, putten etc.) hebben grotendeels gedeelde baten aange-
zien de belangrijkste opbrengst, grondwater, vrij toegankelijk is. In het geval van bo-
dembeschermingsmaatregelen (greppels, aarde- en stenen wallen, etc) is een groter 
gedeelte van de baten privaat, maar ook hier is sprake van aanzienlijke publieke ba-
ten. Mede door het deels publieke karakter van bodem-en waterconserveringsinveste-
ringen heeft de Indiase overheid, tezamen met een groot aantal non-gouvernmentele 
organisaties, fors in bodem-en waterconservering geïnvesteerd. Arme gronden, peri-
odieke droogte en waterschaarste worden algemeen gezien als belangrijke reden voor 
de lage agrarische productiviteit van India’s semi-aride gebieden en investeringen in 
bodem-en waterconservering worden verwacht structureel bij te dragen aan een ho-
gere agrarische produktiviteit. Het investeringsprogramma wordt ook wel het ‘wa-
tershed development’ programma genoemd vanwege de aandacht voor de beneden-
stroomse effecten van investeringen op een deel van het afwateringsgebied. Met een 
jaarlijkse investeringsomvang van ongeveer 500 miljoen dollar (in 2000) een van de 
belangrijkste rurale ontwikkelingsprogramma’s voor India’s semi-aride gebieden. 
De vraag of van lokale gemeenschappen in India’s semi-aride gebieden verwacht kan 
worden dat zij de semi-publieke investeringen in bodem-en waterconservering op de 
lange termijn vrijwillig zullen onderhouden is niet alleen relevant voor betrokkenen 
bij het Indiase ‘watershed development’ programma, het is tevens relevant voor het 
bredere ontwikkelingsbeleid. Lokale gemeenschappen worden in toenemende mate 
geacht semi-publieke investeringen zoals wegen, scholen en irrigatie-infrastructuur te 
onderhouden  en  steeds  meer  programma’s  decentraliseren  het  beheer  van  semi-
publieke  goederen  en  collectieve  hulpbronnen  naar  het  gemeenschapsniveau.  Het 
portfolio van de Wereldbank met gemeenschapsgerichte projecten alleen al wordt 
geschat op 7 miljard dollar, terwijl het onduidelijk is of a) de huidige benadering wel 
werkt en b) op welke wijze de effectiviteit van de benadering kan worden vergroot.  
Om  beter  inzicht  te  krijgen  in  de  voorwaarden  voor  effectief  beheer  van  semi-
publieke goederen op gemeenschapsniveau, en om de effectiviteit van de gemeen-
schapsgerichte benadering te kunnen vergroten, maakt dit proefschrift gebruik van de 
literatuur over vrijwillige samenwerking, gemeenschappelijk beheer van publieke en 
collectieve goederen en hulpbronnen, sociaal kapitaal en gemeenschapsgerichte pro-
jectimplementatie. Aan de hand van vier onderzoeksvragen tracht het proefschrift de 
volgende twee hoofdvragen te beantwoorden: a) onder welke voorwaarden kan ver-
wacht worden dat lokale gemeenschappen in India’s semi-aride gebieden vrijwillig 
bijdragen aan het onderhoud van semi-publieke bodem-en waterconserveringsmaat-
regelen en b) wat zijn de welvaartseffecten van bovenstroomse investeringen in bo-
dem-en waterconservering op stroomgebiedsniveau.         
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Na een inleidend hoofdstuk over het ‘watershed development’ programma en de ka-
rakteristieken van bodem- en waterconservering in India’s semi-aride gebieden wor-
den in vier hoofdstukken de volgende vier onderzoeksvragen opgepakt: 
1. Kan je van huishoudens in India’s semi-aride gebieden verwachten dat ze vrijwil-
lig samenwerken in het onderhoud van bodem- en waterconserveringsinvesteringen, 
gegeven de context van agrarische produktie in India’s semi-aride gebieden en gege-
ven het semi-publieke karakter van bodem-en waterconserveringsmaatregelen?     
2. Wat is het effect van investeringen in participatie, gemeenschapszin en lokale or-
ganisatie op het lange termijn onderhoud van bodem-en waterconservering investe-
ringen? 
3. Hoe beïnvloeden gemeenschapskarakteristieken vrijwillige samenwerking en wat 
is het relatieve belang van dit effect?  
4.Hoe belangrijk zijn de benedenstroomse effecten van bovenstroomse investeringen 
in bodem- en waterconservering en wat is, in Indiaas semi-aride gebieden, het wel-
vaartseffect  van  bodem-  en  waterconserveringsmaatregelen    op  stroomgebiedsni-
veau? 
De eerste onderzoeksvraag, of van huishoudens verwacht kan worden dat zij vrijwil-
lig bijdragen aan het onderhoud van een semi-publiek goed, wordt uitgewerkt in een 
speltheoretisch kader, waarbij huishoudens de keuze hebben tussen samenwerken of 
niet. Huishoudens baseren hun beslissing op de verwachte baten van samenwerking. 
Indien de baten van samenwerken lager zijn dan die van meeliften, werken huishou-
dens niet samen en zijn de investeringen in bodem-en waterconservering laag. Indien 
het echter lukt een strategische coalitie van coöperatieve huishoudens te vormen kan 
samenwerken wel een aantrekkelijke optie worden en nemen de verwachte investe-
ringen in bodem- en water conservering toe. Of dit ook leidt tot lange termijn onder-
houd hangt af van de stabiliteit van de coalitie, of de mate waarin huishoudens een 
prikkel hebben om samen te blijven werken op termijn. Zonder mechanismen om 
meeliftgedrag te voorkomen is de enige reden waarom huishoudens zouden willen 
blijven samenwerken dat de baten van samenwerken die van meeliften overtreffen. 
Dit is alleen het geval als het strategisch voordeel van de coalitie dusdanig is dat alle 
huishoudens deel van de coalitie willen uitmaken. In dat geval werkt iedereen samen 
en wordt een sociaal optimale hoeveelheid investeringen in bodem-en waterconser-
vering gemaakt. Uitgaande van het gegeven dat de coalitie een strategisch voordeel 
heeft doordat over een gemeenschappelijke strategie kan worden gecommuniceerd, 
blijkt onder bepaalde condities langdurige, vrijwillige samenwerking mogelijk.   
In het hoofdstuk wordt specifiek aandacht besteed aan het belang van zich ontwikke-
lende arbeidsmarkten, aangezien dit in de context van bodem-en waterconservering 
in India’s semi-aride gebieden van belang wordt geacht. Zoals verwacht neemt in het 
geval van een zich ontwikkelende arbeidsmarkt de prikkel om in bodem-en water-





Onder bepaalde voorwaarden kan het echter ook de strategische positie van de coali-
tie versterken waarmee de rol van zich ontwikkelende arbeidsmarkten voor bodem-
en waterconservering niet perse negatief is. Aandacht voor het effect van arbeids-
marktontwikkeling op het beheer van gemeenschappelijke goederen en hulpbronnen 
is voor gemeenschapsgerichte projecten lijkt derhalve van groot belang.  
De tweede onderzoeksvraag, over het lange termijn effect van investeringen in parti-
cipatie  en  gemeenschapszin,  is  geanalyseerd  met  behulp  van  gegevens  over  683 
huishoudens uit 22 dorpen verspreid over 4 stroomgebieden. Specifiek richt de ana-
lyse zich op het onderscheid tussen projectinterventies door de centrale overheid, die 
over  het  algemeen  niet  participatief  zijn,  projectinterventies  door  non-
gouvernementele organisaties, die over het algemeen wel participatief zijn, en dorpen 
waar  geen  interventies  hebben  plaatsgevonden.  De  belangrijkste  vraag  van  het 
hoofdstuk is of investeringen in participatie en lokaal beheer de effectiviteit van de 
interventie op de korte en lange termijn verbeteren. De indicator voor korte termijn 
effectiviteit is het aantal huishoudens met investeringen in bodem- en waterconserve-
ring. De indicator op lange termijn is het aantal huishoudens dat aangeeft van plan te 
zijn in de toekomst bij te dragen aan bodem-en waterconservering. In overeenstem-
ming met de bestaande literatuur blijken participatieve benaderingen inderdaad effec-
tiever op de korte termijn te zijn, maar op de lange termijn is er geen significant ef-
fect. Wel geven huishoudens in overheidsgeïmplementeerde projecten aan niet van 
plan te zijn in de toekomst bij te dragen aan bodem-en waterconservering. Aangezien 
een grotere kritische massa van huishoudens met bodem- en waterconserveringsin-
vesteringen bovendien van positieve invloed is op de motivatie om op de lange ter-
mijn bij te dragen heeft een participatieve benadering indirect wel een positief effect.  
Naast een analyse op het niveau van de huishoudens, wordt in het hoofdstuk aan-
dacht besteed aan het effect van participatieve benaderingen op het gemeenschapsni-
veau. Zo werkt betrokkenheid van lokale gebruikers positief door op de kwaliteit van 
de genomen investeringen en is men in participatieve projecten over het algemeen 
meer tevreden over hoe de baten van projectimplementatie zijn verdeeld. Zelfs in de 
meest participatieve projecten is de verdeling van baten echter ongelijk, wat deels 
samenhangt met geografische karakteristieken maar deels ook met het gedrag van de 
lokale elite. Tenslotte lijkt de werking van zogenaamde onderhoudsfondsen groten-
deels averechts: indien er een onderhoudsfonds beschikbaar is willen huishoudens 
zelf geen investeringen meer doen, terwijl de fondsen zelf nauwelijks voor onder-
houd blijken te worden gebruikt. 
De derde onderzoeksvraag, over de rol en het belang van gemeenschapskarakteris-
tieken, is opgepakt met behulp van een experimenteel economische benadering. In 
zes van de 22 onderzoeksdorpen zijn 20 representanten van de eerder geselecteerde 
huishoudens uitgenodigd voor een spel. De bedoelding van het spel was om te meten 
in hoeverre spelers elkaar vertrouwen en wat dit zegt over de mate waarin men be-
reid is om bij te dragen aan het onderhoud van bodem- en waterconserveringsinves-
teringen of niet.         
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Interessant genoeg blijkt er een duidelijke samenhang te zijn tussen de resultaten van 
het spel en de antwoorden in de huishoud vragenlijst. Individueel vertrouwen is niet 
significant,  maar  het  gemiddelde  niveau  van  vertrouwen  op  gemeenschapsniveau 
wel. Dit kan gezien worden als indicator voor het beschikbaar zijn van sociaal kapi-
taal, of het niveau van vertrouwen en de gedeelde normen en waarden op gemeen-
schapsniveau. In gemeenschappen waar mensen elkaar vertrouwen wordt meer sa-
mengewerkt dan in gemeenschappen waar dit niet het geval is, en de analyse laat 
zien dat in heterogene gemeenschappen vertrouwen lager, en samenwerking minder, 
is.      
Het relatieve belang van vertrouwen voor de bereidheid om bij te dragen aan bodem- 
en waterconservering op de lange termijn is in dezelfde orde van grootte als het al 
dan niet toegang hebben tot irrigatie, de mate waarin men meent de besluitvorming 
op gemeenschapsniveau te kunnen beïnvloeden en het al dan niet aanwezig zijn van 
een onderhoudsfonds. Dit betekent dat sociaal kapitaal een belangrijke verklarende 
variabele is voor het begrip waarom bepaalde gemeenschappen wel samenwerken en 
andere niet.  Tegelijkertijd geeft het ook aan dat dit niet betekent dat investeringen 
zich alleen op homogene gemeenschappen zouden moeten richten. De belangrijkste 
les van het hoofdstuk is dat het belangrijk is rekening te houden met sociale factoren 
en gemeenschapskarakteristieken indien het beheer van semi-publieke goederen en 
collectieve hulpbronnen wordt gedecentraliseerd naar gemeenschapsniveau. 
De vierde onderzoeksvraag betreft de welvaartseffecten van bodem- en waterconser-
vering op stroomgebiedsniveau. Alhoewel verschillende studies hebben aangetoond 
dat investeringen in bodem-en waterconservering over het algemeen leiden tot een 
welvaartsverbetering in het gebied waar de investeringen zijn gemaakt, is het ondui-
delijk wat de effecten op benedenstroomse gebieden zijn. Zeker indien boven – en 
benedenstroomse gebieden, naast een stroom van oppervlakte water, niet ook via een 
stroom grondwater met elkaar verbonden zijn, lijkt bovenstroomse waterconserve-
ring te leiden tot een reallocatie van water op stroomgebiedsniveau. De beneden-
stroomse welvaartseffecten van een dergelijke water reallocatie moeten in de be-
schouwing worden meegenomen wanneer de welvaartsimpact van ‘watershed  deve-
lopment’ wordt bepaald. Dit is tot nu toe nog niet gebeurd.  
In het bepalen van het welvaartseffect van ‘watershed development’op stroomge-
biedsniveau spelen twee factoren een belangrijke rol: 1) het opslaan van water in be-
nedenstroomse irrigatiereservoirs leidt, door verdamping,  tot een verlies van 20% en 
2) door betere en plattere landbouwgronden en een minder aride klimaat is de pro-
duktiviteit van  landbouw benedenstrooms hoger.  Het uiteindelijke  welvaartseffect 
van bovenstroomse investeringen in waterconservering hangt af van de balans tussen 
deze twee factoren. Om de balans te bepalen gebruiken we een economisch model. 
Het model maximaliseert de opbrengsten uit landbouw voor beide gebieden, op basis 
van de hoeveelheid beschikbaar water en land. De uitkomsten suggereren dat de kos-





Uit de gevoeligheidsanalyse blijkt dat alleen als investeringen worden onderhouden 
er  een  kleine  kans  bestaat  dat  ‘watershed  development’  de  welvaart  vergroot  op 
stroomgebiedsniveau. Houden we echter rekening met het feit dat in de meeste wa-
terconservering investeringsgebieden de waarde van agrarische produktie veel lager 
is dan in het onderzochte gebied dan wordt de kans op een positief effect verwaar-
loosbaar klein.  
Aangezien ‘watershed development‘ projecten er meestal ook niet in slagen om de 
armoede te verlagen in het interventiegebied, lijkt het vanuit maatschappelijk oog-
punt niet wenselijk te investeren in bovenstroomse waterconservering indien dit de 
beschikbaarheid van water benedenstrooms verlaagt. ‘Watershed development’ pro-
jecten hebben echter ook vaak welvaartseffecten in termen van bodemconservering 
en verminderd overstromingsgevaar en verzilting benedenstrooms. Dergelijke effec-
ten zijn in de studie niet meegenomen, maar kunnen wel van invloed zijn op het uit-
eindelijke resultaat.  
De conclusie van het proefschrift is dat alhoewel onder bepaalde omstandigheden 
huishoudens vrijwillig zullen bijdragen aan het onderhoud van bodem-en watercon-
serveringsinvesteringen op de lange termijn, de prikkel voor het gemiddelde huis-
houden in het gemiddelde dorp in India’s semi-aride gebieden vrij klein wordt ge-
acht. Relatief gegoede huishoudens, met toegang tot irrigatie, een duidelijke stem in 
dorpsbesluitvorming en goeie kwaliteit land, die deel uitmaken van de meerderheids-
groep in een homogeen dorp, en die zijn gelegen in een gebied met weinig alternatie-
ve inkomstenbronnen maar voldoende regenval, zijn wellicht tot lange termijn vrij-
willige samenwerking bereid. Echter, de marginale huishoudens in aride gebieden 
die publieke investeringen in bodem-en waterconservering het meest nodig hebben 
zijn het minst geneigd deze te onderhouden op de lange termijn. Dit levert een inte-
ressante  paradox. Door interventies te richten op de meest marginale huishoudens 
neemt de duurzaamheid van de investeringen af, maar alleen als ‘watershed deve-
lopment’ erin slaagt de armoede te verlagen kunnen de baten van meer water boven-
strooms opwegen tegen het verlies aan water benedenstrooms. Indien huishoudens de 
investeringen niet onderhouden biedt dit echter geen structurele oplossing van het 
probleem, en een revisie van het ‘watershed development’ programma lijkt gewenst 
om de effectivietit te verbeteren op de lange termijn.  
De les met betrekking tot gemeenschapsgerichte project interventies is dat niet sim-
pelweg kan worden aangenomen dat huishoudens langdurig samenwerken in het be-
heer van een semi-publiek goed. Zelfs als de baten van samenwerking groot zijn is 
het niet gezegd dat dit samenwerking bevorderd op de lange termijn. Door interve-
nies te richten op homogene gemeenschappen en door aandacht te besteden aan con-
sensus-vorming, betrokkenheid en het versterken van strategische coalities van sa-
menwerkende huishoudens op gemeenschapsniveau kan de kans op lange termijn 
succes wel worden vergroot. Uiteindelijk hangt veel echter af van de context waar-
binnen gemeenschapsgerichte initiatieven plaatsvinden, en is externe ondersteuning 
in het beheer van de semi-publieke goederen in veel gevallen waarschijnlijk gewenst.           
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Annex A Summary overview of the empirical variables of 
chapters 4 and 5   
 
Variables from the LEAD household survey, IWMI (2004) 
a) Household investment in soil and water 
    conservation (SW) 
Dummy  variable,  1 =  household  has  invested  in 
soil and water conservation (question 20, Annex B)  
b) Household contribution to soil and water 
     conservation maintenance (OM) 
Dummy  variable,  1  =  household  is  planning  to 
continue contributing to conservation (question 48, 
Annex B) 
c) Maintenance fund   Dummy variable, 1 = existence of  a village SW 
maintenance fund (for material costs) 
d) Participant is member majority caste  Dummy variable, 1 = participant is member of the 
village’s majority caste group 
e) Village homogeneity   % of households belonging to the majority caste  
f) Number of household members   Number of household members 
g) Income per capita   Total household income in Indian Rs ‘000, divided 
by number of household members 
h) Average income village  Village average of g) 
i) Landholding per capita  Total ha of land owned by the household, divided 
by number of household members.  
j) Access to irrigation   Dummy variable, 1 = household has access to open 
well, tube well or canal irrigation 
k) Black soil  Dummy variable, 1 = household owns land with 
black soil 
l) Influence decision making   Dummy variable, 1 = household feels capable of 
influencing village decision–making (question 61, 
Annex B) 
 
Variables from the trust game experiment (see also Annex C) 
m) Amount sent by individual i (Si)  Actual amount sent by individual i to individual j  
(0–50 Indian Rs) 
n) Average amount sent  Village average of m) 
o) Share returned by individual j (Rj)  Share of amount received that is returned  (Rj/3Si) 
p) Average share returned in the village  Village average of o) 
q) Pre–game discussion  Dummy variable, 1 = pre–game discussions 
r) Participant is older than 50  Dummy variable  
s) Participant is between 20 and 50 years old  Dummy variable  
t) Dependency on agriculture 
 
Dummy variable, 1 = participant depends on non–
farm income 
u) Literate  Dummy variable, 1 = participant is literate 
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Annex B Selection of relevant parts of the household 
questionnaire 
Book 1: General Household characteristics 
1. Village name:_______________________ 
2. Name of hamlet: ______________________ 
3. Location in watershed (Upper, middle, lower): ___________________ 
  (0=lower, 1=middle, 2=upper) 
4. Treated / untreated: _____________________ (0=untreated, 1= treated) 
5. Household no.: ___________________________ 
6.  Respondent:_______________________ 
(1=husband, 2=wife, 3=son, 4=daughter, 5=other) 
Full name of respondent: ______________________ 
Sex of respondent: ____________________________ 
Age of respondent: ____________________________ 
Religion/Community/Caste:____________________       
 
13. Household characteristics: 
    NO  YES 
13.1  Does the household own any land?      
13.2  Does the household lease any land?      
13.3  Does the household own large ruminants?      
13.4  Does the household own small ruminants?     
13.5  Does the household own a tractor?      
13.6  Does the household own/share a tubewell?      
13.7  Does the household own/share an open well?      
13.8  Does the household have access to tank irrigation?      
13.9  Does the household own a bicycle?      
13.10  Does the household own a motorbike?     
13.11  Does the household own a radio?      
13.12  Does the household own a Television?     
13.13  Does the household have connections in the city?     





Book 2: Land use, ownership and investments in soil and water conservation 
 
20. Land use, ownership and investments in soil and water conservation 
  Plot 1  Plot 2  Plot 3  Plot 4 
Land areas (acres)         
Ownership status 
(1=owned, 2=leased in, 3=leased out, 4=other) 
       
Distance from homestead  
(specify units) 
       
Area irrigated (acres)         
Area irrigated with groundwater (acres)         
Area irrigated with nala water (acres)         
Area irrigated with tank water (acres)         
Area irrigated with purchased water (acres)         
Whether protective irrigation? (1=yes or 2=no)         
Topography  (1=steep  slopes,  2=moderate  slopes, 
3=slight slope, 4=flat) 
       
Soil type (1=red, 2=black, 3=other (specify))          
Soil fertility (1=good,2= medium,3= bad)         
Soil  erosion  (1=non-detectable,  2=slight/moderate, 
3=severe) 
       
Investments in SWC (0=none, 1=bunds, 2=gully plugs, 
3=farm  pond,  4=boulder  checks,  5=combination, 
6=other (specify))  
       
Investments  in  irrigation  systems  (0=none,  1=lift, 
2=hand pump, 3=tubewell, 4=drip, 5=other (specify)) 
       
Location near nala ? (1=yes/0=no)         
Location near check dam? (1=yes/0=no)         
Location near tank? (1=yes/0=no)         
Tenure arrangement if land leased in/out          
Rental share (%)   0=own land         
Tenure arrangement: 0=own land 1=share cropping 2=fixed rent after harvest 3=fixed 
rent before harvesting 4=mortgaged 5=other 
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Book 4: Household income 
36. Average household income over the different cropping seasons 
  Kharif  Rabi  Summer 
Average income from food crop production        
Average income from cash crop production        
Average income from livestock production       
Average income from wage labour in water-
shed 
     
Average  income  from  wage  labour  outside 
watershed 
     
Average income from migration       
How many days in a year do you migrate?       
How many days in a  year do other family 
members migrate? 
     
Average  income  from  other  sources  (spec-
ify)…………………… 
     
Need to purchase cereals for HH consump-
tion?0=no, 1=yes 
     
 
Book 5: Local Resource Management  
44. Has the household been actively involved in watershed rehabilitation?  
0=no 1=yes, member of VWC 2=yes, participation in meetings 3=yes, other means 4=yes, 
passively 
 
45. Have you, or members of your family, participated in the food for work program last 
year or received other drought assistance? If yes, what?  
0=No assistance 1=Food for work,less than 2 weeks 2=Food for work, more than two weeks 
3=fodder  for  livestock  4=food  for  household  5=water  tanker  6=combination  7=other 
_________specify  
 
46. How has the household contributed to soil and water conservation?  
0= none 1=voluntary labour 2=private investments on own land 3=contribution to overall 
costs (cash or kind) 4=plantation on own land 5=changed cropping pattern 6=changed live-
stock production 7=other ____________(specify) 
 
47. How much have you approximately contributed over the last 5 years? 





48. How are you planning to continue contributing to soil and water conservation?  
0=not 1=don’t know 2=use less water 3=more stall feeding 4=OandM of SandW on own 
land 5=contribute in cash/kind to OandM of SandW on common land 6=OandM of check 
dams  and  water  tanks  7=contribute  to  watchmen  costs  8=combination 
9=other_______________ (specify) 
 
49. What constraints do you face in contributing to soil and water conservation?  
0=no constraints 1=don’t know 2=others contribute less 3=effect unclear 4=labour costs 
are high 5=lack of organization 6=other ____________(specify)  
 
50. To which extent do you consider yourself interested in the rehabilitation of the water-
shed?  
1=not interested at all 2. not very interested 3. somewhat interested 4. fairly interested 5. 
very interested  
 
51. To which extent do you consider the current state of common lands (pasture, forest, 
waste lands) in the watershed degraded?  
1= very degraded 2= fairly degraded 3= somewhat degraded 4= not very degraded 5= not 
degraded at all  
 
52. What do you think are the main reasons for the degradation of common and grazing 
lands?  
0=not degraded 1=overgrazing 2=deforestation 3=overpopulation 4=destruction by some 
people 5=negligence by the government, 6=Conflicts in the community, 7= lack of rules and 
regulations 8=other  
 
53. What needs to be done to reduce degradation?  
0=don’t know 1=reduce no. of livestock 2=new rules and regulations 3=fencing 4=higher 
penalties for breaking rules 5=more watchmen 6=reforestation/ban grazing 7=other 
 
54. To which extent do you think water stocks in the watershed are being depleted?  
1=almost  depleted  2=considerable  depletion  3=seasonal  depletion  4=irregular  scarcity 
problems 5=not problems with water availability at all 
 
55. What do you think are the main reasons for the depletion of water resources in the water-
shed?  
0=No  depletion  1=too  many  bore  wells  2=natural  reasons  like  bad  monsoon 
3=overpopulation 4=over use by some people 5=negligence by the government, 6= conflicts 
in the community, 7=lack of water storage and conservation 8= other (specify)        
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56. What needs to be done to reduce water resource depletion?  
0=don’t know 1=increased water storage and conservation 2=rules and regulations 3= ban 
on bore wells 4=ban on certain crops 5= reforestation 6=other (specify) 
 
57. Household benefits of watershed rehabilitation  
Main benefit from watershed rehabilitation   
Secondary benefit from watershed rehabilitation   
0= no benefit 1= employment 2= water in tubewell 3= water in open well 4= soil moisture 
5=better availability of drinking water 6= biomass/fodder 7= less soil erosion 8=other  
 
58. Has everybody benefited equally from watershed rehabilitation, or have some benefited 
more?  
0= don’t know 1= others benefited more 2= others benefited less 3= everybody benefited 
equally 4= other (specify)  
 
59. Who gained most benefits from watershed rehabilitation?  
0=everybody gained equally 1=landowners near nala 2= landowners down stream 3= land-
owners  with  tubewell/open  well  4=  livestock  producers  5=  wage  labourers  6=  others 
________________(specify) 
 
60. Do you regularly attend meetings of the local panchayat, watershed committee or other 
village organizations?  
0=no 1= yes, the panchayat 2= yes, water user organization 3= yes, watershed committee 
4= yes, joint forestry committee 5= yes, other _____________(specify)  
 
61. To which extent can you influence the decisions made?  
0=not at all 1=sometimes, depends on issue 3=I can influence decision making 4=other 
________________(specify) 
  
62. To what extent do you feel the village representatives (sarpanch, watershed committee, 
water users etc) are working in your interest?  
0=don’t know, 1=not at all, 2=to a certain extent, 3=in most cases, yes, 4= yes, they are im-
proving the welfare of all  
 
Any remarks with regard to the questionnaire/any other information that might be useful but 
that has not been asked?  
Thank you very much for participating in this questionnaire, and once we have analyzed 
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Annex C Protocol of the field experiments  
 
Day 1: Instruction day 
Welcome to all of you.  Today we will give instructions about a game you will play 
tomorrow.  In the game you may earn some money.  There are no winners and losers 
in the game, but how much you earn will depend on how you play the game.  Today, 
you will not earn any money.  However, only the people that attend the full session 
today are allowed to play for real money tomorrow.  The objective of the game is 
purely research and the money for the game comes from Europe, from a Dutch uni-
versity.  Seva Mandir/WOTR has no role in this event, they are only facilitating. 
Before I explain the game to you, I would like to introduce the research team.  My 
name is Jetske Bouma.  I come from Holland and I work at the International Water 
Management Institute in Hyderabad.  My translator you all know, his name is Prad-
humn Jagtap and he has been doing research for me in this area for the last 3 months.  
My other two assistants are Bhim Raj Suthar and Srinivas Rao.  They also form part 
of the research team, and are based in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. 
Now I would like to explain the game to you.  Tomorrow, this group will be divided 
into two groups.  In the one group, everybody will be assigned the role of PLAYER 
1 in the other group everybody will be assigned the role of PLAYER 2.  You will 
play the game with somebody from the other group.  So, if you are assigned the role 
of PLAYER 1 you will play with somebody in the other group who has been as-
signed the role of PLAYER 2.  If you are PLAYER 2, you will play the game with 
somebody in the other group who has been assigned the role of PLAYER 1.  To 
make sure you do not know with whom you play the game, the person you play the 
game with will be in another room.  So tomorrow, one group will stay in this hall, 
another group will go to another room.  You will not learn who the person is with 
whom you play the game and the other person will not learn your identity either.  
Nobody will know with whom you play the game.  
To both players we give Rs 50.  Now suppose you are assigned the role of PLAYER 
1.  That means you have to start the game and decide how much of the Rs 50 you 
send to the person in the other room.  All the money you send to the person in the 
other room, we will triple.  All the money you keep is for yourself.  So, if you send 





If you send Rs 20, the person in the other group receives Rs 60, and you keep Rs 30  
If you send Rs 30, the person in the other group receives Rs 90, and you keep Rs 20  
If you send Rs 40, the person in the other group receives Rs 120, and you keep Rs 10  
If you send Rs 50, the person in the other group receives Rs 150, and you keep Rs 0  
You also have the option to send nothing and keep the Rs 50 to yourself.  The person 
in the other group then receives nothing.  (all on the blackboard) 
Now, the second part of the game starts.  Suppose you are PLAYER 2.  That means 
you receive money that has been sent to you by somebody in the other group.  You 
have to decide how much of this money you want to send back to PLAYER 1.   
Suppose Player 1 has sent you 10 Rs.  That amount is tripled, and so you receive Rs 
30.  Of these Rs 30 you can send back 0, 10, 20 or 30 Rs.   
Suppose Player 1 has sent you 20 RS.  That means that you receive Rs 60.  Of these 
RS 60 you can send back 0,10,20…60 Rs.   
Suppose Player 1 has sent you 30 Rs.  That means that you receive Rs 90.  Of these 
Rs 90 you can send back 0, 10, 20….90 Rs. 
Suppose PLAYER 1 has sent you 40 Rs.  That means you receive Rs 120.  Of these 
Rs 120 you can send back 0, 10, 20…120 Rs. 
Suppose PLAYER 1 has sent you 50 Rs.  That means that you receive Rs 150.  Of 
these Rs 150, you can send back 0, 10,20….150 Rs. 
PLAYER 1 can also decide to send you nothing, which means you cannot send any-
thing back.  
Your total earnings if you are assigned the role of PLAYER 1 then equals the amount 
of money you started out with (Rs 50), minus the amount of money you decided to 
send to PLAYER 2, plus the amount of money PLAYER 2 decided to send back to 
you.  
Your total earnings if your are assigned the role of PLAYER 2 equals the amount 
you started out with (Rs 50), plus the amount of money you received from PLAYER 
1, minus the amount of money you decided to send to PLAYER 1.  
If PLAYER 1 sends nothing, PLAYER 2 is not able to send anything back, so from 
the game both players earn Rs 50.  
If PLAYER 1 sends 10 Rs and PLAYER 2 sends Rs 10 back, PLAYER 1 earns Rs 
50 and PLAYER 2 Rs 70 ETC. (all on the blackboard)        
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To make sure you understand the game, we will now show with paper money how 
the game is played.   
 (On one side of the room PLAYER 1 and on the other side of the room PLAYER 2.  
Both receive an envelope, PLAYER 1 a colored envelope, PLAYER 2 a brown enve-
lope.  Both players show there is Rs 50 inside.  PLAYER 1 takes money from the 
colored envelope and gives the rest to the experimenter.  The experimenter walks to 
the middle, takes it out of the envelope, triples it and puts it in a different envelope.  
This envelope he brings to PLAYER 2.  PLAYER 2 opens the envelope and takes 
out what he wants to keep for himself.  The experimenter collects the colored enve-
lope with the remaining money.  The experimenter takes it out of the envelope, puts 
it  in  the  original  envelope  and  gives  it  back  to  PLAYER  1.    PLAYER  1  and 
PLAYER 2 now both show how much money they have).  REPEAT 6 times for the 
options PLAYER 1 has (0,10,20,30,40,50)  
Tomorrow we will test each of you individually to see whether you understand the 
game.  Only if you understand the game are you allowed to play.  If you have any 
doubts, please clear them now.  
This is the end of the instruction  day.  Tomorrow we will play for real  money.  
Please come your self and come on time.  If you don’t come yourself, the person you 
sent will not be allowed to play the game.  Only if you come yourself and if you are 
on time, are you allowed to play the game.  
Day 2: Implementation of the game 
WELCOME to all of you.  Today we will play the game.  We would like you to take 
the game seriously and we would like to ask you not to talk to other participants dur-
ing the entire event.  Today we will play for real money.  You might earn a substan-
tial amount of money, but it is also possible that you do not.  There are no winners 
and losers in this game but how much you earn, will depend on how you play the 
game.  To make sure none of you goes home empty handed, we will give each one of 
you Rs 50 at the end of the game.  This is additional to what you earn in the game.  
However, if during the game you talk to other participants or do not follow the rules 
in any other way, we will not pay the Rs 50 at the end.   
To you refresh your memory, I will now recapture the instructions we gave yester-
day.  This group will be divided into two groups.  Some of you will stay in this room, 
some of you will go to another room.  The game you play will be with somebody 
from the other group (in the other room).  You will not learn whom the other person 
is with whom you play the game, and neither will the other person know that he/she 
has played the game with you.  
All participants, no matter what role they play, receive Rs 50.If you are assigned the 
role of PLAYER 1, you start the game by deciding how much money you send to 





You leave the amount that you want to send to PLAYER 2 in the coloured envelope, 
and you take out the amount you want to keep yourself.  We collect the envelope and 
triple the money we find inside.  This amount we give to PLAYER 2.  If you are as-
signed the role of PLAYER 2, you now receive the coloured envelope; with inside 
the money somebody has sent you from the other room.  You take out of the col-
oured envelope the money you want to keep.  The money you leave inside the col-
oured envelope will go back to PLAYER 1.  We collect the envelope and bring it 
back to PLAYER 1.  
Now I would like you to come forward and pick a piece of carton from this box.  It is 
either marked orange or green.  My assistants will ask you to show the carton to 
them, so that they can register it.  Please do not show to the other participants what 
number or letter you have.  Those of you with a letter on the carton will form the red 
group, those of you with a number are the green group.  The people who draw an or-
ange card will stay here, those who draw a green card will go to another room.  Are 
there any questions or doubts? If not, I would like to ask you one by one to come 
forward and draw a carton.   
Instructions 1: Orange (Green) group 
Welcome to the orange (Green) group.  I am the facilitator of this group and I request 
you to follow my instructions.  Please do not communicate during the game.  Any-
body who does communicate during the game will be punished by not receiving Rs 
50 at the end.   
First, we want you to pick a carton from this box (orange (green) box 1).  On the car-
ton there is a letter (number).  We will ask you to show us this letter (number), so 
that we can register it.  Please don’t show your letter (number) to any of the other 
participants: it is your personal letter (number).   
Now, all the orange (green) people have been assigned to play the role of PLAYER 
1.  We will again explain to you what this means.  We will give you two envelopes.  
One envelope is brown and unmarked.  It is empty and you can use it for the money 
you want to keep for yourself.  So, all money that you put in the brown envelope you 
keep for certain.  The second envelope is orange (green) and is marked with a letter 
(number).  The mark on the envelope matches with your personal letter (number) on 
the carton.  When we give you the orange (green) envelope, please check if it has 
your personal letter (number) or not.   
The orange (green) envelope contains Rs 50 and this is the money you may send to 
PLAYER 2.  Any amount you decide to send to PLAYER 2 we will triple.  So, 
If you leave Rs 10 in the orange(green) envelope, PLAYER 2 will receive Rs 30, and 
you keep Rs 40.          
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If you leave Rs 20 in the orange(green) envelope, PLAYER 2 will receive Rs 60, and 
you keep Rs 30. 
If you leave Rs 30 in the orange(green) envelope, PLAYER 2 will receive Rs 90, and 
you keep Rs 20. 
If you leave Rs 40 in the orange(green) envelope, PLAYER 2 will receive Rs 120 
and you keep Rs 10. 
If you sent Rs 50 in the orange(green) envelope, PLAYER 2 will receive Rs 150, and 
you keep Rs 0. 
If you decide to send nothing, PLAYER 2 receives nothing and cannot send anything 
back.   
PLAYER 2 might decide to send money back to you.  The money you earn at the end 
of the game is the money you have kept to yourself plus the money PLAYER 2 has 
sent back to you.   
For example, if you send Rs 10 and PLAYER 2 sends back Rs 20, you earn Rs 40 + 
Rs 20= Rs 60. 
For example, if you send Rs 40 and PLAYER 2 sends back Rs 60 you earn Rs 10 + 
Rs 60 = Rs 70. 
For example, if you send Rs 40 and PLAYER 2 sends back nothing you earn Rs 10 + 
Rs 0 = Rs 10. 
As promised, we add Rs 50 to the amount of money you earn in the game IF you do 
not talk to other participants during the event.   
We will now ask you one by one to come forward and draw a carton from the orange 
(green) box.  Show us the carton and check if the orange (green) envelope we give 
you has the same letter (number) on it.  Then, take out of the orange (green) envelope 
the money you want to keep for yourself.  This money you put in the brown enve-
lope, your personal ‘wallet’.  Don’t show others the money you have in the brown 
envelope, this is your personal money.  The money you leave in the orange (green) 
envelope will be tripled by us and sent to the person in the other group.  If you are 
done, give the closed orange (green) envelope to my assistant. Before we start the 
game, my assistant and me will ask each of you individually a few questions to check 
your understanding of the game.  Only if you understand the game you will be al-
lowed to participate.  Before my assistant and me check your understanding, are 
there any questions?  
Then I would like you to come forward one by one so that we can ask you some 





 If, out of the Rs 50 in the orange (green) envelope you decide to send Rs30 to 
PLAYER 2, how much do you have left yourself [Answer: Rs 20] 
•  If you sent Rs 30 to PLAYER 2, how much does PLAYER 2 receive? [Answer: 
Rs 90} 
•  If PLAYER 2 receives Rs 90, what is the maximum amount of money he/she can 
send back to you? And what is the minimum amount? [Rs90, or Rs0] 
•  Suppose that you sent PLAYER 2 Rs 30 and that PLAYER 2 decides to send Rs 
50 back to you.  What are your total earnings? [You: Rs 20 + Rs 50 = Rs 70]. 
Now, we will start the game.  If you have any questions during the game, please raise 
your hand and we will come to you.  Are there any questions now?  If not, let us start 
the game.   
Instructions 2: Orange (green) group  
So, we have now completed the first part of the game.  In fact, the participants in the 
other room also played the role of PLAYER 1.  That means that now you will play 
the role of PLAYER 2. 
As PLAYER 2 you will receive a green (orange) envelope from somebody in the 
other group.  In this envelope you will find the money somebody from the other 
group has sent you.  You have to decide how much of this money you want to send 
back to that person in the other group.  The money you take out of the green (orange) 
envelope you keep for yourself.  The money you leave in the green (orange) enve-
lope will go back to the person who sent you the money from the other group.   
To decide which envelope you receive, we will ask you to pick a carton from this 
box (orange (green) box 2).  On this carton a number (letter) is written.  This number 
(letter) belongs to somebody in the other group.  The money you receive will be from 
that person.  Any amount you decide to send back, will go to the same person in the 
other group.  This will most probably not be the same person you sent money to in 
the first part of this game: it will be a different person.   
Now, we will ask you one by one to come forward and pick a piece of carton from 
the box.  You have to give this carton to us and we will give you the corresponding 
envelope.    Please  open the  green  (orange)  envelope  and  take  out  the  amount  of 
money that you wish to keep for yourself.  This money you put in your own brown 
envelope.  The money you want to send back you leave in the green (orange) enve-
lope.  If you are finished, give the closed green (orange) envelope back to my assis-
tant.   
We will give the green (orange) envelope back to the person to whom it belongs in 
the other group.  At the same time, we collect the orange (green) envelopes you sent,        
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from the persons who received it in the other group.  We then give you back your 
own orange (green) envelope.  The money you find inside is yours.   
Are there any questions?  If not, let us continue with the game.   
Instructions 3  
The game is now finished and the money you hold is yours.  Please do not tell other 
people how much money you have earned, this is personal information you should 
keep to yourself. 
Thank you! 